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Abstract
Adarkwah Yaw Antwi
The existing body of knowledge attributes to informal land transactions in sub-Saharan
African cities observed problems in city neighbourhoods. However, the dearth of
empirically insightful studies of how this eventuates continues to leave a vacuum in terms
of practical solutions. But it is commonly held that bureaucratic intervention offers a way
out. Substantial resources, often backed by donor agencies, are therefore being spent in
revamping bureaux and governmental bodies in a bid to solving the problems.
This thesis sets as its central aim to identify and establish the costs to agents of the real
causes of the problems. It also aims to assess the economic impact of formal policy
measures on agents and recommends feasible approaches to market regulations. To
address the objectives insights from property rights, transactions costs and public choice
economics are brought to bear. Based on a survey of market participants of sampled
informal neighbourhoods in Accra, the capital city of Ghana, it employs regression and
discriminant analyses to analyse the data generated. In the process helpful insights are
gained. It has been possible to put some figures to the extent of costs that lead agents to
operate in ways that eventually translate into the problems commonly witnessed. The
study finds that actual costs to market participants of government activities are too high to
be of any benefit. These costs mainly derive from rent-seeking behaviour which
extensive bureaucratic intervention of transactions in urban residential lands bring about.
On the basis of the results of the regression analysis, arguments implying inefficiency of
informal land markets, specifically relating to the arbitrary nature of prices, are refuted.
The futility of the use of compulsory purchase powers to create residential
neighbourhoods also emerges from the results of the discriminant analysis. Similarly,
efficiency' enhancing bureaucratic interventions in the informal market lead to the
diversion of real resources into wasteful rent-seeking expenditures. The sum of these
wasteful diversions of resources explains a great deal of the haphazard developments
that have come to characterise many neighbourhoods of cities in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Market led regulation emerges as the needed focus of future land policy and
management strategy. But to work the study calls for the removal of unwarranted market
interventions extant at the present moment and the reorganisation of bureaux to be
responsible in ways that would induce them to operate efficiently.
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Chapter 1:	 Introduction
1.0. The Problems of Access to Urban Land
The issue of stimulating economic development in sub-Sahara Africa (henceforth
SSA) has engaged the attention of bodies like the International Monetary Fund and
the World Bank in recent times. The past two decades, for example, have witnessed
the introduction of economic adjustment programmes to re-structure SSA economies
and allow efficient utilisation of private capital, leaving central government resources
available to finance areas like education and health. In practice, this has implied
fiscal restructuring and the reorganisation of the relationship between government
and economic agents aimed at attracting capital from the private sector to underpin
economic development.
Against this backdrop the question about access to and/or ownership of land and
their impacts on fostering economic development has attained a pivotal stage,
especially in the urban areas. Land provides the spatial dimension of economic
activities. It also provides the space for housing urban residents. In developing
economies it provides a more attractive form of investment because alternative
investment vehicles are few and subject to great risks. Therefore the mechanisms
through which land is allocated between competing and, often, conflicting claims go
a long way to determining the achievement of economic success. Particularly in
urban areas the concentration of human activities in relatively limited space calls for
a need for systems that balance all the land needs of all aspects of the society.
When these systems do not exist, one witnesses imbalances and allocative
problems of land resources. Such imbalances are being observed in the functioning
of cities of many countries of the developing world. In SSA, urban settlements are
dominated by problems of unauthorised developments, lack of infrastructure, poor
sanitation, health hazards, fire hazard, crime, and generally appalling neighbourhood
conditions. At the same time low-density high standard neighbourhoods are
observed. Urbanisation as a concept here is therefore synonymous with the co-
existence of shanty towns depicting, squalor, fire hazards and disease on the one
hand, and estates of high value residences on the other hand: often separated from
each other by just the width of a highway.
In some parts of the developing world this problem has been attributed to invasion
and other illegal occupation of urban fringe land. In Lima, Peru, for example, De
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Soto (1989) finds land invasion and illegal occupation as the route to the creation of
squatter settlement and shanty towns. This is a result of concentration of urban land
in the hands of few landlords or central government and the slow moving
government bureaucracies. In SSA the position is different (see chapter 2).
Konadu-Agymang (1991) and van Western (1990), to cite two studies, assure us that
there is no such thing as squatter settlements, in the technical sense of illegal
occupation of land. Behind neighbourhoods plagued by sub-standard housing, fire
hazards and haphazard developments lie voluntary exchange of interests in land.
But elaborate governmental provisions, ranging from prescriptions of tradable
interests in land, to absolute prohibition of these voluntary exchanges, render these
transactions illegal (Chapter 2 elaborates on this). This difference in the central
cause of the problem is important for it determines which policy options are likely to
produce desirable results. While in the Latin American scenario, solutions may lie in
finding equitable means of releasing government held urban lands and/or some form
of intervention that will provide incentives for large landowners to dispose of lands, in
the SSA scenario, it might involve removing the prohibitions, prescriptions and the
burgeoning bureaucracies to allow smooth operation of exchanges. To identify
correctly which prohibitions and bureaucracies to remove or alter, however, calls for
detailed understanding of how the exchanges described are effected and what
exactly lies behind the observed problems. Such understanding, at the moment,
simply does not exist.
In SSA, land allocative failures have been blamed on the existence of customary
tenurial systems. Typically they are said to be inefficient, do not allow private
ownership of interests in land, do not permit modern management of land, in short,
are not amenable to coping with the demands of modern sophisticated economies.
This is odd considering that many other economic activities of agents involved in
these transactions - informal sector participants - have been found to be relatively
efficient (Becker, 1994; p. 15). However, very little has actually been recorded about
how these informal exchanges of interests in land work. The need for empirically
based studies that explain the decision processes of the parties involved is clear. It
is towards providing some of this knowledge that this study is undertaken. It
investigates traditional customary exchanges of interests in land which has been
estimated to be behind some 87% (Larbi, 1996; p. 213) of neighbourhoods in Accra,
Ghana and provides insights that can be generalised across SSA.
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1. 1. The Problem in Urban Ghana
The urban land and housing problem is that of a fundamental economic nature
compounded by the complex, uneasy interrelationship of formal and informal
institutional framework of land ownership which determines and rectifies accessibility
to urban residential land. There are a series of issues that require to be addressed.
Issues pertaining to the 'right' land market regulative regime, the strategy of land
policy implementation, security of title to land and the means by which these are to
be achieved, are only some examples from the land market perspective. There are
macro economic issues as well, ranging from increasing the productivity of urban
land, attracting private investment funds into urban housing, achieving an equitable
and efficient distribution of land resources, creating an environment that enables
capital locked up in land to be easily traded and improving economic performance of
the city and country at large.
In the Ghanaian urban land market, a few studies, Acquaye and Associates (1989),
Asiama (1984), Brobby (1992), have focused on discussing the origins and suitability
of the laws relating to land delivery and generally recommend the introduction of
further (presumably better) legislation. Central Government response to these
studies is reflected in the number of laws, legislative instruments and the number of
institutions and bodies set up to regulate the land market. Even basic land market
data compilation functions such as the recording and dissemination of land ownership
information have been operated in a manner to have the practical effect of market
intervention. The combined effects of such regulation on urban land markets are now
emerging. For example, in a study of effects of urban land policies on delivery of
developable land, Larbi (1994; p. 14) observes;
"state intervention in proprietary rights in land in Ghana is far deeper, presents
more complex problems in the development process and has far more
reaching consequences than is usually envisaged".
But despite decades of such intervention one still observes many problems that result
from households' access to urban land; title security, apparently unclear property
rights in land and haphazard development of land among them.
Studies that attempt to answer the question whether traditional institutions of land
ownership, in their current state or developed further, can support advanced market
economies (e. g Larbi, 1994) are emerging. Yet other studies demonstrate, with
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evidence from the traditional land markets, the flexibility of these institutions in
adapting to socio-economic circumstances of the population and suggest they
should be incorporated in formal land management structures (Antwi 1995, Larbi,
1994, Kasanga eta!, 1996). But empirically based studies that seek insights on the
economics of the problem are notably absent. Indeed, as mentioned above,
although nearly 87% of Accra's neighbourhoods are created through these informal
transactions, little attention has been focused on the economic forces behind them.
This is surprising given the substantial effort devoted to official bureaucracies to
handle land registration, administration of traditional lands and legal dimensions of
urban land. The present study aims at contributing to addressing this imbalance.
1.2. The Study
The main proposition of this study is that, allowed to operate in appropriate settings,
the informal customary land allocative mechanism offers the most optimum and
equitable route to achieving efficient allocation of land resources in Ghana and SSA
in general. Land aspects of urban problems in SSA can be solved only after
bureaucratic obstacles of accessibility to urban land has been removed.
The research has been occasioned by calls for regulatory bodies and government
intervention based on flawed arguments. For example, as Larbi (1994) has rightly
observed, there is a notion popular in Ghana that customary land ownership forms
and tenure systems are the cause of access to urban land problems that eventually
translate into urban housing problems. Yet besides inability to substantiate with any
credible empirical evidence, the reasoning behind some of the arguments on which
the notion is based is niisconceived. About the traditional land market in Ghana, for
example, Asiama (1990) writes:
"In the traditional sector, acquisition of land for housing, and for any other
purpose is controlled by the traditional authorities. Frequently, they determine
who is to receive land grants, how much is to be charged for the land, and how
much land is to be offered for sale. The choice of recipients of land grants may
not only depend upon a person's ability to pay the purchase price but also on his
social and political influence in the society. Land prices are high and are often
not directly determined by purely market conditions ..................... (Asiama,
1990, p. 243)
It is difficult, if not impossible, to imagine conditions under which the state of affairs
so described would eventuate. Elementary economics informs us that even if lands
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in a given urban area, say Accra, are supplied by one traditional owner -- a
monopolist - he/she can do one of two things but not both. He/she can either
choose the price at which to sell plots while purchasers determine the quantity of
plots they buy at the given price, or he/she can determine the number of plots
released to the market and take the price which competing purchasers bid for the
plots (see Chapter 6 for an exposition on the operations of monopolists). It is
impossible, even for monopolists, to control price, quantity, and purchasers as
described! In the presence of more than one supplier, which is the reality one
confronts in the cities, the ability of these landowners to control the market is further
curtailed. Thus unless the acquisition of land in urban Ghana does not follow basic
laws of economics, one finds it impossible to agree with the arguments. Indeed just
because one observes what one considers as high land prices or imperfections in a
particular market does not in itself warrant a call for government intervention of any
form. The principal economic forces at play need to be ascertained in order to be
sure that intervention could produce better outcomes. The motivation of this
research derives from the need to address such misconceptions. Consequently the
study attempts to address the need for economic insights of transactions in
traditional customary lands and lay bear the main causes of observed spatial
problems in cities of SSA.
1. 2. 1. Focus of The Study
The main focus of the work is an attempt to design and calibrate quantitative
indicators of urban unrecorded land transactions. It attempts to extend, to the
unrecorded land sector, studies that have attempted quantitative inquiries into the
formal land sector (Asabere, 1981a & b; Asabere et a!., 1982). By providing a
systematically designed empirical dimension to studies that find evidence that the
unrecorded sector operates in economically predictable ways ( e.g. Larbi, 1994 and
Kasanga eta!, 1996), it builds on and extends the understanding of the workings of
the market. Questions like who is selling what land, who is buying, at what prices,
why those transactions are not formally recorded, and does government intervention
have any chance of improving the situation, therefore engage the attention of the
study. In more specific terms, the study addresses the issue of transaction costs,
particularly to the extent that these are imposed on agents by government
intervention, and provides explanations to observed inefficiencies and problems
emanating from them. Thus the main aims and objectives of the research are as set
out below.
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1. 2. 2. Aims and Objectives
The essence of this study is to provide a better understanding of how the unrecorded
land allocative mechanism of Accra operates. This is to be achieved through an
investigation of the agents involved. Some specific objectives towards achieving the
aim are:
1. To demonstrate the fundamental flaws of the basis of current institutional
framework and strategy of formal land administration.
2. Attempt a calibration of quantitative indicators of main drivers of the unrecorded
urban land market.
3. Provide an assessment of economic impact of formal policy measures on agents.
4. Establish the extent to which transactions in the urban land market reflect
economic relationships between landowners and land users rather than social,
tribal or ethnic relationships.
5. Investigate the important factors behind household residential land purchasing
decisions.
6. Recommend a feasible approach to regulation of the market.
1. 2. 3. Importance of the Study
The study is important in that it will inform policy makers and donor agencies in SSA
of the appropriate regulatory systems that would lead to a recorded urban land
market. Also an understanding of the market that brings traditional land suppliers
and purchasers together should provide those concerned in the provision of social
housing and other equity oriented ventures the information for selecting feasible
approaches in achieving the goals. To city planners such an understanding of the
economic realities facing those they are regulating is needed in order to design
physical planning programmes that stand any chance of succeeding. And, above all,
an understanding of reasons behind the persistent irreconcilable calls for further
government intervention, at the same time that complaints of inadequately resourced
bureaucracies are being made, should convince those not yet convinced that
approaching the urban problems in a much more market oriented way may not
provide perfect outcomes but appears to be the best among all the imperfect options
available.
1. 2. 4. Scope and Choice of Research Study
While the study attempts to draw general guiding principles for efficient and
economically sustainable urban land management strategy in SSA, it focuses on
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Ghana and relies on evidence from the capital city, Accra. Primary data generated
from surveys conducted in the city provides the main empirical basis of the study.
The choice of Accra as a case study has been predicated by the following reasons:
(1) Accra typifies SSA cities with affluent, low-density, planned neighbourhoods
abutting slum and unplanned neighbourhoods. (2) Unlike many of the cities in the
sub-region, informal customary transactions in land are not illegal ab initio.
However, regulations and constitutional stipulations render them illegal for all
practical transaction purposes putting them in the same position as in many of the
cities where transactions are explicitly illegal. (3) Two years working experience in
the Lands Commission Secretariat in Accra exposed fundamental weaknesses in the
Ghana Government's attempts to regulate the traditional land market. The
information so acquired encouraged a broader and more systematic investigation of
the issue. Naturally this could be effectively undertaken with Accra as the focus.
1.3. Definitions
In the study, use is made of the concept of Stool and Family lands. These equate to
customary or traditional lands. Stools (Skins among some tribes in the North of
Ghana) represent the traditional political authority in which is vested all lands owned
by subjects owing allegiance to the Stool. In Accra certain extended families
(Families) equate to Stools in that lands are vested in the family not a Stool. The
origins and how these traditional concepts operate are widely discussed. Chapter 2
provides a summary of some of these studies.
Title registration is used to refer to either or both of the two formal land ownership
documentation systems operating in Ghana. These are (1) the deeds registration
system by the Deeds Registry which incorporates documentation of deeds through
the Lands Commission and, (2) the land title registration system by the Land Title
Registry which is compulsory in Accra and, in principle, certifies and guarantees title
to land.
Land markets and property markets are used interchangeably and loosely to refer to
the market for bare land as well as the market for land with structures or a fully
completed house on it.
SSA is defined to comprise all the countries in Africa south of the Sahara desert -
thus excluding the Islamic countries to the north -- but excludes South Africa to the
south. This definition roughly equates to that of Tropical Africa adopted in O'Connor
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(1991) and comprises the countries in between, from Mauritania in the north-west to
Mozambique in the south-east. These countries have much more in common and at
least some generalisations can be made that apply to them all (O'Connor 1991; p.2).
1. 4. Structure of The Thesis
As has been explained above some misconceptions form the basis on which certain
policy options have been called for and indeed implemented. Specifically,
misconceptions on what constitutes the best land tenurial structure, property rights
transacted in the market, determinants of prices, players in the market, and, most
important, the mechanics of government intervention to supplant markets are being
touted in some academic work. The central aim of providing a fuller understanding
of the workings of the market could not therefore be adequately fulfilled without
clarifying these concepts. The structure of the thesis is therefore designed to deal
with these misconceptions and provide a context for the empirical tests. The chapter
breakdown is as follows:
Following from the current chapter, Chapter 2 reviews the literature on urban land
markets in SSA. It summarises the literature on the general problems of
urbanisation in the sub region. A critical examination of theories and evidence
presented by existing work on SSA urban land allocation systems is then
undertaken. A critique from which broad research questions are framed concludes
the chapter.
Chapter 3 presents the research approach and design. Data characteristics,
sampling method and background information of the survey undertaken are
presented. An explanation of techniques employed in analysing the data is provided.
The chapter concludes with some comments on methodology to provide the limits
and context of findings of the study.
Chapter 4 examines the theory of property rights, It enters into a discussion of the
economic forces driving the attainment of efficient property rights. The discussion is
then applied to government intervention in land markets in the guise of land
administration. This opens up the broader question of government intervention in
markets. Chapter 5 addresses this question.
Chapter 5 starts the discussion with an explanation of the concept of the market and
conditions under which markets thrive. Limiting conditions of markets that present
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governments with the excuse to intervene are discussed and related to land markets
in SSA. It is argued that often such government interventions create monopolies
leading to resource waste. An understanding of how this eventuates is therefore
necessary and provided in Chapter 6.
The discussion in Chapter 6 brings to bear insights from the concept of rent-seeking
to explain and identify the sources and main causes of resource waste that are
brought about by bureaucratic intervention in markets. These insights are then
applied to formal land management in Accra. Insights developed through the various
chapters up to this stage set the scene for a discussion of the empirical analysis.
Chapter 7 presents the first part of the empirical analysis. This is achieved through
an explanation of the background of some computations applied to the results of the
survey. A test of four of the five main hypotheses of the study (stated in Chapter 2)
is then provided leaving the fifth to be pursued in Chapter 8.
Multivariate analysis of the data to test the fifth hypothesis is the subject of Chapter
8. Multiple regression and discriminant analyses are employed here to gain insights
into which variables account for changes in price levels in the unrecorded land
market of Accra and investigate the market on other aspects of transactions beyond
price.
Chapter 9 presents the conclusions of the research. It begins with useful theoretical
insights that explain the prevalence of land market interventions. A discussion of
specific findings of the empirical survey is undertaken to support the main
conclusions. From these policy recommendations are offered. The Chapter
concludes by highlighting limitations of the study and suggesting areas that further
research is needed.
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Chapter 2: Urban Land Markets In Sub-Saharan Africa: A
Review
2. 0. Introduction
Urbanisation is presenting a problem in SSA. The concentration of human population and
firms in constrained geographical space demands mechanisms to ensure high levels of
employment, efficient utilisation and management of land and other resources, and
achievement of social order. Urban areas are, therefore, potentially more likely than rural
areas to have high levels of unemployment and associated poverty problems. When
these exist their effects are felt in the spatial geography of the urban environment. This
chapter examines the literature on the spatial dimensions of SSA urbanisation . The
chapter is organised in three broad sections. Section 2. 1 summarises the literature on
the general problems of urbanisation in the SSA. Section 2. 2 focuses on theory
presented by existing work on SSA urban land allocation systems and examines the
evidence more critically. A critique from which broad research questions are framed is
undertaken in section 2. 4.
2. 1. The Problems of Urbanisation
The difficult aspect of urbanisation and its problems in SSA is that very little is
actually known and understood of the phenomena It is now beyond dispute that a
very substantial part of the urban economy operates in unrecorded environments -
the so called informal sector -- on which practically no statistics exist (Mabogunje,
1990a; pp. 121-22; Doebele, 1994; p. 52; Wekwete, 1994; p. 17; Stren, 1992). The
quest to understanding the process has also not been helped by the lack of any
interaction between researchers from the Anglophonic (former British colonies) and
Francophonic (former French colonies) countries. Some (Amis, 1990; p. 5) consider
this as a deplorable factor that has prevented a fuller understanding.
The following though are clear. First, there is rapid growth of urbanisation in SSA.
The problem with this is that this rapid rate of urban growth appears to exceed the
capacity of the countries to cope (Devas and Rakodi, 1993; p. 6). Compared to
other parts of the world, Africa still contains many of the least urbanised nations
(United Nations, 1988: p. 176; Becker et a!, 1994; p. 32; Findley, 1993; McAuslan,
1985; Findley, 1993; p.3). But SSA is urbanising fast. Urbanisation is increasing in
this region at a faster rate than probably anywhere else in the world as indicated by
various reports. Estimates of growth rates vary between studies but annual rates in
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the region of between 5% to 11% are typically indicated (World Bank 1989b; 224-
25; Findley, 1993; p. 6; UNDP and World Bank, 1992; Devas and Rakodi, 1993).
Indeed SSA's urban population is doubling every twelve years (UNDP and World
Bank, 1992). Much of this growth is attributed to net migration from rural areas (van
Western, 1990; p. 83; Zacharia and Conde, 1981, Kelly, 1991). Explanations as to
why this is occurring have been offered through neo-classically based models such
as that of Harris and Todaro (1970); gravity models (Foot and Milne, 1984; Yap
1977) and Liption's (1979) urban bias thesis (Killick, 1978; Kasanga, 1984 and
1988, Kasanga and Avis, 1988; Kasarda and Parnell, 1993; p. xi). Also this rate of
growth is not expected to change in the near future despite attempts to remove
urban bias through structural adjustment of many of the economies. Becker et a!,
(1994) provide a full discussion of why this will be the case.
The second problem is the presence of acute inequality of incomes, welfare and
urban neighbourhood amenities in cities. Isolated pockets of low density, well-
planned and officially documented, affluent residences with subsidised amenities
exist in cities where vast parts are occupied by neighbourhoods of unplanned,
unrecorded, unorganised substandard housing, lacking any form of amenities and
infrastructure (Larbi, 1994, Wekwete, 1994; Stren, 1992, van Westen, 1990; Durand-
Lasserve, 1990 & 1994; Stren and White, 1989). Many aspects of housing, most
importantly land for housing in this sector, is organised outside of and in spite of
government bureaucracy (Larbi, 1994, Durand-Lasserve, 1990 & 1994). High urban
housing and neighbourhood standards that are impossible for a majority of the urban
population to achieve (Dowall, 1992; p. 16) has led to what has been described
variously as 'squatter settlements' or spontaneous housing' (Gugler and Flanaghan,
1978; p. 45). For example, as many as 30 percent of the population of Dakar and
about 50 percent of that of Abidjan are estimated to live in such unauthorised
buildings (World Bank, 1972; p. 82). Consequently no formal evidence exists of
titles to land and the nature of land relationships between landowners and
purchasers as well as landlords and tenants. These 'squatter' or 'spontaneous'
housing have been seen as a problem by city authorities (Gugler and Flanaghan,
1978; p. 45) who have attempted, unsuccessfully to date, to find a solution (Stren,
1990). For a fuller view on spontaneous housing in the various countries in SSA see
Marris (1961), McAuslan (1985; p. 20), Ama (1990; pp. 88-93), Campbell (1990),
Durand-Lasserve (1990), Okoye (1990), Konadu-Agyeman (1991) O'connor (1991),
Brennan (1993, p. 89).
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The problems above are further compounded by the extent of poverty and the
awareness of the grim fact that solutions may have to be found within present
income level constraints since improvements in incomes and welfare are not to be
realised for some time to come (O'Connor, 1991; p. 5; see also Stren 1992; p. 535;
Riddell, 1997; p. 1304; Binns, 1993; George, 1988, 1992; Hutchful, 1995, Ravenhill,
1993). From the perspective of the spatial dimension, these problems have their
root cause in the nature of accessibility to land for urban housing. Hence the
importance of an effective mechanism for land allocation to meet the growing needs
of the rapid urban population. A review of the literature on this is the focus of the
following section.
2. 2. The Urban Land Allocation Question
An important and essential factor in the provision of housing is land. In urban SSA
the conventional argument is that uncertain and fluid titles to land (Firmin-Sellers,
1997) is one reason why housing investment has been so inadequate (O'connor,
1983; Becker eta!, 1994). Land markets are not developed. Where they exist they
tend to be disorganised, with conflicting, often unrecorded ownership claims and
unclear boundaries (Becker et a!, 1994; p. 44). This state of affairs is easily
attributed to the prevalence of customary land tenurial systems. But the literature is
not wholly convincing on whether or not observed housing and urban land allocation
problems result from the customary tenurial systems. Conclusions to this effect are
made without any direct inquiry into the debate. Bower (1993; p. 23) may be right in
observing that "doctrine and opinion appear to have become embodied in the
literature almost as facts". What then has been written about urban land tenure in
SSA?
2. 2. 1. Urban Land Tenure
As an economic good ownership of land is conceived as ownership of a bundle of
rights associated with the use of land. Indeed such conceptualisation has been
advocated by Coase (1960) for the economic analysis of all goods (see Chapter 4 for
a full discussion). The legal and institutional parameters within which bundles of land
rights evolve, are exercised, exchanged, and passed on to future generations are
contained within the land tenurial system. Land tenure is, Payne (1997) notes,
"the mode by which land is held or owned, or the set of relationships among
people concerning the use of land and its products" (Payne 1997; p. 3).
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Particular bundles of rights capable of ownership may differ from society to society,
reflecting various geographical, economic, demographic, religious and historical
factors. Consequently, tenurial systems are bound to vary over time to reflect
changes in these factors. In this process of evolution trade-offs are made. All
systems of land tenure thus involve trade-offs and none is either ideal or likely to be
universally most advantageous (Doebele, 1983; p. 106).
A feature of urbanisation in SSA is that cities grow mainly by incremental accretion of
existing rural settlements (Larbi, 1996; p. 198; Balbo, 1993). When this occurs the
tenurial system of the hitherto rural society becomes embedded in that of the now
urban system: hence the concept of urban customary land tenure system. The
United Nation's definition of customary land tenurial systems is said to be as follows:
"rights to use or to dispose of use-rights over land which rest neither on the
exercise of brute force nor on the evidence of rights guaranteed by
government statute but on the fact that those rights are recognised as
legitimate by the community the rules governing the acquisition and
transmission of these rights being usually explicit and generally known though
not normally recorded in writing" (United Nations, 1986; p. 165; cited in
Acquaye and Associates, 1989; p. 3; see also Payne, 1997; p. 3).
In its pure form, the urban customary tenure system is, in effect, the rural tenure
system immediately preceding urbanisation. It is imperative therefore that a review
of urban land tenure begins with an examination of the rural ones.
However approached, the best part of the literature on land tenure in SSA
concentrates on rural tenurial systems. Studies have pursed the debate whether
indigenous African tenurial systems are a constraint to agricultural development.
The contention that static traditional tenurial systems are a constraint to agricultural
development (Dorner, 1972, World Bank 1974, Harrison 1987) has been contested
(Cohen 1980; Noronha, 1985; Boserup, 1981; Bruce, 1988) on the basis that
indigenous tenurial arrangements are dynamic in nature and evolve in response to
changes in factor prices. More recently empirical studies covering Ghana, Kenya
and Rwanda, confirm that African land tenure systems spontaneously evolve in
response to increases in commercialisation (Migot-Adholla et a!, 1991). Of particular
relevance to the debate, Migot-Adholla et al, (1994; p.107), found no effect in Ghana
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of type of tenure on land improvement. They suggest that this is because those
without [formal] 1 title already in fact enjoy the same security as those with title.
The contention that African tenurial systems are a constraint to investment in land
derives from various notions of the African's relationship and concepts of land
ownership. Familiar ones include:
(a) The notion that private or individual interest in land is a concept alien to the
African. Thus Chief Justice Maxwell ruling on a Kenyan land case, in 1919, was
to avow with "absolute certainty" that "the theory of individual ownership of land is
absolutely foreign to the mind of any African until he has begun to absorb the
ideas of an alien civilisation" (Kenya Land Commission, 1934: p. 32 quoted in
Berry, 1992; p. 342).
(b) The notion that the African idea of ownership of interests in land is something
that transcends the physical realm into the spiritual, for land belongs to a vast
family of whom many are dead, few are living and countless lots are still unborn
(011enu, 1961: see also Payne, 1997; p. 3; Acquaye and Asiama, 1986; p. 129).
Lands cannot therefore be sold by the living since they are only joint owners with
others who are dead or yet unborn!
(c) The notion that since rights to the use of land derived from membership in the
political community and, traditionally no cash payment was made (Payne, 1997;p.
4), land had no value in the economic sense to households or individual members
of a community.
(d) The notion that there is no security of title since rights are not formally recorded
(Becker, eta!, 1994; Firmin-Sellers, 1997).
Much as indications of many aspects of these and similar notions have been found in
SSA, it would appear that too much have been read into them than the contemporary
evidence would support.
It is rather difficult to characterise the nature of the customary systems that cover the
whole sub-region. As Migot-Adholla et a!, (1991) have found, many varieties exist
within and between the various countries reflecting a variety of ecological conditions,
cultural systems, and political structures. However there is a degree of similarity in
land tenure across comparable agro-climatic zones (Ensminger, 1997; p. 168; see
also Migot-Adholla and Bruce, 1994, p. 5; Shipton, 1994). Ensminger's (1997)
attempt of a characterisation is as follows:
My addition
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"The major types of land tenure in Africa can be crudely lumped into common
property (managed either by all members of the ethnic group or some
recognised large subset), lineage controlled, and chief-controlled. Typically
one finds common property where land is used by hunters and gatherers or
pastoralists Such areas are generally arid and have low population density,
rendering more restrictive control costly due to the high transaction costs"
(Ensminger, 1997; p. 169).
Of course this is a very simplified and broad view of land tenure in SSA and cannot
articulate the subtleties of exclusive private use rights that have been observed
within community ownership. However, the emphasis of transaction costs as an
important factor brings this view closer to the realities and embraces the dynamics of
tenurial systems in Africa. In rural SSA, rights to a particular area of land may have
multiple claims upon them, both group and individual, and can include rights to
water, fuel, grazing, and cultivation plots, which in turn may vary according to
season, species, or intended usage (Campbell, 1993; Fortmann and Bruce, 1988;
Peters, 1994; Neumann, 1997; de Zeeuw, 1997). These more positive views of
African tenurial systems are rather recent. Misconceptions of static traditional
notions of communal land rights -- the absence of the concept of private interests in
land, and absence of land sales for instance -- have been imputed to African land
tenure perhaps rather unjustifiably. In the words of Berry (1997) such
misconceptions:
are encouraged by scholarship which refuses to acknowledge the
processes of negotiation and contest that help to constitute African political
and economic realities, and clings to the colonial administrator's conviction
that ambiguity and indeterminacy are obstacles to progress" (Berry, 1997; p.
1237).
The consensus in the emerging contemporary literature appear to be that land has
value within the African customary establishment. Far from being conservatively
timeless and unable to change, indigenous systems were dynamic and responded in
quite predictable ways to the forces of demographic and economic change
(Ensminger, 1997; p 170). Feder and Noronha (1987; p. 154) report of the existence
of a private land market in Ghana prior to colonial rule, and in Nigeria in 1861.
Similar evidence have been found in Kenya (Leakey, 1977; Muriuki, 1974. p. 70;
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Fleuret, 1988 p.14; Coldham, 1978, p. 95; Brokensha and Glazier, 1973). Raynaut,
(1976 quoted in Platteau, 1992; p. 129) writes:
"There is no doubt that, even before the arrival of the European, private
appropriation and sales of land parcels could occur in areas where population
was heavily concentrated, and where land was scarce and subject to intensive
farming practices. However, during the expansion period, when large areas of
cultivable lands became available again, less clear-cut and more unstable land
relations re-emerged. Those fluctuations were more the effect of pragmatic
adjustments to evolving environmental conditions than manifestations of
profound changes in the people's cultural patterns" (Raynaut, 1976).
As will be explicated later in Chapter 4, such evidence is perfectly consistent with
predictions of property rights theory and in line with similar findings among the
Indians in North America.
At the centre of the debate of inefficiencies inherent in SSA tenurial systems is the
argument that a lack of formal documented titles imply title insecurity which is a
deterrence to investment in land (Cleaver and Schreiber, 1994; Wells and Brandon,
1992; see also Becker, et a!, 1994; p. 44). The test of the efficacy of this assertion
has been conducted in Kenya where a comprehensive nation-wide title registration
system has been embarked upon since the 1950s, based on 1925 English land law
(Okoth-Ogendo, 1986, p. 79). Ensminger (1997; p. 178-179) summarises findings of
the effects of this exercise in Kenya and elsewhere in SSA. No relationship between
title and investment in land has been found in Kenya as well as in seven other SSA
countries - Burkina Faso, Ghana, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, and Uganda (Bruce
and Migot-Adholla, 1994; see also Dewees, 1995 for land titling effect on rights to
trees for households with relatively weak cultivation rights within communities). In
Somalia titling had no statistically significant effects on investments in agriculture
(Roth et a! 1994, p. 224) nor the use of agricultural imputes (Bruce et a!., 1994 p.
255). Pace and Hazell, (1993, pp. 16-18) analyses the Ghanaian, Kenyan, and
Rwandan data sets and find that land rights were not significantly related to whether
farmers made land-improving investments or used yield-enhancing inputs. Basset
(1993) argues that a World Bank project to construct a map of rural land holdings in
northern Cote d'lvoire distorted realities of local land tenure the result of which was
to make tenure rights less secure. In Tanzania where village land titling has been
underway since the late 1980s, land conflicts are reported to be increasing rather
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than decreasing (Coldham, 1995; van Donge, 1993). Berry (1997; P. 1237) provides
an extended account of these and similar evidence. See also Platteau (1992; p.
123).
These findings are particularly relevant in the urban context since formal title
registration has been advocated as essential for improved security that will engender
higher housing investments. Housing standards are presently low, it is contended,
partly because informal access to land does not convey high enough security of
tenure to induce households into making the required investments in their houses
(Brennan, 1993; pp. 78-80; World Bank, 1989a; Jimenez, 1983). Rather surprisingly
there are, as yet, no systematic studies investigating these contentions. If anything
the evidence suggests the obverse scenario. The use of cement blocks and the
construction of housing with permanent materials (relatively higher investments)
have been found to be used as "the most effective means of securing the right to
one's land, and the major tool in the appropriation of urban land" (Canel, et a! 1990,
pp. 162-163). That is to say the causality appears to be from level of investment to
security of title, not the other way round. Nonetheless this very assumption forms
the pivot of land administration with its emphasis on title registration and
regularisation of irregular informal urban plots. As Doebele (1994; p. 52) has
challenged, the assumption that markets that are 'formal' or 'regularized' are more
efficient and productive is not yet proven.
It is indeed surprising that there is an absence of studies attempting inquiries into the
customary tenurial systems' effects on the efficiency of urban land allocation given
the central place such inquiry takes in the rural tenurial system studies. Studies
such as Asiama (1980) completely avoid the efficiency and underlying equity debate
and yet recommend government actions that have the potential of reorganising (for
better or worse) the entire urban tenurial system. O'Connor (1983) blames the
prevalence of customary land law in Accra, Ghana, for impeding the expansion of
the central business district and for discouraging construction investments across the
city (see also Becker et a!, 1994). However, how exactly this is achieved is not
entirely clear. Some recent studies in the city appear to be suggesting the opposite:
customary systems in the city appear dynamic and responsive to urban land demand
(Larbi, 1994; Antwi, 1995; Kassanga eta!, 1996; p.67).
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As already mentioned, it is very difficult to characterise precisely customary land
tenure systems in the entire sub-region. This difficulty becomes magnified at the
urban level. Despite this Baross (1983), Gilbert and Ward (1985), Mabogunje
(199Db), Payne (1997; pp. 6-10) have attempted some classification. In general
whatever classification one adopts, procedures, laws and norms, shaping SSA
urbanite s relationship with land - the urban land tenure systems -- can be broadly
grouped into two: those originating from the state on the one hand; and those
originating from the indigenous societies. A dual tenurial system is the literature's
description of urban land tenure in SSA: formal tenurial systems with the
governmental bureaucracy at its epicentre operates along side customary tenurial
systems (Plateau, 1992; Larbi, 1994; Payne, 1997; van Westen, 1990). The
contentious aspect of this state of affairs is the relationship between the customary
tenurial systems and the government guaranteed formal systems. What constitutes
the contemporary urban customary system depends on (1) what is imputed to it and
the extent to which they are recognised by formal laws and (2) the degree, extent
and vigour with which land relationship of the urban population is organised through
it with or without the acquiescence of the formal system. Recent studies are finding
that some attributes of the contemporary customary law fully recognised by formal
law are indeed widespread abuse of interpretation that suited well-placed and
articulate interest groups (see Firrriin-Sellers, 1996 on the Ga and Akyem Abuakwa
of Ghana; see also, Berry, 1997 p. 1228; Ensminger, 1997; Hobsbawm and Ranger,
1983).
It would appear that assumptions of inefficiency of indigenous traditional systems
similar to those made in the rural agrarian context shaped and continue to shape
formal urban land policy and state willingness or otherwise to accept customary
systems. Planning policies, land title legislation and entire land administration
bureaucracies have been established without any consultation or reference to the
customary systems (Mattingly 1993; Larbi, 1996). The political-economy of post-
independence state control of economic activities - housing and infrastructure
provision especially -- augmented this approach. State monopoly of interests in
and/or management of urban land is the dominant policy of land administration
(Kasanga et a!, 1996; Durand-Lasserve, 1994; p. 58). But for the resilience of
customary tenurial systems and/or the sheer impracticality of formal laws, there
would practically exist no urban customary land tenure in SSA.
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In most of the French former colonies, all interests in land are supposed to be held
by the state and individual private rights are granted upon application. Yet much of
urban land transactions take place and are organised through informal customary
systems. These transactions are therefore technically illegal (Attahi, 1994; Durand-
Lasserve, 1994; van Western, 1990; Platteau, 1992). In many of the former British
colonies (Nigeria being a notable exception where full control of all interests in urban
land is vested in the government under the Land Use Decree) customary tenure
systems are allowed even though they are substantially constrained through
elaborate formal approval impositions (Larbi, 1994; 1995; Kasanga eta!, 1996). But
here again it is the customary system that dominates land transactions (Larbi, 1994,
1996: Becker et a!, 1994) ignoring or flouting the state impositions. Illegality results
not so much because the transactions themselves are illegal but because certain
state stipulations are not complied with. It is this uncomfortable co-existence of
customary and formal tenure systems which is at the centre of title (in)security
commonly asserted (Firmin-Sellers 1996, Becker et a!, 1994).
That there is an uncomfortable co-existence of tenurial systems in SSA is born out
by the evidence. In almost all cases, despite the formal tenurial system's attempts to
eliminate or supplant informal, unrecorded (customary) transactions, the latter
dominate. Becker, et a!, (1994; p. 44) provide a handy summary of this evidence. In
Kinshasa, Zaire, only 10 percent of the parcels are officially registered, while the rest
have been acquired informally. In Cameroon new titles issued each year represent
less than 10 percent of the demand. In Kampala, Uganda, about 20 per cent of
transactions are officially recorded and fully documented while about 80 per cent
take the form of verbal agreements, all technically illegal. In Dakar, Senegal, despite
the state vesting all interests in urban land in itself, the land tenure status of about 60
per cent of urban dwellings is unclear. In Accra, as much as 87 percent of land are
customary land (Larbi, 1996; p. 213) many transactions of which are not registered
despite the existence of a compulsory land title registration law. Less than 20 per
cent of plots affecting transfers of only 2 percent of stock annually in Conakry are
registered (Durand-Lasserve, 1994; p. 61). It is in this context of land tenure
problems that urban land markets operate in SSA.
2. 2. 2. Urban Land Markets.
To the economist, a market is any mechanism that allows the allocation of goods
among competing claims through balancing demand against supply. The interplay of
the forces of demand and supply determines the price of the good. Whoever can
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afford and is prepared to pay the resultant price gets the good. For a market to work
efficiently there should be, among other things, free flow of information about
transactions. A land market is therefore one in which access to parcels of land (or,
more appropriately, interests in land) is organised impersonally through a
mechanism that balances demand for against supply of those rights and accord
ownership to those participants that can afford and are prepared to pay the relevant
price. Chapter 5 provides a fuller discussion of markets and circumstances when
they fail.
In urban SSA, any discussion of land markets is fraught with difficulty. Government
intervention in the allocation of urban space is so much entrenched as to present a
paradox of a complete absence of land markets (see Payne, 1997; Mabogunje,
1990b). For reasons that are mainly practical economics, such government
imposition is open to challenge (Gilbert, 1990; p. 25). In fact land transactions in
direct contravention of government regulations are the norm in SSA (Durand-
Lasserve, 1990 and 1994; Larbi, 1996; Kasanga, et a!, 1996; van Western, 1990;
Gugler and Flanaghan, 1978; Kaitilla, 1987; Gilbert, 1990). These contentious
dimensions of the resultant urban land allocative mechanism serve to transform the
appearance of the market so much so that one may be led to doubt the very
existence of any allocative mechanism(s). Indeed if a land market is conceived as
an efficient mechanism that allocates land among the competing claims with
complete transparency without any tensions then the simple conclusion would be
that there are practically no land markets in most cities of SSA. Many a researcher
have made such a conclusion. In Ghana, for example, the World Bank observes
that "there is no effective market for land" (see Becker eta!, 1994).
However evidence of active land markets are reported throughout the cities of SSA.
In the cities of Accra (Asiama, 1980; Asabere, 1981; Larbi, 1994, 1996; Kasanga et
a! 1996), Conakry, Bamako, Brazzaville, Nouakchott, Tilabery, Ouagadougou,
(Durand-Lasserve, 1994), Lagos (Agbola, 1987; Okoye, 1993; Ama, 1990), Dar es
Salam (Kaitilla, 1987), studies indicate an active urban land market irrespective of
the particular legislative regime. Much of the land for housing outside the meagre
government sponsored housing schemes is obtained through unrecorded voluntary
transactions. The conclusion which clearly emerges from these studies is that a
different picture from that depicted in Latin America and elsewhere in LDC cities
where land for spontaneous housing is obtained through organised land invasions
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(de Soto, 1989), prevail in SSA (see O'Connor, 1991; van Westen, 1990; Konadu-
Agyemang, 1991). Nor is access to land based chiefly on traditional customary ties
as some have been made to believe (Soares and Stussi, 1990; p. 243). The so
called spontaneous housing in urban SSA takes place on lands which are obtained
through negotiation with the active consent and involvement of legitimately
recognised parties within recognised traditional institutional set-ups. Writing about
the situation in Bamako, Mali, van Westen, (1990) encapsulates the state of land
markets in SSA in the following words:
"By definition all tenure practices in Bamako s spontaneous settlements are
illegal. This does not mean, that land rights are not observed in this area.
Actually, customary ideas about tenure are usually scrupulously complied with.
In principle, all aspirant house owners in the spontaneous
settlements will proceed according to customary rules. Before construction
starts, permission for use of the plot is ensured with the customary master of
the land, that is, either the chief of the (former) village where the land
traditionally belongs or the head of the family that exerts traditional use-rights
to the land." (van Westen, 1990; p. 97)
Similar observations of rational economic behaviour within traditional institutional
parameters are reported across the region. See for example Larbi (1994 and 1996),
Kasanga et a! (1996), Durand-Lasserve (1990, and 1994), van Westen, (1990). As
in other LDC cities (e.g. Bombay or Calcutta) a clear trend of land markets with land
prices responding to high rates of urban growth is taking root irrespective of
whatever the formal rules are (Payne, 1997; p.7).
Further evidence show that prices of parcels are determined by the interaction of
demand and supply of the particular rights being conveyed (see Larbi, 1994; Durand-
Lasserve, 1994; van Western, 1990; Payne, 1997). Assertions that prices in
customary land transactions are based on non-economic factors (Asiama, 1984 &
1990; p. 243) are rather difficult to justify and fly in the face of the evidence. What
appears to be true about this market is that government agencies have no record on
them. Consequently government activities are organised as if these markets do not
exist. Studies relying on government land agencies would, naturally, conclude that
there is an absence of land markets.
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But these markets operate rather inefficiently. Becker et al (1994) indicate observed
inefficiencies of the market as follows:
"Property transfers are fraught with long-term risks. Transactions are time-
consuming and may involve payments to several purported owners.
The lack of clear ownership of urban land has created a number of
problems.......It has prevented development of any effective system of
mortgages, inhibited land sales and building construction, discouraged
improvement and maintenance of existing structures, and undermined the
establishment of effective real estate taxation" (Becker etal, 1994; p. 34).
What causes these markets to operate in such inefficient ways is a question
that has not been adequately answered so far. It has however been used as
justification for the governments to intervene even further. Despite the often
laudable, if sometimes rather pious (Amitabh, 1997; p. 13), objectives of
government involvement in land matters in SSA (Payne, 1997), such
involvement should be taken for what they are -- the creation of state
monopolies - and analysed accordingly.
2. 2. 3. The Role of Governments in Land Market Operations
There are sound theoretical reasons why governments may intervene in urban land
markets. The need for intervention may include: to provide public amenities, such as
open spaces, which are unlikely to be privately provided. Another is to increase
efficiency: for example, by guiding development and redevelopment of land to more
desirable purposes, limiting urban sprawl and unnecessary encroachment on
agricultural land, and achieving economies of scale and least-cost production of
public services (Courtnery, 1983; Whitehead, 1983; Rivkin, 1983). Some argue for
government intervention on equity grounds: the poor can only have easy access to
urban land if the government intervenes to limit price escalation (Asiama, 1980).
Others find it tempting to suggest that the urban land market in African cities is
approaching an 'urban nexus' which can only be solved by state intervention (Amis,
1990 p. 26; see also Scott, 1980 and Lojkine, 1976). The evidence in SSA of
government intervention, however, appears to be suggesting anything but the
achievement of these goals (see for example, Kasanga et a!, 1996; Payne, 1997;
Mattingly, 1993; Larbi, 1994 & 1995). Moreover government intervention has its own
22
costs. Evidence of corruption, bureaucratic inertia, high cost operations 2 and
general allocative inefficiencies have been found to characterise government
intervention in the land market in SSA (van Western, 1990; Mattingly 1993; Kasanga
eta!, 1996; Wekwete, 1994). These are costs to society. Other costs, perhaps the
most important ones, are in the nature of costs private agents (land owners and
purchasers) are compelled to incur in order to comply with or protect their land rights
against interventions. Private land owners' costly attempts to prevent compulsory
acquisition of their lands is a case in point here. Such costs may be large and have
to be set against any benefits before a call for government intervention is made
(Chapter 5 provides a full discussion) A systematic framework for predicting, ex
ante, the costs and benefits of government intervention vis a vis customary land
market operations needs to be established. Such frameworks can be designed
when fuller insights of the forces behind economic decisions of agents in the
customary land markets are well understood. Studies offering such insights are
notably absent in the literature. In Accra, studies have concentrated on issues of
specific government land administration.
2. 3. The Case of Accra
Accra in every respect is a classic case of an SSA city struggling to function under
rapid growth of its population and spatial boundaries. Housing or entire
neighbourhoods without governmental sanction (spontaneous, slum, squatter
housing, as the conventional literature is wont to call them) is the order in Accra.
Much of the growth is by gradual accretion of existing peripheral villages (see Larbi,
1996) with practically no records of their entire economies or spatial dimensions.
Through a plethora of laws, decrees, ministerial policies, the Ghana government
have attempted to gain control of urban land and housing markets (for a concise
discussion on this see, Larbi, 1994). Customary institutions of land holding therefore
sit uncomfortably with formal land policies based on the English land administration
bureaucracy. State land agencies are at a continuos struggle with traditional
institutions to control the land market (Larbi, 1994, 1995, 1996; Kasanga eta!, 1996)
with the traditional institutions by far winning this struggle. Land and housing
markets, predictably, have mutated in response to these struggles and operate in
somewhat unconventional ways. So much so that it has been concluded by the
World Bank that there is practically no land market in the city (see Becker, et a!
2 is reported, for example, that in Malawi cadastral survey costs alone
could be as much as five times the value of the plot! (Mattingly, 1993; p.
Ill).
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1996). A brief discussion of policies that have led to this state of affairs in Accra is
appropriate at this stage.
2. 3. 1.The Context of Land Market Intervention in Accra.
In Accra, as in Ghana in general, legislation empowering Central and Local
Governments to intervene, regulate and/or manage traditional land markets dates
back to colonial times. Various pieces of legislation existed before 1957 (the year of
independence from Britain) that allowed, for example, the compulsory acquisition of
native land by Central Government (Public Lands Ordnance 1876; Public Lands
(Leasehold) Ordnance 1950). There were others such as Local Government
Ordnance 1952 and Housing Scheme (acquisition of land) Ordnance, 1945
empowering agencies of government to interfere with the use and ownership of
native land resources. Legislation expressing the need for transactions concerning
land to be in writing had also been established in the form of Land Registry
Ordnance, 1895 and the Concessions Ordnance, 1900. However, the use of these
instruments had been approached with extreme caution (Colonial Reports, 1927-28;
p. 38: Meek, 1946; p 172: see also Larbi, 1994). Serious incursions in private land
matters by Central Government in Ghana really took effect after independence in
1957 (Larbi, 1994; Chapter 4). 	 The details of the legislation empowering
interventions are summarised in Larbi (1995).
As a result the government of Ghana currently possesses powers which it has used
extensively in Accra to intervene in the market. Various pieces of legislation ensure
that, in addition to lands which the government claims absolute ownership of through
the use of compulsory acquisition legislation, practically all transactions in land in the
city are subject to some form of government intervention. There is legislation for the
management of urban land which covers almost every aspect of transactions in
interest in land. Laws have been enacted to effect the State and its related
institutions' control over the creation of proprietary rights in land without taking land;
for example, the management of stool land under the Administration of Lands Act
1962 (Act 123); the prohibition of freehold grants of stool lands under Article 190(4)
of the Third Republic Constitution, 1979 and Article 267(5) of the Fourth Republic
Constitution, 1992. Other laws allow control over the creation of proprietary rights by
taking land; as for example, the compulsory acquisition of land and the payment of
compensation under the State Lands Act, 1962 (Act 125); compulsory acquisition of
land by local authorities especially under Local Government Law, 1988 (PNDCL 207)
and more recently the Local Government Act, 1993 (Act 462). There are yet other
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laws and policies that allow control of development of land, such as the requirement
for planning permission and building permits before undertaking any construction of
structures on land; and policies that affect returns from ownership of interests in land.
Elaborate laws provide the framework for recording transactions in land. From the
need for transactions affecting land to be in writing, (Conveyancing Decree, 1973
(NRCD 175)) to the framework for recording transactions affecting land under the
Land Registry Act, 1962 (Act 122) and the Land Title Registration Law, 1986,
(PNDCL 152). Indeed using powers under PNDCL 152, Accra has been classified
as an area where registration of interests in land is compulsory. To effect the
market intervention allowed under the pieces of legislation, various agencies have
been established. The relevant agencies, as far as objectives of this study are
concerned, include:
• The Lands Commission and its Secretariat;
• The Land Valuation Board;
• Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands;
• The Various Planning Authorities;
• Authorities for Issuing Building Permits;
• Deeds Registry and;
• Land Title Registry.
Aspects of intervention introduced by the operation of these agencies and their
market impacts are analysed at appropriate stages of the thesis.
2. 3. 2. Land Market Research in Accra
Research of spatial aspects of urbanisation in Accra is a perfect fit of the description
that urban research concentrates on specific issues and lacks broader economic
studies of structures and forces behind the evidence. Of a longer history are studies
detailing the legal dimensions of customary land tenure in the city through formal
case law. 011enu's (1961) work is the main authority of customary land tenure
systems in Accra. Similar studies cover the subject; some relating it to particular
regions or tribal areas of the country (Sarbah, 1904; Danquah, 1928; Busia, 1958;
Bentsi-Enchill, 1964; Kludze, 1973; Asante, 1975). They dwell mainly on legal
aspects and do not incorporate economic dimensions. Being of legal complexion,
aspects of the tenurial system are discussed as set in stone. These (011enu, 1961
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and the other studies) do not pretend to have any economic allocative mechanism in
mind.
A few studies of relatively recent origin have attempted to throw some lights on some
aspects of land markets and urban land administration in the city. Here Asabere's
work is significant. In Asabere (1981) an empirical investigation into the
determinants of land prices in the city was conducted though the data employed
restricts the study to the documented sector of the market. As has been discussed
earlier the extent of undocumented, informal land markets and the different
dynamics of these markets limits the usefulness of any insights gained in such
studies. In any case this study does not attempt to explain the fundamental forces
belying tenurial conflicts. However, some of the findings serve as pointers to the
direction deeper enquiries should take, as for example, the finding that a land market
exists in the city, if rather imperfect, and stool lands sell at a discount to government
lands (Asabere, 1981; p. 395). Asabere eta!, (1982) is focused on the intensity of
residential land use in Accra and attempts to estimate the elasticity of substitution
between non-land and land imputes. By their nature, such studies take land prices
as given and concern themselves with the optimum combination of land and other
imputes given available technology. Issues of political economy of urban land
management and administration are completely ignored.
Other studies concentrate on specific aspects of the problem: Brobby (1991) on the
issue of compensation payments when customary lands are acquired by
government; Aquaye and Associates (1989) investigate some institutional and legal
problems associated with land delivery in Accra and, among other things, point out
some problems to do with the customary land holding systems and government land
bureaucracies in the city, particularly in relation to their implementation of land
legislation. Antwi (1995) examines economic implications of land policy
implementation and views much of urban land problems as originating from the way
policy is practically implemented; while Kufogbe (1996) reviews the changing
patterns of land use in peripheral Accra. Kasanga et a! (1996) have examined the
interplay of government agencies and customary tenurial systems and shown some
contradictions in the approach of government intervention in the land market. Some
of their findings attest to the existence of dynamic customary land markets. They
identify state monopolisation of interests in land as a major contradiction and
recommend the liberalisation of the land market; a review of existing state
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enactments and state encouragement and support of traditional land management
departments (Kasanga, et a!, 1996; pp. 69-70).
Asiama (1980) has analysed the direction of social change in a traditional society of
Labadi, an Accra suburb, and found that urbanisation has significantly altered
traditional social relations and the land tenure system. Hence a reform of the land
tenure system would not cause social upheavals. The economic aspects of such a
conclusion, the study agrees, will have to be thoroughly researched (Asiama, 1980;
p. 264). Larbi's (1994, 1995, 1996) studies concentrate on evaluating effect of
formal land policies on the land delivery mechanism and present exhaustive
evidence (especially Larbi, 1994) that show the dynamism of the customary tenurial
systems in the city. Between them these studies reflect a damning indictment of the
failure of land administration in general and spatial planning in particular (see for
example, Larbi, 1996 p. 213). They touch on some issues of political-economy and
specific matters of allocative inefficiencies of state involvement in the land delivery
system. But they do not provide a general framework for analysing the urban land
allocative mechanism. Concentration on formal land administration policies leave
unanswered the question as to whether or not urban land allocation between
competing claims in the city is the most efficient attainable. Also unanswered is the
question of the extent to which land allocation mechanism in the city is driven by and
informs the economic decision process of agents be they formal or informal.
2. 4. A Critique
There is a general dearth of studies attempting to explain structures and forces
behind the apparent evidence of land tenurial confusion and the resulting state of
urban land and housing markets. That urban land and housing markets operate
unconventionally in SSA and may be exacting costs to households and firms may be
beyond dispute. However, much of the existing work has tended to be predicated on
assumptions about the customary tenurial systems which are still not proven. The
assumption that unrecorded property rights conveyed through customary institutions
are insecure (Becker et a!, 1994, O'connor, 1983; Firmin-Sellers, 1996) is yet to be
proven. The same goes for the assumption that such rights are uncertain. The
evidence from rural SSA, at least, suggests that such assumptions need to be
proved before policies based on them are implemented.
Tenure security and certainty of titles, for example, have been equated to
government sponsored land titling or cadastral systems. 	 From an analytical
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perspective there is no automatic reasons why this should be the case. Certainty of
title to land relates to the clarity, to transacting agents, of the nature and extent of
bundle of rights conveyed. Security of title imply the degree of confidence such
agents place on the enforceability of those rights against all those they are purported
to be enforced against for the agreed duration. These conditions can prevail
whether or not the bundles of rights genuinely conveyed are recorded. What is
important is the credibility and legitimacy, in the conception of the actors, of the
institutions conferring those rights. This legitimacy relates to the institutions' ability to
help defend property rights conveyed, as it is to their power to exact costs on actors
purporting to derive their rights from other sources. It is perfectly possible for
recorded bundles of rights in land to be insecure in much the same way as
unrecorded rights would be if actors do not view the institutions conferring those
rights as legitimate and credible. Legitimacy of the institutions from whom such titles
emanate is thus very important. Whether any tenurial system would convey certain
and secure titles is therefore more of an empirical matter.
Governments, with their advantage of monopoly over the use of coercion, might be
the most appropriate institution to guarantee security and certainty of title in land.
But this is not to assume it will, in fact, be so in all cases. The sate may be too weak
and/or too remote to influence local relations with land even if it wants to (Bardhan
1989; p. 14). In the circumstances as persist in urban areas of SSA with dual
tenurial systems, governments become competitors with informal tenurial institutions
for the provision of clear and secure titles. Which institution wins depends on how
sensitive they are to agents' requirements, expectations and aspirations. If, in fact,
unrecorded customary rights are certain and secure, government sponsored title
documentation and registration are but only a statistical exercise no different from
population censuses. To the extent that population censuses only count but not
create number of persons, title documentation under these circumstances does not
create property rights in land. Any artificial ascription of security and certainty of
tenure for the sake of title registration is likely to produce unpredictable outcomes
depending largely on the degree of security and certainty that, in fact, exist in
unrecorded forms and the extent to which the documentation exercise reflects them.
Implications for who pays and how much to charge for the exercise may require a
rethink of many on-going land titling projects in SSA. So does any attempts of
nationalisation of interests in land. A great deal of harm may have been done by
ignoring the credibility and legitimacy - and the cost implications emanating from
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them -- that traditional institutions command among the players in the market. Their
perceived ability to help enforce property rights and impose costs on transactions --
in an environment where poverty is so pervasive that marginal increases in
transaction costs may prevent transactions from taking place - will determine which
property rights are considered secure. Agbola (1987), for example, details how local
customary land owners have to be contacted and paid the relevant market price for
land allocated by government (military) officials before one can occupy land in urban
Nigeria even though the Land Use Decree renders any interests held by such
customary institutions null and void. De Zeeuw (1997) investigating the relationship
between security of tenure and sustainable land use in Burkina Faso has
commented:
it can be concluded that land tenure issues are part of wider social and
political relationships and that the concept of 'security of tenure' as used in
discourses on sustainable land use may be perceived differently by local
procedures. If land tenure issues are considered in isolation of the wider
social-political context and if the specific nature of security of tenure is
neglected, even those legal interventions which obviously aim to increase
security of tenure and to create favourable conditions for sustainable land use
may have the opposite effects" (De Zeeuw, 1997; p. 594).
As some of the studies have rightly observed (Kasanga et a!, 1996; Durand-
Lasserve, 1994), government intervention in the urban land allocative system lead to
the creation of state monopolies in certain (or all) bundles of land rights. The
analytical framework for predicting the outcome of such monopolies is well
established in economics. An application of these insights to urban land title
registration, planning, nationalisation and other government activities affecting the
land market is needed. Such an analysis is absent in the literature. Evidence of
positive and negative outcomes of government intervention are advanced in the
literature but none provide systematic analysis of the issue in the framework
suggested.
There is, as yet, no study that views these problems as part of a broader economic
allocative problem. Technical work has sometimes avoided economics though the
economics would be appropriate (Stren, 1994; Pugh, 1997; p. 1561). To be sure,
explanations of aspects of the problem from an economic perspective have been
offered by some earlier studies. Simpson (1976), for example, challenged the view
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that customary law prohibited the sale of land in the face of empirical evidence to the
contrary and explained what might be the true position in a typical evolution of
property rights paradigm. Acquaye and Associates (1989) disagree with such an
explanation and go as far as to suggest the inappropriateness of analysing the
problem in an economic framework. To this effect they wrote:
"It would be more safe to leave Adam Smith and the early Britons out of this
completely alien and different social context" (Acquaye and Associates, 1989;
p. 5).
Can one really leave Adam Smith out of something which is basically an allocative
problem? Spatial problems of urbanisation in SSA result from fundamental issues of
rapid growth in demand for urban land in the context of acute poverty and suppliers
bounded by traditional customary institutions. Like any good, income levels of urban
population is the primary factor that determines the level of housing, infrastructure
and services that are affordable to various sections of the population. An unfettered
market, within the parameters of existing institutions, would allocate land rights and
other resources to achieve an equilibrium where households and firms meet their
accommodation requirements according to their ability to pay. Granted,
governments everywhere intervene in housing markets to prevent what they perceive
as unwanted aspects of the market mechanism. Minimum standards for housing
and neighbourhood amenities are set to prevent levels of housing and city
neighbourhoods which are deemed unacceptable. For those who genuinely cannot
achieve these standards, subsidies are sometimes provided. The issue of
subsidised housing -- housing the poor, or social housing -- is thus a universal
concept. However in western industrialised countries, where subsidisation of some
housing has been achieved, standards of housing and amenities are generally
allowed to be driven by income levels of the majority of the population. Subsidisation
of housing and associated services is restricted to a relatively small section of the
population for whom what may be affordable through the market mechanism is
generally considered inadequate and, probably, inhumane. A trade-off is being
achieved between some level of efficiency and equity.
In SSA, housing the urban poor' is a different issue altogether. Poverty is so
entrenched that in relation to existing minimum standards of housing and state
policies on land transactions, even the notion of urban poor is meaningless. It is far
more meaningful to speak of the very small groups who are not poor, and the even
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tinier minority who can be considered rich (O'Connor 1991; P. 166; Riddell, 1997; p.
1304). To recommend subsidisation of urban land and housing for the poor' imply
recommending the subsidisation of practically the entire market. In poor agrarian
economies such as those in SSA the evidence reveal the futility of such attempts
(see for example, Mayo and Gross, 1985). In so far as actual subsidies affordable
fall short of what is structurally required, allocation has to be rationed
administratively. A choice has to be made between what sections of 'the poor' gets
the subsidies and what sections lose out. In this state of affairs those in relevant
positions would effect selection procedures that benefit themselves in one form or
another to the detriment of 'the poor' (Chapter 6 deals with these aspects through
the concept of rent-seeking). The evidence from SSA that projects with equitable
intentions benefit the relatively well-off (O'connor, 1991; McAuslan, 1985; Amis 1990;
Campbell, 1990; Mattingly, 1993; Brobby, 1991; Larbi, 1994: Antwi, 1995) is not just
a mere coincidence. It reflects a fundamental flaw of the approach to the problem.
In an environment where standards are beyond the reach of even the very
bureaucrats responsible for administering subsidies, attempts of supplanting the
market on equity grounds present opportunities for the relatively better-off to allocate
the benefits to themselves and their cronies. Equity in SSA, in this sense, is really
not equitable. Studies of housing the "urban poor" through some state subsidies or
monopolies of one kind or the other in the name of equity helps to divert research
attention from the real issues.
Asiama's (1980) study needs special attention here. On the basis of a finding that
urbanisation has significantly changed the social relations of a land owning traditional
institution in Accra, this study advocates for state monopoly of urban land rights
since:
"The escalation of land prices would be checked, at least in the initial stages,
because the state would be the sole determinant of the price of land allocated
to would-be users and the state can ensure that the rules of equity would
determine accessibility and price and not the market mechanism, as is
currently the practice with publicly owned land" (Asiama, 1980; p. 257).
Analytical flaws of such an argument is preserved for later chapters (Chapter 5). For
the moment it is enough to point out that such a recommendation assumes the
'state' is a competent, neutral, benevolent entity equipped with information necessary
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to do the job. The evidence of governments around the world, and SSA
governments in particular, would suggest otherwise. On this Doebele (1987) states:
the record of governments, particularly in the developing countries, in the
effective management of land has been a discouraging one. Every piece of
land is unique It does not lend itself to the uniform procedures of
bureaucracies. Its special value and scarcity have opened the door to political
favouritism and corruption. It is a subtle asset to administer, and most
governments are simply not very good at it" (Doebele, 1987; p. 7).
In fact Asiama's (1980) recommendation is made in the context of the study's own
findings of allocative inefficiencies and political favouritism of the state (Asiama,
1980 pp 186-187; see also Brobby, 1991, Larbi, 1994, 1995, 1996, Antwi, 1995;
Kasanga et a!, 1996). As if to emphasise the belief in the equitable credentials of
state intervention, in a subsequent paper (Acquaye and Asiama, 1986; p. 141) a
recommendation is made for African governments to establish commissions and
boards staffed by knowledgeable experts from the ministries, the universities, and
private enterprise to aid the poor in acquiring urban housing. There are strong
theoretical reasons why regulatory bodies would not achieve any better outcomes
(see Stigler, 1971; Posner, 1974). As to empirical evidence, SSA has served as a
laboratory for testing the outcomes of government land agencies and regulatory
bodies. For evidence of inefficient outcomes see many of the studies referred to
earlier (e.g. Mattingly, 1993 p. 117; Larbi, 1994; Antwi, 1995; Kasanga eta!, 1996).
There are a lot of unanswered questions that massive government intervention of
urban land allocation in the name of equity triggers off. Who exactly constitutes the
'urban poor'? What is their level of income? How far are these income levels below
what would enable them achieve accepted standards of housing? What is the size
of subsidy required? Are those subsidies affordable? What mechanisms are in
place (or to be designed) to ensure that those who qualify for subsidies actually
receive them when provided? Answers to these and many related questions need to
engage the attention of any researcher recommending state intervention in the urban
land market for the benefit of the 'urban poor'. Though some studies are pointing
out the inferior outcomes of government land market regulatory bodies in SSA
(Mattingly, 1993; Larbi, 1994; Antwi, 1995; Kasanga et a!, 1996), these government
intrusions in urban land market operations have been analysed less intensely than
the evidence would require. Further empirically based research is needed. It is time
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a study moved beyond documenting and lamenting over evidence of inefficient,
costly and corrupt practices of government intervention in urban land markets and
provide more insightful analysis of such behaviour. The evidence appears to be
pointing to fundamental pertinent issues that need to be investigated. For example,
are inefficient outcomes of government land agencies due to the African public
official's incompetence and ignorance of market effects of policies? Or are they a
result of factors more fundamental to government and regulatory bodies' intervention
in land markets or markets in general?
2. 4. 1. Research Questions
The task of achieving improved functionality of SSA cities should begin by an
acceptance that standards need to be driven by income and affordability levels.
There is no point legislating standards that less than 50 percent of the urban
population can afford (Dowall, 1992; p. 23). The relevant question to be asked
therefore is what level of standards can people afford, not what is the 'right' standard
(Dowall, 1992; p. 25). Once such a floatation of standards, as it were, has been
accepted, the real issue becomes attempts to improve observed level of standards
(of urban housing and neighbourhoods) achieved through existing allocative
mechanism(s). Theoretically, there are two main ways of improving existing
standards. One is to find a way of increasing income levels. This will increase levels
of standards affordable. The other is to increase the efficiency of the allocative
mechanism. Increased efficiency will reduce transaction costs, increase gains from
trade and hence increase levels of standards affordable.
Increasing income levels in SSA has engaged the attention of development
economists and has proved intractable so far. This suggests that, at least in the
short to medium term, existing low income levels are not going to improve. For
urban land economists and city planners concerned with achieving functional cities,
attention needs to be focused on achieving efficiency of urban land markets through
minimisation of actual (as against assumed!) transaction costs. These costs are
defined broadly to include conventional trading costs and all costs imposed on
agents as a result of the complex and continuous feuding between formal and
informal land tenure institutions.
The main research question to be asked in this regard is therefore: how to improve
the efficiency of existing allocative mechanisms for land and resources for housing
in the entire urban area. To adequately answer this question one needs to first
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identify the land allocative mechanism(s). These include the informal traditional
routes - both legal and illegal - and the formal government bureaucratic routes. The
next step is to identify and ascribe transaction costs and benefits of the various
routes. That is to say identifying the nature of transaction costs associated with
each route for given levels of benefits; establish joint and common costs and pin-
point those imposed on either route by the other(s). The final step will be to attempt
to eliminate those costs that can be eliminated without sacrificing efficiency and
minimise those that need to be met. Improving efficiency through minimisation of
costs is based on findings that agents are rational and will not take on any extra
costs without compensatory benefits (See Ault and Rutman, 1979). For studies on
rationality of peasants in poor agrarian economies generally see Bardhan (1989) and
Stiglitz (1989). One also needs to point out that analysis of the type being developed
here is set within a market framework. Following these steps by itself will lead to a
fuller understanding of the system than is presently available. For to engage in such
an enquiry demands analytical tools that enable testable predictions to be made
about the costs/benefits and allocative outcomes of the various mechanisms. Such
a tool can be designed based on application of insights gained from relevant
persuasions of economics - neo-classical, property rights, public choice, and the
new institutional economics schools. This is the approach adopted in this study.
Specifically, the study states and tests the following related hypotheses:
1. Urban land in SSA is principally allocated through markets characterised by
rational agents whose economic decisions are shaped by constraints of formal
and informal institutions of land holding.
2. Apparent irrational and illegal behaviour of agents is optimal given the constraints
imposed by formal and informal land institutions.
3. Current activities of formal institutions limit the efficiency attainable by informal
institutions and agents, hence reducing gains from trade.
4. Without interference of government land agencies, property rights under
customary institutions are clear and secure.
5. Holding incomes constant, improvements in allocative efficiency remains the only
equitable way of improving urban housing and neighbourhood standards.
The inquiry necessitated by a research designed to test these hypotheses is
expected to provide much more fuller insights that are urgently needed to inform
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policy planners. What remains is a concise account of the research design. That is
the task of the next chapter.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
3. 0. Introduction
Having established the main research questions to be addressed in the previous
Chapter, this Chapter discusses the research approach adopted. To serve as a
recap, the five central hypotheses of the study are:
(a) urban land in SSA is principally allocated through markets characterised by
rational agents whose economic decisions are shaped by constraints of formal
and informal institutions of land holding;
(b) apparent irrational and illegal behaviour of agents is optimal given the
constraints imposed by formal and informal land institutions;
(c) current activities of formal institutions limit the efficiency attainable by informal
institutions and agents, hence reducing gains from trade;
(d) without interference of government land agencies, property rights under
customary institutions are clear and secure and;
(e) holding incomes constant, improvements in allocative efficiency remains the only
equitable way of improving urban housing and neighbourhood standards.
The discussion in the chapter is organised around: Research Approach (3. 1);
Research Design (3. 2); Sampling (3. 3); Sample Characteristics (3. 4); Data
Collection Procedures (3. 5); Data Analysis (3. 6); Comments on Methodology (3. 7).
3. 1. Research Approach
The study depended heavily on the quantitative (positivist) approach and adopted
standardised questionnaire surveys as the main approach of enquiry. As distinct
from the qualitative paradigm which perceives research as exploratory, evolving as
the project develops and capable of influencing and being influenced by outcomes,
the quantitative, inductive or positivist paradigm perceives truth to exist and capable
of objective measurement (Creswell, 1994). Research in this tradition is therefore
designed to test given effects or outcomes of factors of interest under controlled
environments. In the social sciences two variants of quantitative research are
adopted: experiments and surveys. In experiments subjects under study are
arranged in a laboratory setting and the factors of interest applied in a desired
manner while outcomes are monitored and documented. Surveys involve designing
theoretical constructs and selecting samples from a population to test real life
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responses to these constructs. Responses are then analysed and inferences
applied to the population. Major conclusions of the research are therefore
empirically based, induced from analysis of the data collected. The influencing
factors for adopting this approach are fully explained below.
3. 2. Research Design
The rationale underpinning the research design is schematically presented in Figure
3.1. The site for the study was Accra, the capital of Ghana. Accra typifies an SSA
major city where majority of neighbourhoods have been described as unplanned,
spontaneous and informal (see Chapter 2). Analysis of data generated from survey
of samples of market participants from these neighbourhoods is to be generalised
for the entire city - statistical generalisation. As a typical SSA city (case study),
these generalised conclusions are then applied to other cities of SSA -- analytical
generalisation (see Yin, 1994).
Figure 3.1: Rationale of Research Design
Analytical Generalisation
Accra	 Case Study	 Sub-Saharan Cities
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(See Yin, 1994: pp. 30-31)
For reasons fully explained in chapters 1 and 2 viz.: (a) the predominance of
unrecorded urban land/property transactions; (b) questionable and/or inappropriate
and/or dearth of secondary data from government agencies and; (c) existing work
typically based on casual empiricism; the research needed to rely heavily on
extensive systematic primary data generation. Data collection was conducted
between 6 July and 10 September 1999. It covered housing land purchasing
households (demand side); customary landowners (supply side) and real estate
consultants (market intermediaries). These were augmented by secondary data
from official sources to provide the appropriate context where necessary.
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Extra care had to be taken in the design to achieve reliability and validity of research
instruments. Reliability of a measurement is the extent to which it produces
consistent results; measuring the same characteristic or situation repeatedly should
yield the same results. Validity is the extent to which a measure actually
corresponds with what the researcher is trying to measure. Full discussions on tests
of reliability and validity of research instruments and measurements can be found in
Fowler (1993 and 1995) and Fowler and Mangione (1990).
3.2. 1.Questionnaire Design.
Fully structured standardised questionnaires were adopted as the appropriate
research instrument (Appendices 1-3 contain copies of the questionnaires). That is
to say all questionnaires comprised mainly of a set of pre-prepared questions with a
domain of answers from which respondents were to choose an answer. An
advantage of this approach lies in achieving reliability of measurements (see above):
restricted domain of responses ensures that consistent responses are obtained over
all respondents. Another is its amenability to making statistical inferences and
generalisations from data collected. Since responses have to lie in given domains,
one can apply formal statistical techniques in the analysis. Another advantage is the
assurance of standardisation when, as in this case, interviewers other than the
designer of the research are to be utilised (see 3. 5 below).
A disadvantage however lies in the undue emphasis placed on the researcher's
ability to predict a priori, the appropriate items to include and their response domain.
In this sense the researcher imposes constraints on responses. This disadvantage
can, however, be minimised with experience and knowledge of the field under
investigation as well as extensive literature review. Given the experience in this
particular field through both practical involvement and the literature, it was
considered that the gains from employing this approach far outweighed the losses.
Creswell (1994 & 1998), Fowler (1993 & 1995) and Fowler and Mangione (1990)
informed ideas on questionnaire design. The pertinent factors to investigate were
informed by and adapted from Asiama (1980) and Larbi (1994).
A set of questions sought factual and quantitative information. Others sought to
measure perspectives and attitudes of respondents. For these an adaptation of the
Likert (1932) scale approach commonly used by social science researchers was
adopted. It was felt that the "strongly agree, agree, not sure, disagree, strongly
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disagree" format of Likert-type questions could not adequately measure respondents
true attitudes and perceptions of aspects of the market. An adaptation to measure
degrees of perceptions and attitudes of land market transactions using jargons
employed in the market was more appropriate, Items 4.d; and 4.i on household
interview schedule (Appendix 1A) exemplify this adaptation. For a full set of these
questions and the context of how they were employed in the analysis see Chapter 7.
Given that some of the information sought was sensitive, respondents were given
the liberty to refrain from answering any questions they did not wish to answer. Also,
the use of field assistants and the need for translation into vernacular, required that
questionnaires were designed to allow internal consistency checks. This took the
form of asking for similar information using different questions. The downside of this
is the length of questionnaires employed, which limited the number of interviews per
interviewer in a given time.
The demand side questionnaire sought to generate data on seven main independent
variables expected to inform household housing land/property purchase decisions.
The variables in question are: (i) land acquisition; (ii) market price information; (iii)
interest in property; (iv) post registration expenses; (v) physical development of
property; (vi) litigation; (vii) government land squatters (see Appendix 1A).
The supply side questionnaire sought to generate data on nine main independent
variables of the management and decision to sell lands comprising of: (i) title; (ii)
physical delineation and protection of land; (iii) management strategies; (iv) cost of
administration; (v) circumstances of plot sales; (vi) determinants of price of plot; (vii)
litigation; (viii) government prescriptions on land sales; (ix) compulsory
acquisition/vesting (see Appendix 2A).
The questionnaire for market intermediaries sought to generate data on four main
variables of consultants' practice. These were: (i) background company information;
(ii) land price information; (iii) market problems; (iv) title documentation (see
Appendix 3A).
3. 3. Sampling
In all 305 market participants were surveyed comprising of, 286 housing land
purchasing households, 9 customary landowners and 10 real estate consultants.
The sampling strategy adopted for each main group of respondents was as follows:
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3. 3. 1. Household Survey (demand side data)
A two stage sampling process was employed. First, neighbourhoods for study were
selected based on their age. Recent and developing neighbourhoods were preferred
to ensure that (a) information requested for the survey are as recent as possible in
the minds of respondents given the prevalence of unrecorded transactions and, (b)
the survey captures any recent trends in transactions. This meant that
neighbourhoods in the periphery of the city satisfied this criterion. A second level
consideration was to select neighbourhoods to reflect the eastern, western and
northern orientation of the city. One neighbourhood, Sports Complex, was selected
for survey mainly to gain insight into 'illegal transactions' on government acquired
lands. In all five neighbourhoods (broadly defined) were selected for survey as
shown in Table 3.1.
The second stage sampling process involved sampling of respondents in the
selected neighbourhoods. This was done on a purely random basis. Interviewers
were to pick the first property encountered walking from the main lorry station ('tro-
tro' station) of the neighbourhood. From then on each other property was to be
selected. In the event that there was no qualified respondent for any property
selected by this randomisation process the one immediately following was selected.
This happened a number of times for a series of reasons such as, uncompleted
structure, resident is only a caretaker, resident is only a relative of owner and was
not involved in the purchase of the land (see front of household survey
questionnaire, Appendix 1A, for who constitutes qualified respondents).
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Table 3.1: Number of Respondents in Neighbourhoods
Neighbourhood	 Respondents	 Choice Criterion
1 Santa Maria	 45	 West
2. Awoshie/Anyaa	 36	 West
3. Sraha Ashaley Botwe	 89	 East
4 Mallam/Gbawe	 36	 North
5. Sports Complex	 Generally West
Chantan	 Government Acquired Land
Abeka Lapaz	 Developed by private individuals
Abeka Race Course Area	 without Government approval
Abeka Sports Complex	 17
Kwashebu	 15
KATA Hotel Back	 5	 80
Total	 286
3. 3. 2. Customary Land Owners Survey (Supply side data)
There is no comprehensive list of customary landowners in Accra. To survey a
sample therefore required making enquiries in the manner that households
interested in purchasing housing land would. The procedure is as follows. First, a
neighbourhood of interest has to be identified and enquires made as to the Stool or
Family who sells those lands. The residences of accredited stool/family
representatives that sell land are then located. Negotiations for the transaction then
ensue. In practice enquiries from Land Commission Secretariat reveals staff who
serve as front men for various Stools/Families. These staffs were used to locate
nine landowners that were interviewed.
3. 3. 3. Survey of property consultants (Data on market intermediaries)
The Ghana Institute of Surveyors, the professional body of surveyors in Ghana,
publishes the list of all qualified surveyors annually. This list for 1999 was used to
sample out all firms in Accra that practise as General Practice Surveyors, the
appropriate professional surveying division that advise on purchasing, sale, finance
and related aspects of land/property dealings. This yielded 25 firms A postal
survey was undertaken to cover the entire population. 10 responses (40% response
rate) were returned3.
Many of the non-respondents were actually visited and showed interest in
the survey and promised to return the questionnaire. However it would
appear that sheer pressures of work ensured that they just did not get round
to completing and returning them. There is no specific reason to suspect
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3. 4. Sample Characteristics
278 out of the 286 household respondents provided answers to items requesting
information on age group, gender, employment and educational status. This
information is summarised in Table 3.2, at page 43. From the table it is clear that
out of the 278 land purchasing respondents providing answers for these particular
items the majority, 79 (28.4%), were male, between the ages of 40 and 49 years.
Between both sexes purchasers tended to be over 40 years. This is more apparent
among females where only about 1.8% of all respondents were under 40 compared
to around 9% for males. Indeed, unlike the males, the dominant age group among
female respondents was 50 to 59 years, contributing 9% of respondents. On the
whole, 77.7% of all respondent purchasers were male and 22.3% female.
By Ghanaian standards, with 64.5% of adults over 15 years estimated to be able to
read and write (CIA, 1999), land purchasers in the study are well educated. As
much as 92.8% have had some form of formal education (can read and write). Of
the total respondents, 52.3% (146) have had education beyond elementary school
level (i.e. secondary, commercial, technical, teacher training college level). 15.8%
(44) had university level education. Also, land purchasers in the study tended to be
predominantly self-employed. As much as 112, constituting 40.1% of all responding
purchasers, are self-employed. This is followed by, in descending order of
predominance, those who described themselves as white collar employees, 79
(28.3%), blue collar employees, 46 (16.5%) and those with no specific employment
42(15.1%).
The nine landowners surveyed have been involved in the land market as suppliers
for varying number of years, ranging from a minimum of two years to a maximum of
28 years. Among them they have been operating for an average of 12.33 years.
Compared to land purchasers, land suppliers have lower standards of education. A
majority of them (44.4%) have only up to elementary school education while 3
(33.3%) have a post elementary education qualification. Only one (11%) had a
university level education. The same number (1) had no formal education.
that the response of these firms would have been significantly different from
those returned.
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The characteristics of the ten real estate consulting firms from whom responses
were obtained are shown in Table 3.3 at page 43. Of the ten firms, 5 have been
practising in that capacity for over 15 years while, 4 (40%) have been operating for
between 51,410 years. These are small firms with the majority (6 firms) employing
between 5 and 10 staff. 6 firms employ between 2 and 4 professionally qualified
surveying staff while 3 employ between 5 and 7 qualified staff. All firms employ at
least one qualified surveying staff.
3. 5. Data Collection Procedures
By far the most comprehensive of the data collected was on the demand side, viz.
the household survey that required field assistants. Five graduates were recruited
for the purpose. This introduced the need for training to minimise interviewer-related
errors particularly pertaining to when interviewers fail to be standardised 4 (Fowler
and Mangione, 1990: p. 11). Interviewer training covered three days and was mainly
to ensure interviewers (a) read questions as worded, (b) probe inadequate answers
non-directively, (c) record answers accurately and (d) be interpersonally neutral in
the interviewing process (Fowler and Mangoine, 1990; Creswell, 1994 & 1998). A
mock interview was organised on the second day where the researcher posed as a
difficult land/property owner to be interviewed and each interviewer took turns to
conduct the interview. The third day of training was in the field at one of the sampled
sites, Sports Complex. All five interviewers accompanied to undertake real field
interviews. The researcher conducted the interviews while they observed. Four
interviews in all were conducted. After leaving a property we discussed the practical
problems encountered and my reasoning behind dealing with them the way I did.
This turned out to be very productive because it prepared the interviewers for what
they were to meet when left on their own. As to choice of Sports Complex as the
training site, it was the most difficult neighbourhood expected of all the sampled sites
in view of the illegal nature' of property ownership. If respondents were to pose a
problem for interviewers it was likely to be encountered on this site.
Once interviewers were left on their own on the various sites to pursue the work,
checks to detect interviewer error were made by paying random visits on sites and
observing interviewers. After the first four days of detecting and discussing bad
Fowler and Mangione (1990) explain that wthout training to ensure the adoption of a
standard approach interviewer related errors can emerge from differences among interviewers
regarding, reading questions, probing inadequate answers recording answers, being
interpersonally neutral to the interview ng process
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practice detected of two interviewers, there were no detectable signs of bad practice
during subsequent random visits.
The main criteria for selecting interviewers were; (a) they should be graduates to
ensure proficiency in English and (b) they should speak at least Twi and Ga
Ghanaian languages to be able to interpret questions when necessary. All five
interviewers selected spoke Twi and Ga. One spoke Ewe in addition, another spoke
Hausa in addition.
The interview itself involved an interviewer reading the questions and domain
responses and ticking off the response on an accompanying response sheet.
Supply side data was collected solely by the researcher. It took the form of visiting
the accredited land allocating committee of the identified stool or family. The
interview process involved the researcher reading questions and the domain of
answers to respondents. Selected answers were then ticked off on the
questionnaire. In some instances there was the need for an interpreter since the
researcher does not speak Ga, the language of landowners in Accra.
Market intermediaries (real estate consultants) data was generated through a postal
survey. All 25 qualifying practices were posted questionnaires. Follow-up telephone
reminders were made to all firms from whom responses had not been received after
a month of posting questionnaires. Given the very disappointing response rate (8
respondents at the end of the research period) reminders were sent from the UK in
September enclosing fresh questionnaires for those from whom responses had not
been received at the end of the survey period. This yielded an additional two
responses5.
3. 6. Data Analysis
Data entry and initial computations were undertaken using Excel.
	 Initial
computations were needed to convert multiple responses obtained from the adapted
Likert-type questions (see page 38). This was in the form of calculating intensity
scores. For questions requesting consultants to rank items, rank scores were
computed. Details of these initial calculations are provided in Chapter 7. The main
analysis of the data was undertaken using SPSS 9.0. This consisted of deriving
For comments concerning possible response bias see footnote 3 at
page 41.
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descriptive statistics (frequency tables) to test the first four hypotheses of the study.
Chapter 7 discusses this aspect of the analysis. The test of the fifth hypothesis
demanded the utilisation of multivariate analysis. Multiple regression and
discriminant analysis were employed to achieve this. This is discussed in Chapter 8.
3. 7. Comments on Methodology
It should be mentioned that the absence of systematically recorded data presented
problems that possess the potential to impact adversely on the results reported in
the study. As discussed in section 3. 2 attempts have been made in the research
design to counter this. However some important problems are worth mentioning if
only to provide a context of limitations of the findings. These include:
• The unrecorded nature of transactions meant that respondents needed to recall
historic answers. This introduced a high potential of error pertaining to the extent
to which such recollections are accurate reflections of the actual events. On
prices, for instance, it imposes limitations on the reliability and applicability of the
findings relating to land price appreciation.
• Concerning purchasers of lands in government acquired neighbourhoods in
particular, is the danger that agents would provide responses which they
perceive not likely to compromise them in the event confidentiality of the survey
is breached. Responses might therefore reflect different circumstances from
their actual actions, decisions or behaviours. Similarly there is the chance that
landowners reported what they deemed right (and legal) rather than their actual
actions. Attempts to convince respondents that their responses are not to be
used in anyway to their detriment were to counter this6.
• The disappointing response rate of consultants imposed limits on inferences that
could be made from results of their survey. This however is compensated for by
the extended survey of households.
• Allowing respondents to refrain from answering any question they did not wish to
meant that for some variables, the number of applicable cases was so few as to
create degrees of freedom problems in the multivariate analyses.
6 Evidence from the general comments of many of the respondents show that
the attempt to counter this through explicit assurances, both orally and in
the introductory letter (which they were allowed to keep), before the
interview commenced, paid off. From the comments, respondents were so
reassured that in some cases they were prepared to discuss illegal activities
of some government officials and even mention names.
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In order to place the results of the data analysis in context and to properly address
the hypotheses presented earlier, it is first necessary to understand the economics of
property rights, market failure and rent-seeking behaviour. This is done in the
following three chapters.
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Chapter 4: Some Theory and Economics of Property Rights
4. 0. Introduction
As discussed in Chapter 2, the debate about the causes of spatial aspects of urban
problems in SSA raises issues relating to property rights in land. In the bid to
achieve effective management of urban lands tools like neighbourhood zoning,
planning regulations, among others, are employed. In the main, these tools define
or redefine property rights in urban land. An understanding of the concept of
property rights is therefore essential for a comprehensive analysis of urban land
policy and management, the effects on property markets and conditions of the urban
built environment. This chapter provides an economic analysis of property rights.
Section 4. 1 examines the concept of property rights. This is followed by a
discussion of the economics in section 4. 2. Section 4. 3 concludes the chapter with
a general discussion of government regulations and property rights.
4. 1. The Concept of Property Rights.
The concept of property rights concerns constraints and classes of permissible
action within and among members of a society. Property rights are therefore defined
and made up of all the acceptable rules and conventions in a society which
conditions the manner, mode and nature of "doing things". The concept of property
rights has grown out of the law of property. "The law of property is concerned with
conferring on us legal powers in relation to a thing" (Lawson and Rudden, 1982).
From the perspective of property law, the content of ownership is the sum of all that
can be done with it. Lawson and Rudden (1982) list the main elements of what can
be done to a 'thing' as: (a) the right to make physical use of a thing; (b) the right to
the income from it, in money, in kind, or in services; and (c) the power of
management, including that of alienation. The concept that ownership of a thing is,
in principle, ownership of right(s) in relation to that thing is brought home more
forcefully when dealing with land or real property.
In view of the immovability of land it would be rather difficult for it to form the basis of
economic transactions in a modern economy. Ownership would only be possible
through physical possession and use. The law invented the idea of ownership of a
bundle of rights This means that ownership of landed property relates to ownership
of a set of rights impinging on the use of the land. Thus when one is said to own a
piece of land or a house, strictly speaking, this means one owns some bundle of
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rights over the said piece of land to the exclusion of other members of the society.
In essence a pure private good. These rights may include the right to use, to receive
income, to disinherit and, to dispose of the land. In effect, ownership of immovable
property means ownership of a bundle of rights that allows the owner to make
decisions about utilization of the resource.
With such an invention, trading of immovable property is made possible. Physically
possessing property is not necessary when ownership is in terms of rights. The
rights can be traded like any commodity. Furthermore, the bundle of rights is
capable of re-packaging so that different subsets could be owned by different parties
at the same time. It is possible, for instance, for one agent to own the right to
occupy a house for a specified period, while another owns the right to receive
income from the house, and the right to decide the mode of use of the house after
the specified period. Such simultaneous ownership of different sets of rights by
different agents is typically observed in landlord and tenant relationships. Both are
owners of the house in their own right; they own some right(s) that exclude any other
person from exercising that specific right on the house. The tenant owns the right to
occupy and use the house for an agreed period of time, whilst the landlord owns the
right to receive the rent, re-let the house after the agreed period, or dispose of it. It
is also possible for a group of persons (indeed a whole community) to own the same
set of rights over some immovable property concurrently. In such instances the
exercise of the right by one member of the group does not exclude the exercise of
the same right by another member. Common ownership of public parks, public
footpaths -- public goods -- are examples. Further rights-packaging possibilities
enable the concurrent ownership of exclusive rights held by individual(s) to exist with
common ownership of other rights by the whole community in a particular piece of
landed property. One can think of the existence of public right of ways over farm
lands owned exclusively by some individual or household as an example.
While the concept has been essential in obviating the immovability problem of
landed assets in trading, immovability is not a necessary condition for extension of
the concept to other goods. In fact ownership of all economic goods could be easily
conceptualised as ownership of rights over the use of the good. Ownership of a car,
for example, is in reality ownership of the right to drive it, the right to park it in non-
prohibited areas, the right to re-paint it and many other rights which ownership of a
car confers. These rights are subject to constraints set by other individuals' rights.
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That such conceptualisation had not been fundamental to economic analysis has
been cited by Coase (1960) as the reason for the failure [at the time] to develop a
theory adequate to handle the problem of harmful effects7.
An important point worth emphasising, particularly because it exposes
misconceptions of land management practices in SSA, is that property rights are
defined by both formal and informal rules, customs, and regulations of a society.
Whilst formal state and municipal rules and regulations may prescribe which actions
are legal and which are not; which actions of one individual are preferred against
those of another, for instance.; certain informal norms of society determine aspects
of actions that may or may not be acceptable. The way we dress, speak and
conduct ourselves in public conform to certain unwritten rules most of which are
principally informal but well known and generally adhered to. The law of tort and
nuisance have emerged to set the limits to which the exercise of one individual's
right can interfere with another individual's. Formal legislation defines acceptable
behaviour which is enforced by state power. Add together these formal and informal
rules and we define a system of property rights. Thus a system of property rights
implies a method of assigning to particular individuals the authority to select, for
specific goods, any use from a non-prohibited class of uses. It follows from this that
property rights determine which individuals or groups of individuals in a society, at
any given time, have the right to decide how a specific resource is to be employed.
It also follows that property rights determine the nature of rewards and sanctions
(cost-rewards system) associated with such resource employment decisions. De
Alessi (1980) sums it up very nicely as follows:
'The system of property rights.........specifies the nature of the rights which an
individual may hold to the use of resources, to the income generated from
those resources, and to the transferability of those resources to other
individuals. The system of property rights thus determines, via actual or
imputed prices, how the benefits and the harms resulting from a decision will
be allocated between the decision maker and other individuals, thereby
specifying the expectations which an individual can hold in his dealings with
other members of the society" (De Alessi, 1980; p. 3).
7A full discussion of Coase's contribution is provided below under,
Economics of Property Rights, Page 53
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It should also be noted that a system of property rights appears to prevail in a society
not so much because the state or other dominant force in the society prefers it but
because individuals prefer to be ruled and organised in the chosen system, at least
for a vast, overwhelming majority of people (Alchian, 1965: p. 817). As evidence
from the field survey of this study will demonstrate in Chapter 7, the Ghana
Government's attempt to prohibit the sale of freehold 8 interests in customary lands is
having no effect on the prevalence of the sale of perpetual interests precisely
because an overwhelming majority of agents prefer to transact in freehold interests.
So, what types or nature of property rights system may prevail.
4. 1. 1. Private and Public Property Rights
It has become customary to discuss property rights in the context of private and
public rights. Private property rights are found in societies where the acceptable
means of doing things' allow individuals to act in particular ways provided those
actions do not interfere, in some pre-defined manner, with that of others in the
society. An owner of private property rights possesses the consent of fellowmen to
allow him to act in particular ways. An owner expects the community to prevent
others from interfering with his actions, provided that these actions are not prohibited
in the specifications of his rights (Demsetz, 1967). In terms of resource allocation, a
system of private property rights assigns decisions concerning the employment of
resources, to a large extent, to individual economic agents. Private property rights
mean that an individual's rights to the use of the resources he owns are exclusive
and voluntarily transferable. That is, the owner has the exclusive authority to choose
how the resources he owns will be used, as long as the selection does not affect the
physical attributes of goods owned by others. Moreover, he has the exclusive right
to receive the income generated from the use of his resources and to exchange his
property rights with those of other individuals at mutually agreeable prices (De
Alessi, 1980).
This contrasts with public property rights which are normally held by members of a
society or a group in such forms or manner that no one individual or groups of
individuals can exclude other members from exercising the right. There are, in
reality, few public' goods which hold the characteristic of pure non-excludability, for
example, defence and the law. In some form, common owners possess the
concurrent right to exploit the resource. The proceeds of such exploitation then
becomes the private property of the individual. Ownership of fishing rights allowing
8 Feuhold in Scotland
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every member the right to fish is a typical example. Fish caught by any individual
becomes their private property. In other forms, common ownership implies the
requirement of the consent of all members of the owning group in the employment of
the resource. A typical example of this can be found in cases where landed property
is bequeathed to members of a family to be owned in common. The consent of all
members is required, in these circumstances, to effect a disposal of the property.
While this distinction is normally drawn between societies based on private property
rights (e.g. Western industrialised nations) and those based on common ownership
rights (e.g. the former Soviet bloc of nations), in reality, we observe traits of both
private and public property rights in all societies. In Western industrialised
economies where private property rights dominate, there are still some economic
activities that are organised through public ownership. Economists have long
established that the provision of facilities like roads, streetlights and the like are of a
nature that creating private property rights in them to enable voluntary trading of
rights is not the most economically efficient way. At the other extreme, despite
strong ideological persuasions of the advantages of public ownership of productive
resources, Communist nations exhibited evidence of private property rights in some
goods. Individuals in the former Soviet Union had their exclusive private rights to
their cars and flats, for example.
Effectively private and public property rights are the extreme ends of a continuum of
systems of property rights. One society may prefer a system of property rights that
may comprise combinations of private and public rights in a way that sways it
towards one extreme, while another society prefers a combination biasing the
property rights system to the opposite extreme. From our observations of both the
West and the former Soviet Union, ideology alone does not seem to fully explain why
one combination prevails against all other possible combinations. What factors
determine the preference for one system of property rights against another by a
given society is an interesting enquiry to pursue. In order to undertake such enquiry
it is necessary to understand how a system of property rights affects or is affected by
the economic system. To what extent a given system of property rights affects
prices, economic activity and economic behaviour is therefore a key question to be
dealt with. The economics of property rights offers some insights into this.
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4. 2. Economics of Property Rights
4.2. 1.Transaction Costs
The introduction of the idea of systems of property rights as essential to economic
analysis has been attributed to a seminal paper by Coase (1960) who highlighted the
importance of costs arising from the existing system of property rights in resource
allocation. Following this work, various studies have contributed in making the
subject an important area in economic analysis today. A compilation of some of
these studies is provided by Madama (1995). Coase (1960) recommended the need
to conceptualise resource ownership as ownership of rights. Such a
conceptualisation is helpful in economic analysis for, as has been examined above,
the forms and kinds of property rights sanctioned in a society define or identify the
kinds of competition, discrimination or behaviour characteristic of that society
(Alchian, 1965). In a neo-classical economic framework, resources eventually move
to their optimum use. Through the processes of income and/or utility maximisation
of individual economic agents and profit maximisation by firms, resources are traded
to the point where marginal costs of resource utilization are equal to marginal
revenues. In equilibrium, efficiency is achieved through optimum employment of
resources. The nature of the ownership structure of resources, that is to say, how
the costs and rewards of resource utilization impinge on those making the decisions
are structured (the existing system of property rights) has been given secondary
importance in this framework.
"The traditional neo-classical model assumes an (unspecified) ideal property
rights structure that enables producers to choose from all known sets of
contractual relations or organisations. In reality, production functions and the
value of rights to production functions depend on the structure of property
rights, just as they depend on the state of technology" (Eggertsson, 1990: p.
451).
The re-allocation of resources to achieve efficient utilization implies a re-allocation of
property rights. Given that the system of property rights conditions the nature of
doing things, it determines the form of economic organisation. The movement of
economic resources from one form of production to another, which is fundamental to
achieving efficiency in a neo-classical model, is constrained by the existing property
rights system. That is to say, the nature of exchange and trade fundamental to
resource allocation and re-allocation, is determined by the existing property rights
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system. In a real world where costs are associated with these transactions, it implies
that the cost profile of factor mobility is a function of the existing property rights.
Therefore achievement of efficiency through optimum employment of resources
would only be attained if the costs introduced by resource re-allocation do not
exceed the gains resulting from such re-allocation.
Coase (1960) demonstrates that resources would move to their efficient use
irrespective of the initial delimitation of property rights in the absence of transaction
costs. However in the real world, transaction costs are positive. To the extent that
these costs are not considered, the analysis is incomplete. Indeed Coase (1960)
observes that the concept of a factor of production, in particular, is faulty to the
extent:
"it is usually thought of as a physical entity which the businessman acquires
and uses (an acre of land, a ton of fertiliser) instead of as a right to perform
certain (physical) actions" (Coase, 1960; p. 43).
Once the costs of carrying out market transactions are taken into account it is clear
that such a rearrangement of rights will only be undertaken when the increase in the
value of production consequent upon the rearrangement is greater than the costs
which would be involved in bringing it about. In these conditions the initial
delimitation of property rights does have an effect on the efficiency with which the
economic system operates. One arrangement of rights may bring about a greater
value of production than any other. But unless this is the arrangement of rights
established by the system of property rights, the costs of reaching the same result by
altering and combining rights through the market may be so great that this optimal
arrangement of rights, and the greater value of production which it would bring, may
never be achieved (Coase, 1960). The ideas of property rights and transaction costs
in economic analysis are known as the Coase theorem. In a later article, Coase
(1992; p. 717) describes his view of the work in the following words:
I regard the Coase theorem as a stepping stone on the way to an analysis
of an economy with positive transaction costs".
The following deductions can be made. There exists a system of property rights
which may bring about a greater value of production than any other. Call this the
optimum system of property rights. This optimum rights system is the one
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associated with the minimum transaction costs profile resulting from resource re-
allocation. Given what we understand from basic economics, one would expect the
presence of some internal forces working to push any society to designing the
optimum property rights system . Are there any such forces at work? If there are,
would there be different forces for different circumstances or at different levels of
economic development? Why do we observe different systems among different
societies? Why, again, do we sometimes observe, in a given society, the existence
of a different system from the predominant property rights system in the organisation
of certain resources? For example, what is it that makes citizens of Western
industrialised nations prefer public property rights in certain resources in view of the
dominance of private property rights in these societies? The quest for answers to
questions of this nature instructs us to investigate why a given system of property
rights prevail against all other possible combinations.
4. 2. 2. Systems of Property Rights -- Forces at Work.
It has been established above that property rights exist to organise competing claims
of individual members of a society. Individual claims tend to compete because there
is always a finite stock of resources to satisfy all claims. In effect property rights
exist because resources are scarce relative to competing claims; it is because
resources are scarce that we need to define a system that stipulates who has the
authority to exercise rights that lead to the utilization of given resources at any given
time. In the absence of scarcity there would be no need for property rights. Some
even argue that the whole question of economics is actually a question of property
rights. Alchian (1967; p. 370) makes the following observation;
"Without scarce resources there is no point to property rights. The allocation
of scarce resources in a society is the assignment of rights to uses of
resources in a society. So the question of economics or of how prices should
be set is the question of how property rights should be defined and exchanged
and on what terms".
If property rights exist to allocate scarce resources then the nature and condition of
available resources ought to influence the type of property rights system that would
exist. In other words, whilst the existing system of property rights conditions the
level of efficiency attainable in resource utilization, the form of property rights system
itself would have emerged as a result of the particular allocative needs of the
available resources and the level of economic organisation (see Libecap, 1978).
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The informal way in which agents prefer to transact urban residential land in SSA
may be conveying information about the availability and level of economic
organisation of urban land resources than about agents' ignorance or cultural
backwardness concerning modern documentation of titles to land. All things being
equal, the internal forces of costs against gains would push a society to achieving
the optimum rights system, given available resources. From this perspective alone,
one may conclude that at any given time the system of property rights we observe in
a given society may be the optimal one or, at worst, the 'second best' outcome.
It is to be remembered that systems of property rights observed in various societies
typically comprise of many combinations of private and public rights (see page 52).
It seems to be the case that these combinations occur because the cost/benefit
functions associated with property rights differ for different resources. In general a
system of private property rights engenders a more efficient use of resources. The
cost of transaction under private property rights should be less than costs under any
communal or public ownership rights system. It would be less costly to obtain
information on a private owner willing to trade; to draw contracts of trade, to enforce
contracts, than it would with many co-owners. Furthermore, the stronger are private
property rights the closer is the relationship between the welfare of an individual
owner and the economic consequences of his decisions. As a result, the greater is
his incentive to take account of the benefits and harms that his decisions visit on
other individuals (De Alessi, 1980).
"In controlling that resource, private property rights have the characteristic that
it is easier (cheaper) to exchange the rights for other forms of marketable
(money) than for rights that are less private......In publicly owned property it is
not legally possible for one person to sell his rights to public goods to some
other people. The rights are not marketable individually as is corporate stock
ownership" (Alchian 1967 p. 374).
Under public ownership the costs of any decision or choice are less fully thrust upon
the selector than under private property (Alchian, 1965). Superior (cost effective)
resource utilization decisions are therefore expected to be employed under private
property rights than under public ownership systems. In the absence of any
constraining factors, systems of private property rights should replace other inferior
systems.
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However, costs arising from the nature of contracts to be drawn and costs of
enforcing such contracts, set against gains to be made by establishing private
property rights may mean, for some resources, that common ownership rights
prevail. It might be possible, for example, to partition the common ownership of
footpaths among members of a community in a way that allows each member the
exclusive right of use at particular times. If trading of rights is then allowed,
efficiency in the use of the footpath could be achieved. Individuals who value the
right to walk at certain times less than others would seek to exchange their right of
use at one time for another. Some may completely relinquish their right to use the
footpath by exchanging it for rights in other resources because they value those
rights higher. Through trade, congestion on certain parts of public footpaths at
certain times and the irresponsibility which generally characterises the use of public
facilities could be eliminated. This could lead to efficiency gains in the use of public
facilities. But to establish private property rights in these facilities might mean the
setting up of expensive enforcement systems to prevent the use of one individual's
rights interfering with other's. The overall costs of locating and compiling a list of all
owners, setting up an elaborate partitioning system and enforcing them, may far
outweigh any gains that might arise through trading of rights. Under these
conditions, public ownership may prevail. In other circumstances (what, in fact,
amounts to the same cost/benefit issue), a resource may be so abundant, and of
such small value at the margin, that it does not pay to incur the costs of establishing
and enforcing private property rights (De Alessi, 1980).
Economic efficiency alone, of course, is not the only force guiding societies in
choosing specific property rights systems. Political, historical and cultural
circumstances have a part to play. Thus common ownership may prevail not
because the realignment of specific rights are costlier but because, for some
political, historical or cultural reasons, such realignments may simply be prohibited.
This implies that resource rights are inhibited from flowing to those individuals with a
comparative advantage in their use, and output is smaller. Nevertheless, seemingly
inefficient organisational structures are established and survive either because they
are preferred to other forms, and members of the society are willing to forego other
goods in exchange, or because they work to the benefit of groups with a comparative
advantage in the exercise of political power, or because they suit other constraints.
That is, the establishment and enforcement of a specific system of property rights
depends not only upon considerations of economic efficiency, but also upon
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individual preferences and political realities within a community (see De Alessi, 1980;
p.4; and De Alessi and Staaf, 1989; p. 179).
Like any equilibrium in economics, the optimum system of property rights is not a
static phenomenon. As changes occur, the emergence of new property rights takes
place. For instance, in circumstances where a resource is so abundant that it does
not pay to establish private property rights, a change in relative prices or technology
may change the situation. An increase in the marginal value of the resource,
perhaps due to an increase in demand for the final product or to a decrease in the
costs of enforcing private rights, may change matters drastically. A change in the
relative prices changes the cost-reward profile. New property rights emerge in
response to the desires of the interacting persons for adjustment to new benefit-cost
possibilities (Demsetz, 1967; p. 350). In the main, this results from changes in
economic values, changes which stem from the development of new technology and
the opening of new markets, changes to which old property rights are poorly attuned.
Thus, given a community's tastes in regard of systems of property rights, the
emergence of new private or state-owned property rights will be in response to
changes in technology and relative prices. It is precisely for this reason that ideas of
SSA concepts of ownership of land developed from observations made many years
ago and attempts to frame formal land management policies on them may be flawed.
"It is the possibility of profits that cannot be captured within the existing
arrangemental structure that leads to the formation of new (or the mutation of
old) institutional arrangements" (Davis and North, 1971).
It is useful to summarise the important arguments so far:
• Through transaction costs, a system of property rights conditions the level of
efficiency attainable in an economy.
• All things being equal, a system of private property rights is expected to lead to a
more efficient utilization of resources than other public ownership rights. Under
private rights, incentives for efficient employment of resources are stronger
because the cost-reward possibilities of decisions are fully thrust upon the
selector than under public ownership.
• The resource stock and level of economic organisation influences the form of
systems of property rights that may emerge.
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• Within constraints of political, historical and cultural factors, observed property
rights systems may be the optimal one.
• Property rights are dynamic: with changes in any of the constraining factors, new
property rights may emerge to replace old ones.
There is some empirical evidence in support of most of these arguments. Libecap
(1978) has found evidence to support the view that the evolution of American
institutions reflected the costs and benefits of defining and enforcing various kinds of
property rights. Investigating the timing and emergence of particular legal
institutions in mineral rights in the American West, it was found that private property
rights law did not evolve autonomously, but rather was continually shaped by
external economic forces.
"This leads to the conclusion that the pattern of legal change in Nevada from
the mining camp through the state government was largely determined by
efficiency needs -- the need to reduce ownership uncertainty as competition
for mine income grew" (Libecap, 1978; p.361).
On the emergence of new property rights to cater for transactions for which old
property rights are poorly attuned, Demsetz (1967) quotes studies which together
establish a close relationship, both historically and geographically, between the
development of private rights in land among the American and Canadian Indians and
the development of the commercial fur trade. For example the introduction of the
commercial fur trade in Canada increased the value of beaver furs to the Indians and
led to increased hunting; within fifty years Indian communities evolved private
property rights (Demsetz, 1967; p.351-357). The introduction of barbed wire lowered
the cost of enforcing exclusivity and encouraged the development of private rights in
American Western lands (Anderson and Hill, 1975). These findings are in tune with
those found in SSA where population increases relative to availability of fertile lands
led to the establishment of private property rights before European colonisation
(Raynaut, 1976: see Chapter 2). On the question of which property rights systems
engender the most efficient utilisation of resources, De Alessi's (1980) review offers
some answers. This work reviews studies that show differences in economic
efficiency under various types of property rights systems and demonstrate the
superiority of private property rights in economic organisation.
	
For instance,
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evidence by Nicols (1967 & 1972 also reviewed in De Alessi, 1980) suggests that
mutual entities incur larger expenses than their counterparts floated in the stock
market. Mutual managers follow more conservative business practices, including
lower-risk investments and slower growth, than managers of stock associations.
Moreover, managers of mutuals hire more staff, including more relatives, and
engage in other practices that will ease their workload and increase their utility (see
De Alessi, 1980).
In all these circumstances, the existence of government institutions in promoting or
attenuating private property rights introduces an important dimension to the
discussion: that of government intervention in the economic system.
4. 3. Governments and Property Rights
Modern societies are characterised by an active involvement of government in the
day to day activities of their citizens. Government interference in the economic
system ranges from taxation, through regulation of economic activity, to prescribing
standards. All these activities define or redefine property rights. Neo-classical
economic analysis justifies government intervention in the market under
circumstances when markets fail. Such circumstances are said to include: imperfect
competition, problems of externalities, equity issues and missing markets9.
Such economic justification of government intervention in the market dates back to
Pigou (1932) who had argued that under conditions when
"One person A, in the course of rendering some service, for which payment is
made, to a second person B, incidentally also renders services or disservices
to other persons (not producers of like services), of such a sort that payment
cannot be exacted from the benefited parties or compensation enforced on
behalf of the injured parties"
it would be appropriate for government intervention to rectify the apparent failure of
the market. These conditions have been known as a divergence between private
and social costs and benefits and lead to problems of externalities. Pigou (1932)
argued that government intervention to remove this apparent failure of the market
will lead to efficient use of resources and increased welfare. In The problem of
Social Cost, Coase(1960) demonstrated the shortfalls of such an approach and
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highlighted the importance of property rights in deciding the appropriate action to
take. Indeed Coase's contribution to the concept of property rights resulted from this
treatment of the externality problem and the appropriateness of government
intervention in solving the problem. Since economic activity is, in reality, rights over
use of resources, in the absence of transaction costs, Coase (1960) argues, trading
of rights would take place to internalise the externalities leading to the achievement
of efficient utilization of resources, irrespective of the initial delimitation of property
rights. However in the real world, costs associated with trading of rights may prevent
the achievement of the optimum use of resources. But just because an inefficiency
appears to exist in the way the market may be operating in these circumstances
does not mean government intervention to remove the externality will yield any better
results. Government intervention in the economy leads to an altering of existing
property rights. Since there are costs associated with these property rights re-
ordering, the aim of such regulation should not be to eliminate the externality but
rather to secure the optimum amount, considering the costs and benefits arising
from the re-ordering of rights. The following quotation from Coase (1960) defines
the analytic framework that should guide policy makers.
"But in choosing between social arrangements within the context of which
individual decisions are made, we have to bear in mind that a change in the
existing system which will lead to an improvement in some decisions may well
lead to a worsening of others. Furthermore we have to take into account the
costs involved in operating the various social arrangements (whether it be the
working of a market or of a government department), as well as the costs
involved in moving to a new system. In devising and choosing between social
arrangements we should have regard for the total effect" (Coase, 1960; p. 44).
The implications of having to focus on the costs and benefits (net-benefits) of
government intervention has led many studies to investigate the operations and
outcomes of government intervention in various aspects of economic life. What
incentives and hence economic behaviour expectations are presented by
governments' running of economic activity (More, 1970; Davis, 1971 & 1977; Cram
and Zardkoohi, 1978), and government regulation of firms (Stigler, 1971; Hilton,
1972; Jordan, 1972; De Alessi, 1974; Borcherding, 1977) are some aspects which
have attracted the attention of researchers. Most of the findings and implications of
these studies are interesting reading. In general, the nature of the cost-reward
A discussion of markets and market failure is the subject of Chapter 5
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impact on individual decision makers (the system of property rights) under
government firms, leads to higher costs in government operations and regulations.
Relative to private firms, government firms have higher operating costs, engage in
less-wealth maximising, price discrimination, change prices less frequently and in
response to larger changes in economic determinants, adopt cost-reducing
innovations less readily, maintain managers in office longer and exhibit greater
variation in rates of return (See De Alessi, 1980 for a full review of the literature).
Government regulation of business firms reduces the bundle of rights held by their
owners (for example, it may restrict the right to set prices), attenuating owners'
private property rights and thereby reducing their ability to capture the benefits of
improved management and their incentive to monitor managers.
"Among other things, this analysis implies that private firms are more likely
than comparable political firms to introduce cost-reducing innovations, adopt
cost-minimising input combinations, cater to consumer wants, and respond
more quickly and fully to changes in economic circumstances" (De Alessi and
Staaf, 1989; p. 182).
In effect, government interventions or regulations of the economic system come with
costs. These are costs which result from the re-organisation of property rights, costs
which originate from inefficient decisions stemming from the distortions of incentives
presented to decision makers. Therefore, it should not be assumed
"...in those instances where the market place is inferior in certain respects to,
say, public ownership or government control, that we ought to switch from the
private property market to the government. The presence of one kind of
relative deficiency does not justify a switch to another agency -- which has
other kinds of deficiencies" (Alchian, 1966).
These implications provide strong analytical tools for analysing the administration of
urban neighbourhoods (which is, in effect, government regulation of private property
rights in urban land) that is the overall concern of this study. Some brief discussion
of this application is provided in the following section. Fuller analyses and empirical
tests of some of the implications in the Accra land market is undertaken in Chapters
6 and 7.
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4. 3. 1. Property Rights and Urban Land Administration
As has been explained in section 4. 1, ownership of no other economic product
enables an easy conceptualisation of the concept of property rights than ownership
of land and landed property. The in situ nature of land brings home more clearly the
idea that ownership of the product is, in fact, ownership of some rights to determine
the type and timing of use, disposal, and re-development. Land provides the spatial
dimension of most economic activities. In this sense, demand for property rights in
land is derived from the demand for the satisfaction of various needs like, residential
and recreational needs of the population, space for industries, and space for
infrastructure. By virtue of the fact that urbanisation implies a greater concentration
of different economic activities, competing claims for space is more acute in urban
areas than in rural areas. All things being equal, an urban land market (specifically,
a market for property rights in urban land), emerges to allocate land resources
among these competing , in most cases, conflicting needs. Forces of the demand
for and supply of rights in property should lead, in equilibrium, to an efficient
utilization of land resources. Generally speaking, the market mechanism is a
fundamental factor determining the structural form of many cities. Theories of urban
land use explain how cities are structured with activities that offer higher prices for
land use in city centres, followed by the next highest bidding activity and so on until
activities with the least bids are found at the outskirts of cities -- bid-rent theory. In
these models, each parcel of land in the urban environment, is eventually employed
in its highest and best use. See, for example, the model by von Thunen (1826), and
later developments by Alonso (1964), and some empirical tests by Yeates (1965).
For some view of these ideas and models see Balchin, et a! (1995).
But this is only part of the story behind urban structure. In reality, government
intervention in urban land allocation is well entrenched in almost every city of every
society. So entrenched, in fact, that interventions of government agencies in the
urban land market, manifested in the form of planning legislation, zoning, special
rules and legislation for trading urban land, and urban land administration in general,
are taken for granted. They are justified on the grounds that certain needs for urban
land are such that the market, left alone to allocate all land resources, would not
allocate land for their provision. Examples of these needs include public parks, play
grounds, spaces for waste treatment and land uses of this nature. These uses of
land are essential for the overall benefit of the urban society, the argument goes, but
because of the difficulty in establishing private property rights in them, they would not
be provided under a competitive market. The market fails. Here again we are
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thrown into the argument of a diversion between social and private costs in an urban
land use context. Because the market is inefficient in dealing with the problem,
government intervention is necessary to improve the situation.
But all these interventions are actually an attenuation of private property rights in
land. From the discussions above, it is clear that the existence of the apparent
inefficiency in the market alone does not justify government intervention which is
itself riddled with other forms of inefficiencies. On this Coase (1960; p. 18) has this
to say:
"But the governmental administrative machine is not itself costless It can, in
fact, on occasion be extremely costly Furthermore, there is no reason to
suppose that the restrictive and zoning regulations, made by a fallible
administration subject to political pressures and operating without any
competitive check, will necessarily always be those which increase the
efficiency with which the economic system operates. Furthermore, such
general regulations which must apply to a wide variety of cases will be
enforced in some cases in which they are clearly inappropriate."
The problem clearly is not that of removing an inefficiency in the market through
government intervention, but that of devising practical arrangements which will
correct defects in one part of the system without introducing more serious harm in
other parts. This point of government intervention possessing the potential of
introducing other costs is pursued in detail in the next Chapter where the activities of
politicians and bureaucrats are subjected to rigorous economic analysis.
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Chapter 5: Market Failure and Government Intervention
5. 0. Introduction
In keeping with the overall aim of the study - the identification of the fundamental
causes of observed problems in the Accra urban land market - it has been essential
to enquire into the nature of rights that can be held in urban land. Chapter 4
therefore established the forces behind the attainment of appropriate property rights
systems in given urban areas. Armed with those insights, it is now appropriate to
investigate the mechanisms that determine how property rights in urban land are
allocated between competing needs. As will be explained in detail in the discussion,
whether the allocation and exchange of rights in land are effected through free
market competition or Government administrative agencies, is important in predicting
the possible problems associated with the outcomes. Such an investigation should
provide further insights that will be needed in the evaluation of land/property markets
in Accra later in the study.
The discussion of the economics of property rights raised an issue about the
intervention of governments in the management of interests in urban land resources.
Government or state involvement in dealings relating to urban land; planning
restrictions and regulation of land use, special regulative requirements for contracts
relating to land and landed property, are examples of governments' attenuation of
property rights in urban land. In practice an indication of the overwhelming
involvement in this aspect of economic activity is provided by the plethora of
government agencies an individual has to deal with in property transactions. Most
private transactions in land in Accra, for example, are required to be 'formalised' by
an extensive government bureaucracy (see Chapter 6 for a full discussion). In view
of the consensus from the property rights literature that private property rights are
likely to produce superior outcomes than central control, why is this the position?
Implicit in general responses to this question is that urban housing and landed
property may possess social attributes which the market may fail to allocate
equitably and/or efficiently (see for example, Courtnery, 1983; Whitehead, 1983;
Rivkin, 1983; Asiama, 1980). However, critically viewed, the issue this question
raises comes down to a debate about the most efficient way of organising societies'
scarce resources - the debate about governments or markets -- a debate that is
better informed by economic insights.
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This Chapter seeks to examine the issues of the debate as they relate to land
markets employing analytical insights developed from economics. The main focus of
the Chapter is a critical analysis of the market failure paradigm as it relates to urban
land in Accra and the chances government agencies have in addressing market
failure. As Beckerman (1986) has aptly observed;
"while it is not within the scope of economic science to provide precise
scientific estimates of the socially optimal size and functions of government, it
can replace vague waffle or rhetoric with a clear statement of what positive
information is required and what value-judgements may be important"
(Beckerman, 1986; p. 90-1).
The Chapter is organised as follows. Section 5. 1 starts the discussion with an
explanation of the concept of the market and conditions under which markets thrive.
Limiting conditions of markets - market failure -- are examined in section 5. 2 where
government intervention to 'correct' market failure is discussed and related to land
markets in SSA. A summary of the Chapter is then provided in section 5. 3.
5. 1. Markets
Roper and Snowdon (1987: p. 9) have observed that in each economic system the
way in which decisions are made will differ, but each society must devise some
mechanism for solving three unavoidable problems namely: (a) which goods and
services to produce and in what quantities and quality; (b) the most economically
efficient way of producing the desired goods and services; (c) an acceptable method
of deciding who is to receive the goods. Options available for the resolution of these
basic problems span between two polar extremes. These are: (i) through planning,
under which some powerful body emerges to prescribe details and directions for how
available resources are to be utilised and; (ii) through a free for all competition for
resources to satisfy individual needs.
When one talks of markets, in principle, one is talking about the second of the above
extremes of economic organisation. That is to say, the organisation of economic
activities via the freedom to compete for resources. Implied in the freedom to
compete for scarce resources, is the need for exchange of resources. To be sure
that scarce resources are not wasted while needs of members of society are left
unsatisfied, what is required is a mechanism that informs owners of idle resources
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which have the potential for exchange. Mechanisms need to arise to enable and
render effective exchanges. Within institutional set-ups with powers of enforcing
contracts and property rights, markets emerge as the mechanism which enables the
competition for satisfaction of needs.
Markets today are indeed complex mechanisms that enable exchange of various
levels of economic goods; from consumer goods through intermediate goods to
factors of production. Markets enable, for example, remote owners of property over
their immediate occupational needs to let to tenants who require space to carry out
their business. Indeed without access to markets most of us would perish, since we
don't typically produce the things that we need to survive (Sen, 1985; p. 1). The
designs and pursuit of self interest by different people in a given society are co-
ordinated and achieved by the market (see Begg et al, 1997; p. 8). What then are
the main characteristics of markets?
5. 1. 1.The 'Marvel' of The Market
Since Adam Smith's (1776) publication of the Wealth of Nations, economists have
recounted the marvel of markets (the Invisible Hand) in the way they ensure
achievement of efficient allocation of resources. When free exchange is allowed,
and there is free flow of information, individuals' actions to satisfy their selfish needs
lead to an overall efficient allocation of resources. Through the decisions of self-
interest economic agents (who, it must be pointed out, have no interest whatsoever
of ensuring an overall efficient utilisation of the society's resources but the
satisfaction of their own immediate needs), markets make sure that goods that are
produced and consumed, are the most optimal, given tastes, income and resource
constraints. As well put in Adam Smith's (1776) classic inquiry into the wealth of
nations, it is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that
we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interests. Therefore when
markets prevail: a) there is no necessity to specify, a priori, preferences for resource
utilisation; b) no need to ensure that individual agents behave consistently with any
prior specifications, thus eliminating any need for (and costs associated with)
supervision; and c) no need for economic agents to be benevolent, honest or
possess any normative ambitions towards enhancing the welfare of society in
general. This feat is achieved through the price mechanism.
Prices of goods signal their relative ability to satisfy needs and trigger off two
opposing forces: (1) consumers use the price system as a guide to choosing goods
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that maximise their utility within constraints of limited budgets. Achieving this aim
implies paying the minimum possible price to obtain any good. (2) Producers on the
other hand use the price system to guide them as to which goods to produce, how to
produce and when to produce. These two opposing forces ensure that eventually
the right goods will be produced at the right time, by employing the least cost factors
of production and least cost production processes. But this is a characterisation of
the market which prevails only in ideal circumstances.
The problem is, it is next to impossible in the real world to get to a state of affairs
where perfect competition and all that goes with it prevails. Yet the achievement of
efficiency that entails in the market mechanism is conditional on the existence of
perfect competition. The real world comprises individual economic agents who
frequently behave in apparently irrational ways. Historical, cultural and geographical
barriers more often than not work against the emergence of competition that lead to
perfect operation of markets. Social welfare implications of certain goods may be
considered too important for their allocation to be left to the Invisible Hand. The
extent and absolute nature of poverty in urban areas of less developed countries
(LDCs), for instance, is argued to be enough reason why governments should
intervene in urban land markets (see, for example, Asiama, 1984). Thus when the
right conditions are absent markets may fail to operate as efficiently as one would
expect. The idea of markets failing - the market failure paradigm - has therefore
attracted a lot of attention by economists.
5. 2. Market Failure
As implied above, market failure describes the prevalence of circumstances which
prevent the market from working effectively (and efficiently). Market failure has been
defined as circumstances which lead to the questioning of the allocation of resources
that a pure market system brings about. It means that the best attainable outcome
has not been achieved: it does not mean that nothing good has happened (Lipsey
and Harbury, 1992; Lipsey and Chrystal, 1995).
"Market failure describes the circumstances in which distortions prevent the
Invisible Hand from allocating resources efficiently" (Begg et at, 1997; p 248).
There are three main sources of market distortions: imperfect competition (failure to
set price equal to marginal cost), externalities (divergence between private and
social costs or benefits), and other 'missing' markets in connection with future goods,
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risky goods, public goods or other informational problems (Begg et al, 1997; p. 248).
These have been classified as technical market failure (Middleton, 1996). There are
other circumstances under which the market may be working perfectly well within its
given constraints, but does not measure up to some normative standards of society.
These factors have been called social market failure (Middleton, 1996). The
remainder of this section discusses, in broad terms, these possible sources of
market failure.
A natural stating point in a discussion of market failure is the case of imperfect
competition. It is well established that markets work best under perfect competition.
Under imperfect competition, producers set marginal cost equal to marginal revenue,
which is less than the price at which the last unit is sold. Since consumers equate
price to marginal benefits derived from the last unit, in general marginal benefit will
exceed marginal cost in imperfectly competitive industries. Such industries will tend
to produce too little. Efficient allocation of resources would not be achieved because
there is room for additional production of goods. (Chapter 6 provides a detailed
discussion of the total loss to society resulting from imperfect competition).
There are many examples of circumstances that may prevent competition from
taking place Consider an industry facing decreasing costs or increasing returns.
Under conditions of decreasing costs, the lowest cost mode of production would be
achieved by a single producer. Consequently, a free market will result in monopoly.
Assuming that the monopolist cannot discriminate in the prices charged to different
buyers, and hence a single price prevails in the market, the outcome will be
inefficient, in both static and dynamic terms. In static terms, the outcome will be
inefficient because the quantity produced will be lower, and the profit-maximising
price charged by the monopolist will be higher, than warranted by the costs of
production. In terms of dynamic efficiency, the outcome will also leave something to
be desired because incentives for innovation by a secure and unchallenged
monopolist will be weaker than would likely prevail under a more competitive regime
(Wolf, 1988; pp. 23-24). And, as will be elucidated in Chapter 6, the attempts to
protect the monopoly position induce diversion of real resources into wasteful rent-
seeking activities.
Another area where markets have been observed to fail is when conditions result in
'missing' markets. A good example is the provision of public goods. Public goods
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are goods the consumption of which cannot be precluded for particular consumers.
Once they are produced, it is difficult to restrain members of the society from
consumption.
"A pure public good has two salient properties: one person's consumption of
the good does not reduce another person's ability to enjoy it; and once the
good is produced there exists no principled or efficient way of excluding
anyone from consuming it" (Coleman, 1985; p. 79).
National defence and public parks are public goods. These features of public goods
create what is called free-rider problems. Free-rider problems result because it is in
the interest of the individual utility maximiser not to pay for the production of the good
knowing that when available he/she cannot be easily prevented from its
consumption: he/she can ride free on the back of those paying. Under these
circumstances, the free market is expected to fail because producers do not have
the incentive to produce the good if they cannot effectively charge consumers.
In other circumstances, solely relying on the market to allocate resources sometimes
results in the production of externalities which cannot be overcome. Externalities
result when one person, in the course of rendering some service, for which payment
is made, to a second person, incidentally also renders services or disservices to
other persons, of such a sort that payment cannot be exacted from the benefited
parties or compensation enforced on behalf of the injured parties (Pigou, 1932).
Externalities include pollution, noise, congestion, and other environmental 'loads'.
They are the costs or benefits of a transaction that are incurred or received by other
members of the society but not taken into account by the parties to the transaction.
Common to the list of externalities is the fact that one person's actions have direct
costs or benefits for other people which the individual does not take into account
(Lipsey and Chrystal, 1995). An externality arises whenever an individual's
production or consumption decision directly affects those of others other than
through market prices. This is described technically as a divergence between
private and social cost and benefits. Distortions occur whenever free market
equilibrium does not equate marginal social cost and marginal social benefit. These
distortions lead to inefficiency or market failure.
Yet another source of market failure relates to asymmetry of information.
Incomplete information may lead to private choices which do not represent the best
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interests of individuals or society as a whole. The case is commonly made that the
lack of adequate information or the technical sophistication of the information if
available may prevent private individuals' ability to make the right choices.
Regulations for health quality, safety at work, building standards and density of
housing developments are designed both to provide information and to express
society's value judgements about intangibles such as life itself. Other 'missing'
markets like future goods, risk, and information present particular cases under which
markets are observed to fail.
One powerful argument that has been advanced for the need to interfere with the
operation of markets is the market's inability to achieve social priorities such as
equity. In achieving efficient allocation of resources, the market may produce
outcomes which may not be socially ideal. The competition to satisfy needs that is
fundamental to the workings of the market also means that individual members who
possess the right kind of resources, skill, and training that may be in high demand
have the potential, through trade, to gain control of what may be considered, an
'unfair' share of available resources. The 'fair' distribution of incomes and wealth
(whatever that means) among members of a society is one thing that the free
competitive market, left on its own, cannot achieve. In a society where the
distribution of resources are skewed in favour of a minority but dominant group, the
market may achieve efficiency within this constraint but questions may remain as to
whether this state of affairs is ideal.
As stated earlier, these examples of market failure are normally analysed at two
levels: technical market failure, that is problems of allocational inefficiency, such as
monopoly, which are inherent to the system; and social market failure, where
technically efficient markets may produce results that are not accepted by a smaller
or larger proportion of the population (Middleton, 1996).
5.2. 1.Technical Market Failure
Under technical market failure are classified sources of market failure like: market
power (monopolies), where there has occurred a concentration of production, or
where there are geographical or natural factors favouring the emergence of
monopolies which undermine the assumptions of the competitive model. The effects
of imperfect competition and the powers of monopolies in ensuring sub-optimal
allocation of resources has been demonstrated by Robinson (1933) and
Chamberlain (1933). Galbraith (1967 & 1974) examines the use of market power to
71
undermine the free market case. Also classified under technical market failure are
externalities, where market failure results from the market s inability, at equilibrium,
to achieve efficient allocation of resources due to a divergence between private and
social cost and benefits; Pigou (1932); Coase (1960). Market failure resulting from
the market's inability to produce public goods is also classified as technical market
failure. It is difficult to achieve efficient production of goods of these nature under
free market competitive conditions precisely because the price system, the
information transmitting mechanism, fails because of the inability of pricing
consumption resulting from the non preclusive nature of consumption of the good.
Another area where markets are technically said to fail relates to problems with the
concept of general equilibrium. Many economists express doubts about the
extension of neo-classical analysis of market forces and their equilibrating
tendencies to the economy as a whole. Three major problems have been expressed
with this analysis: (1) whether there exists a general equilibrium in which all actors
and all markets are in simultaneous equilibrium; (2) whether there is equilibrium as
against multiple equilibria; and (3) whether if an initial equilibrium position is
disturbed, market forces are capable of restoring the system to its general
equilibrium. Developing these questions to apply to the real world case, Clower
(1965) and Leijonhufvud (1968) demonstrate that even in the absence of wage and
price rigidities the market would not automatically produce a general equilibrium
solution without involuntary unemployment due to the market's failure to provide the
right signals. Indeed the macro-economic dimension of market failure is central to
what has become known as 'Keynesian economics'. Between various works (in
particular, Keynes (1930; & 1936) Keynes developed the case for
"state action to overcome the free market's inherent tendency to provide
insufficient co-ordination for the automatic achievement of full employment"
(Middleton, 1996 p 61).
Problems with the general equilibrium paradigm have been extended to embrace the
problem of disparities between economies of regions For example, Myrdal's (1957)
theory of cumulative causation formalised by Kaldor (1970), explains that;
"if things were left to market forces unhampered by any policy interferances,
industrial production, commerce, banking, insurance, shipping and indeed,
almost all those economic activites which in a developing economy tend to
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give a bigger than average return and, in addition, science, art, literature,
education and higher culture generally - would cluster in certain localities and
regions, leaving the rest of the country more or less in a backwater" (Myrdal,
1957; p. 26).
See also Thirlwall (1981 and 1982) for application of this analysis to the issue of de-
industrialisation. For more on technical market failure see Middleton (1996; p. 54)
and also Lehner and Widmaier (1983).
5. 2. 2. Social Market Failure.
Social market failure stems from the efficiency-equity trade-off. Recall that the
strong points of markets are their ability to ensure that in equilibrium resources are
employed at their optimum level leading to an overall efficient allocation of resources
in the economy. Under perfect competition therefore markets lead to a Pareto-
optimum state of affairs where no member of the society's welfare can be improved
without damaging the welfare of other members. But we may have some normative
judgement about the Pareto-optimum state concerning equity or fairness. Indeed
"if the utility of the deprived cannot be raised without cutting into the utility of
the rich, the situation can be Pareto optimal but truly awful" (Sen, 1985; p.10).
Often the goal of a more equitable distribution conflicts with the goal of a more
efficient economy. Thus even if the price system allocated goods and services with
complete efficiency, members of a society might not wish to rely solely on the market
since they have other goals that they wish to achieve.
"Moreover, considerations of Pareto-optimality cannot distinguish between
societies characterised by widespread slavery or starvation and affluent,
democratic ones, just so long as, in each case, no one can be advantaged
without disadvantaging someone" (Rosenberg, 1985: p. 49).
5. 2. 3. Miscellaneous Failings of The Market.
In addition to technical and social market failure, there are sources that may lead to
the market failing to achieve acceptable goals which do not fit neatly into the two
classifications. One can classify these (following Middleton, 1996; p. 63) as
miscellaneous market failures. These may include the following situations:
1. Improvidence: the contention that the market system has an inherent deficiency in
respect of its capacity to take account of the consequences of some important
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decisions taken within its institutional framework, thereby imbuing the market with
a short-term horizon and bias towards proceeding by piecemeal decisions.
2. Limited time horizon: a special case of improvidence in which, in the absence of
supervision, exhaustible natural resources are considered a free good by the
production sector with prices failing to reflect their long-run scarcity and there
being insufficient protection against environmental degradation.
3. The tyranny of small decisions: this category refers to the characteristic of the
market system that its guidance function scans only a narrow range of marginal
alternatives and considers each marginal adjustment in isolation, thereby ignoring
the interdependence of isolated choices and posing the possibility of unexpected
and undesired global outcomes (see Kahn, 1966).
4. Option demand: a special case of the market's provision of insurance services
against risks, but in this case the market may not provide for goods and services,
from which consumers may gain utility (for example, national parks) but choose
not to enforce their option to consume, the income received from actual users
being insufficient to cover the costs of market provision.
5. Pricing practices: here the existence of business practices such as advertising
and cross-subsidisation distorts relative cost structures and undermines the
function of competition to reveal deliberate instances in which pricing is divorced
from costs, thereby lessening consumer sovereignty (see also, Kaldor, 1950,
Galbraith 1967).
6. Information database: This encompasses many phenomena, an important one of
which concerns the longer time horizons for innovation and product cycles
characteristic of technologically advanced economies which generate increased
uncertainty about future demand. Government intervention may thus be
necessary, through compensation for risk and support for research and
development.
7. Complementary markets: where, without government intervention individual
economic agents may not decide to market a good or service because the
demand for it requires complementary provision from other economic agents.
This has a particular application to large-scale development projects which may
require the state to co-ordinate private actors.
8. Information failures: market efficiency requires that information be freely
disseminated, but frequently in practice the market communicates incomplete or
distorted information and it is argued that government action to rectify these
failures is Pareto-improving.
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One can identify most of these failures in the land and property market. The
problem of information, the need for complementary provision of costly infrastructure
which is beyond the means of individual private owners but necessary for efficient
functioning of cities and the domination of few landowners which can serve to
undermine the efficient working of urban land markets are only some few examples.
How can these failures be avoided? One is always tempted to provide a prompt
answer to this question in the following manner. The state must intervene to prevent
the failures that occur from the free market system. In fact a lot of state activities in
the developing world, the former socialist countries, and, indeed, the major market
oriented industrialised nations are premised simply on this very basis. The evidence
of market failure has been taken as good enough justification for government
intervention.
5. 2. 4. Governments in Correcting Market Failure
The main sets of tools available to governments in dealing with market failure are
rules, public ownership, expenditure, and taxation. At the operational level,
governments employ these tools through bureaucracies. Here lies a fundamental
difference between governments and markets. Whereas markets co-ordinate
activities and behaviour of self-seeking individuals through the invisible hand,
governments attempt the same feat through visible hands of bureaucracies. To
succeed, bureaucracies ought to be comprised of staff interested solely in the
achievement of objectives forming the raison d'être of government intervention.
Whether or not governments succeed in replacing or correcting markets is therefore
dependent on this very condition. But, like technical market failure which eventuates
because conditions set for the perfect operation of markets are too stringent to be
satisfied in the real world; governments fail because their success is premised on too
stringent assumptions about the political process, and the behaviour of the
bureaucracy. For example, contrary to implied assumptions of benevolence
underlying arguments for governments' taxing to redistribute income for the benefit
of the disadvantaged and the provision of public goods, evidence in real life indicate
that all too often such policies tend to be undertaken for the benefit of certain interest
groups. Actual outcomes of government interventionist policies in the presence of
such tendencies, may turn out to be something completely different (generally
perverse) from the intended outcomes: governments fail to correct market failure.
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Stiglitz (1988, PP. 5-6, and also 1989) identifies four sources of government failure
as: the limited information of government, which makes the consequences of many
of its actions both complicated and difficult to foresee; the limited control of
government over market responses to its actions; government's limited control over
the bureaucracy; and the limitations imposed by the political process. Consequently,
a great deal of research into government intervention in the market has focused on
two fronts. One strand of research, following Niskanen (1971), has investigated the
behaviour of government bureaucracies. A related branch has focused on the
workings of politicians and the political process (see works by Tullock and
Buchanan, in particular, Buchanan and Tullock, 1962). Linking up with the property
rights question (see Chapter 4) this growing literature has provided some very
helpful insights. Details of some of these works may be found in, for example,
Alchian (1966), Niskanen (1971; 1975; 1994), De Alessi (1980), Ostrom (1984
&1 987), Wolf (1988), and De Alessi and Staaf (1989). A brief summary of the main
insights are as follows:
In the bid to maximise votes, politicians have strong incentives to pursue the agenda
of vote winning interest groups. Consequently, better organised and articulate
groups are able to get governments to legislate and spend tax revenues on
economic activities which may not be in the interest of society as a whole (Tullock,
1976; Wagner, 1996 p. 27-31). Related to this is the log-rolling tendency of
politicians characterised by Tullock (1976 p. 41) as "I agree to vote for something
you want in return for your agreeing to vote for something I want". The efforts to
maximise votes lead to deal-making so that policies and activities which a politician
(or a political party) is originally not in favour of would be allowed in order to secure
the support of other politicians in pushing through parliament some policies which
are judged to be of high vote winning potential in the constituency of the said
politician. As a result society, more often than not, ends up with excessive legislation
and the provision of excessive or inappropriate goods and services, precisely
because of log-rolling (Pennock, 1959; Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Tullock, 1976;
Wolf, 1986, p. 36; & 1988; Stiglitz, 1988; Boardman and Aidan, 1989; Foldvary,
1994; Middleton 1996; Wagner, 1996).
The behaviour of bureaucrats presents even more interesting insights in the way it
impinges on economic activities of governments. 	 They posses these two
characteristics; a) the owners and employees of these organisations do not
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appropriate any part of the difference between revenues and costs as personal
income. b) some part of the recurring revenues of the organisation derive from other
than the sale of output at a per-unit rate (Niskanen, 1973; p. 8; 1994; p. 15). Given
these conditions, a self-seeking bureaucrat may only maximise their personal utility
rather indirectly. First, a lot of effort is employed in activities that lead to promotion
and additional perquisites of office which may, indirectly, increase income and
comfort. In this regard, working practices adopted, for example, may be ones that
prevent the discovery of shirking among key agency members: in general, people
(bureaucrats not excepted) do not like hard work! Other objectives may include,
efforts to increase power, influence and public respect. These indirect utility
maximands are achievable the bigger the size of the bureaucracy and the larger the
budget. Thus the over-riding motive of the bureaucrat is to maximise the size of the
bureaucracy which means increasing the size of the budget. Instead of cost
minimisation, it is in the interest of the bureaucrat to employ higher cost methods in
undertaking a given activity - employing more staff for example (see Tullock, 1976;
p. 29).
The following implications for governments' attempts to correct market failure
emerge. The bureaucracy, in particular, is bound to exaggerate market failure in the
bid to maximise budgets. But if what is perceived as market failure is indeed the
optimal outcome given the circumstances; as, for example, the market's failure to
provide flood control in an area subject to flooding reflecting not market failure but a
recognition that the cost of preventing flooding exceeds the benefit (Wagner, 1996;
p. 14), government intervention to provide flood control will be a failure ab initio.
Note the implications for governments' attempt to regulate standards for housing and
land transactions which may not be achievable given the level of household incomes.
On the equity justifications, a ground broad and vague enough to be invoked to
justify almost any government intervention, it has been shown that much of
government redistributive activities results in distributional inequities. Stiglitz (1989;
p. 61) provides a telling insight in these words;
Concerns about equity are pervasive in the public sector. We have seen how
they affect both employment and expenditure policy. We have also seen that
while they often provide the 'rationale' for government policy, the
redistributions are not those which would accord with generally accepted
principles of equity; rather they are the consequences of special interest
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groups using the powers of the state to reap private gains at the expense of
the general public These redistributions are not only inequitable, but also
inefficient They are not only inefficient because of the rent-seeking
expenditures that the special interest groups make in the quest for the special
treatment; they are also inefficient because the equity constraint results in
government programs that are ill-suited to any 'rational objective'. (Stiglitz,
1989, p 61)
Government economic activities tend to employ high cost methods producing
inefficient results because of the budget maximisation tendency of bureaucrats. As
already explained, this is directly a result of the incentive structure - the property
rights system - facing staff of government agencies. Unlike in a market
environment, the costs/benefits of decisions do not bear directly on the decision
maker. For an expansion on this follow the property rights literature, beginning with
Coase (1960) and later refinements, especially on incentives of bureaucrats (e.g.
More, 1970; Davis, 1971 & 1977; Cram and Zardkoohi, 1978), and government
regulation of firms (Stigler, 1971; Hilton, 1972; Jordan, 1972; De Alessi, 1974 &
1980; Borcherding, 1977).
Armed with these insights it is possible to briefly examine government activities in
SSA urban land and property markets concentrating particularly on that of Accra.
5. 2. 5. Governments and Sub-Saharan Urban Property Markets.
The discussion above leads to the following predictions. To indirectly maximise their
income and comfort through maximising budgets, bureaucrats involved in the
regulation of urban land markets in Accra and SSA cities in general are expected to
argue for greater government intervention in the market. This will be justified on
many grounds which, prima fade, aim towards equity in the allocation of urban land
resources. However, much of any benefits of government intervention would, in fact,
accrue to articulate interest groups, not the general public. One finds some
evidence of these in SSA.
There is a great deal of involvement of governments in the allocation of urban land
resources in SSA. In about 50% of the countries in the region, absolute and full
control of all property rights in land are held by the various governments. Payne
(1997; p. 11) citing Mabogunje (1990) states that 20 out of the 40 countries in the
region have nationalised all lands and extinguished private freehold ownership. Of
the remaining 50% (of which Ghana is part) where land is not completely
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nationalised, the story is no different in reality. The need for clearance from
government agencies in all private transactions and the control and regulation of
many rights lead to excessive control of the market. Payne (1997; p. 11) offers four
reasons for such interventions to include, a belief that governments in intervening
are carrying on a traditional African practice, in which ownership of land resided in
the community and not in the individual (e.g. Lesotho); a continuation of the French
colonial position of refusing to recognise customary land tenure (e.g. Mali, Senegal,
Congo); improving the efficiency of land allocation for both public and private use
(e.g. Nigeria, Sudan); and finally socialist ideology (Angola, Benin, Ethiopia Zambia).
It is interesting to observe that out of the four reasons, only one, that of improving
efficiency of allocation, is, at least on the face of it, on an efficiency criterion. But
even in these cases outcomes have been perverse. Bureaucratic corruption, political
interference and interest group lobbying have ensured that in Nigeria, for example,
20% of the rich adult population of Lagos obtain 92% of the land and housing
resources in Apapa, Victoria Island and lkoyi. Government intervention in the name
of ensuring efficient and equitable distribution of urban land resources in practice,
allows the rich to obtain virtually all available land resources at less than market price
(see Agbola, 1987).
Much as lands in Accra are not nationalised, government control and regulation of
rights in property lead to similar perverse results. These activities are justified on
various grounds including, prevention of fraudulent sales, ensuring developments
conform to city plans, health and safety reasons, and enabling the poor to have
easier access to urban land than the market would otherwise allow. Outcomes
appear to be anything but these objectives. One area where political power,
bureaucratic behaviour and interest group lobbying have been combined to a
devastating effect is the use of compulsory purchase powers to acquire all property
rights in some urban land in the city (in the public interest!) to effect government
redistributive activities. Far from benefiting the poor, Brobby (1991) and Larbi
(1994), find that the main beneficiaries of the 'acquire and redistribute' land policies
are the rich and influential, including bureaucrats in other government agencies (see
also Antwi, 1995). A full discussion of this and other aspects of land market
intervention in Accra is provided in the next Chapter (Chapter 6).
5. 3. Summary
This Chapter has attempted an exposition of the fundamental factors that need to be
grasped and balanced in deciding whether governments should intervene in
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markets.	 It has shown that though markets work efficiently under ideal
circumstances they have their shortfalls. They may, under certain circumstances,
produce inefficient and/or socially unacceptable outcomes. But just because
markets sometimes fail does not imply government intervention will always salvage
the situation. It is true that governments have some comparative advantages,
particularly in circumstances when social issues are concerned. In the context of
urban planning and management for example, they can (and do) regulate to prevent
exploitation of purchasers that may result in a market with limited information such
as urban land markets in SSA. But they can also fail. By their very nature,
governments' economic activities are hampered by the political and administrative
framework. They are "essentially a political process characterised by lags,
bottlenecks, coalitions, logrolling, and other fuzzy attributes of political behaviour"
(Wolf, 1988; p. 62). Therefore in the decision to intervene or not, it is very important
to note this observation by Stiglitz (1989; p. 20): More generally, all transactions
between parties other than the State are voluntary. From this, some strong
inferences can be made: for instance, that the transaction must have made both
parties better off. This is not true for transactions between the government and any
individual: any individual may be worse off as a result, precisely because the
transaction may not be voluntary.
In the context of urban land markets in Accra this observation about government
intervention forcing individuals to enter into involuntary transactions with the state is
a pertinent one in view of the extensive use of compulsory acquisition and similar
powers as tools of land management in the city. Given that landowners are
involuntary parties to compulsory acquisitions, they would be prepared to spend
resources to counter such moves by government. Such resources diverted from
productive activities into wasteful ones may explain a lot of the behaviour of agents
that cause problems observed in the Accra land market. The issue of resources
wasted by economic agents in circumstances like this is therefore an important one
to pursue. The next Chapter (Chapter 6) therefore discusses 'rent-seeking', an
economic concept which throws lights on resource wastes that some government
actions may bring about and applies it to land market intervention in Accra.
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Chapter 6: Rent-Seeking and Urban Land Policies
6. 0. Introduction
In the previous chapter an attempt was made to discover the real reasons why
governments intervene in markets and the likely outcomes when they do. A major
insight from this economic analysis of governmental activities relates to the mis-
allocation of resources associated with special interest-group activities in the political
system. Another is the behaviour of politicians and bureaucrats in the resource
allocation process. More specifically, politicians aim at maximising votes. To
achieve this, they pursue policies of articulate interest-groups. Bureaucrats aim to
maximise budgets and therefore undertake high cost sub-optimal production
techniques. Interest groups influence the political process to redistribute resources
for the benefit of their members. The link between activities of these political agents
and the mechanism via which resources are wasted is provided by the rent-seeking
concept. This chapter deals with the relatively new concept of rent-seeking and
applies it to resource waste associated with government intervention in the Accra
land market.
In general the interaction of the activities of politicians, interest groups and
bureaucrats manifests itself in the economy as monopoly earnings. For instance the
main activity of a producers' interest-group may be to lobby politicians to introduce
protectionist legislation which is bureaucratically administered in a way that increases
the monopoly earnings of their members. That such monopolies in given industries
or whole economies lead to Pareto-inferior outcomes and introduce costs to society
has long been established (see for example Robinson, 1933). Though theoretically
unambiguous, the empirical magnitude of the monopolist's (deadweight) cost to
society has been traditionally held to be very small. Noted studies in this regard are
Harberger's (1954 and 1959) works which suggested that the cost of monopolies
was probably of the order of 1% of the United States GNP (see, Tullock, 1996). The
rent-seeking concept suggests that there is far higher resource waste associated
with monopolies than deadweight costs studies suggest. As will be apparent shortly,
the opportunity to gain artificially contrived rents are governmentally created and
assigned. Rational self-seeking agents would therefore expend resources in a
competition to improve their chances of winning these opportunities. Resources
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spent in such competition are a loss which, added to the deadweight loss, constitute
the total loss to society.
The nature and extent of the welfare loss resulting from lobbying governments into
creating monopoly powers which are then exploited by agents is of immediate
concern to this study. It has been explained in earlier chapters how much of urban
land policy administration and planning involves state intervention in a market for
property rights in urban land (see Chapter 5). These interventions create structural
problems in the workings of the market. They create monopoly rents through the
erection of artificial entry barriers in the form of minimum standards of construction
and upper-limits to development density, to mention only two examples. In the
particular case of the developing world, urban planning and land resource
administration may involve government subsidies through the provision of
infrastructural facilities in limited neighbourhoods of cities and the bureaucratic
rationing of access to lands in such neighbourhoods. In general monopoly rents are
conferred on beneficiaries of these policies since supply is artificially constrained.
At least in theory, mis-allocation of property rights in urban land resources are bound
to result from such government activities. Quite apart from this mis-allocation,
resources spent by households in preventing the impact of government intervention
and the parallel government expenditure in asserting authority, constitute a
significant source of waste to society. In order to make any recommendations for
policy reforms, it is imperative to investigate the fundamental sources, extent and
form of such resource mis-allocation. Such an attempt is made in this chapter
through an examination of the concept of rent seeking as it relates to urban land
policies in Accra. The discussion is in three main sections. To provide a context for
the rent-seeking concept, a brief analysis of the loss to societies as a result of
monopolisation is provided in the next section. This is followed in section 6. 2 by a
detailed discussion of the rent-seeking concept covering the extent of resource
waste (6. 2. 1), and the rent-seeking environment (6. 2. 3). Section 6. 3 applies the
concept to land management in Accra and relates it to the use of compulsory
purchase powers (6. 3. 1) and activities of government land agencies in general (6.
4).
6. 1. The Social Cost of Monopoly
Under competitive environments, individual firms cannot influence the market price
of their products. Firms under these conditions are price takers. Profit maximisation
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decisions therefore involve choosing the optimal level of production (MC =MR). At
this output level marginal cost equals average revenue or market demand. This
level of output and consumption contains welfare gains to society comprising of
producers' and consumers' surpluses. The question to be investigated is; what
happens if a single firm emerges in this market and operates as a multi-plant
monopolist? Given the general rule that more goods can only be sold at reduced
prices, it can decide to influence the market price of its product by choosing given
levels of production. Thus unlike under perfect competition, the monopolist faces a
downward sloping marginal revenue curve. Costs imposed on society by such a
monopolist can be explored with the aid of Figure 6.1 below.
Figure 6.1: Market Behaviour of Monopolist
I	 LI
Consider a monopolist in an industry characterised by constant long run average and
marginal costs (LAC, LMC) as represented in Figure 6.1. MR is the monopolist's
downward sloping marginal revenue curve. To maximise profits, the monopolist will
produce Q1 quantities of the good and sell at a unit price of P 1 : LMC = MR at this
level. This is however lower than the socially desirable output Qo which would be
produced and consumed under perfect competition. The important implications for
resource allocation can be traced along the following lines. At the monopolist's level
of production, part of the consumer surplus enjoyed under perfect competition is lost.
The total loss to consumers is given by the area bounded by P 1 abP0. Part of th s
loss, however, is a mere transfer to the monopolist. Specifically, the area P 1 acP0 is
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transferred from consumers to the monopolist in the form of excess monopoly
profits. But notice that the area abc is completely lost to society. Ignoring income
distribution implications, the total loss to society as a result of monopolisation, is
therefore the triangle abc. Thus the emergence of the monopolist in an otherwise
competitive industry imposes a cost to society given by the triangle abc.
Traditional efforts to provide empirical estimates of the social costs of monopolies
have therefore concentrated on the size of the triangle. Notable among these is the
study by Harberger (1954) which has resulted in the characterisation of the triangle
as the Harberger triangle. Harberger's (1954) study estimated the total loss to the
United States resulting from monopolies to be rather small; in the order of some 1%
of GNP (see Tullock 1996; p. 3). For similar results from other countries see
Johnson (1958), Wemelsfelder (1960) and Schwartzman (1960). Given systematic
observation of delays, ineptitude of staff and shirking that tend to characterise single
firm industries, these findings were rather surprising. Obvious questions remained
as to whether it is economically worthwhile preventing monopolies. There existed a
paradox where some observations and intuitive feelings about monopolies
suggested they waste a significant proportion of society's resources. However,
empirical estimates of this waste produced insignificant results.
The concept of rent-seeking unravels some of the secrets behind this paradox. The
real costs of monopolies are indeed larger than the Harberger triangle. Real world
monopolies do not normally emerge through natural advantages possessed by firms
over their competitors or through accidents of the market. They tend to result from
concerted efforts of lobbyists in persuading governments to erect entry barriers.
Certainly in urban land markets, the earning of monopoly rents by some landowners
eventuates as a result of planning and other government regulatory restrictions.
Even when they result through accidents of events, monopolists are not expected to
be passive. They will spend resources to guide their monopoly position. Since
resources are spent in lobbying and protecting monopoly positions, loss to society
comprises the traditional triangle and resources so spent. To bring home the force
of the argument of rent-seeking, consider the 'acquire and redistribute' policy
employed in Accra (Chapter 5). Since redistributing serviced lands confers huge
profits on beneficiaries, resources would be spent by prospective beneficiaries to
influence their chances of obtaining lands. In addition, customary landowners from
whom lands are acquired would spend resources in preventing this activity of
84
government (more on this at 6. 3. 1). This expenditure of resources has nothing to
do with the employment of the land resource. They are therefore wasted. This is
the main insight of the rent-seeking literature. The following sections deal with the
concept in some detail.
6. 2. The Concept of Rent-Seeking
Monopoly powers, be they natural or created through legislation, generate rents.
Self-seeking agents are therefore expected to compete for these rents. Additionally,
once monopoly powers are achieved, existing monopolies will allocate resources to
defend this position. On their part, losing groups, like consumers, will seek the
reform of existing monopolies. When well organised, they may even attempt to
influence policy to prevent monopolies from emerging in the first place. As a general
rule, therefore, the existence or the potential for monopoly profits is expected to spin
off the expenditure of real resources in a zero-sum struggle. These are spent not in
increasing wealth, but in attempts to transfer or resist transfer of wealth (Tullock,
1967; p. 228).
Rent-seeking as a concept and an insight into society's waste of resources was
brought to the fore in economic analysis by Krueger (1974). In this paper Krueger
provided, through theoretical and some tentative empirical estimates, the extent of
resources wasted through activities to secure the benefits of licenses created
through tariff regimes in India and Turkey. To be sure, Tullock's (1967) paper had
shown similar insights, albeit, with no reference to the term rent-seeking. Bhagwati
(1982) characterised these activities as directly unproductive profit (DUP) seeking to
reflect the wider activities of resource waste inherent in governmental policies of rent
creation and capture (see also, Bhagwati et a!, 1984). The basic concept has been
extended and applied to many aspects of government intervention by various
researchers. Tollison (1982) provides a survey of the literature. The following
sample of the literature provides a more up to date view of the concept: Tullock
(1967; 1980; 1985; 1988; 1989; 1993; 1996), Browning (1974), Krueger (1974),
Posner (1975), Buchanan (1980a & b), Congleton (1980), Corcoran (1984), Higgins
et a!, (1985), Mueller (1989), Rowley (1992), Doughan and Snyder (1993), Linster
(1993), McNutt (1996). A convenient compilation of many of these works has been
achieved by Tollison and Congleton (1995).
Rent-seeking activities cover the whole range of expenditure of resources to secure
redistributive policies in favour of agents undertaking the activities. These could be
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in the form of employing professional lobbyists to influence parliamentarians and
party contributions. Included too are resources expended in most activities by
interest groups, bureaucrats and politicians. In some cases competition for rents
occurs through choice of location -- locating the firm in the capital, or expenditure of
resources upon travel. In other cases, government officials themselves receive part
of the rents - bribery, hiring relatives of officials or employing the officials themselves
upon retirement (Krueger, 1974 p. 291).
6. 2. 1. The Extent of Resource Waste
To render the arguments more transparent Figure 6.1 is reproduced as Figure 6.11
below removing the marginal revenue curve for clarity of exposition (see Tullock
1967).
Figure 6.11: The Extent of Rent-Seeking
U
In the diagram H, the Harberger triangle, represents the traditional deadweight cost
of the monopolist. T is traditionally considered to be a direct transfer to the
monopolist. The whole point of the rent-seeking concept is that the potential to earn
T will entice many firms to compete for such rent. Faced with the possibility of
earning T, a firm's rational behaviour is to expend resources to improve their own
probability of winning. How much resources it is rational to spend, from an individual
firm's point of view, depends on the size of T, the rent to be earned. A firm will
expend any amount up to T to gain the monopoly power (Tullock, 1967). By
definition, there is only one successful winner. The winner captures all the rents.
The total loss to society resulting from the creation of this state of affairs is therefore
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-T=
N (o<fl<1)
H plus the sum of any fractions of T expended by both the winner and losers in the
competition for T. The loss to society is therefore always greater than H. Under
assumptions of perfect competition for the rent, the winner is expected to spend up
to T to out-compete competitors. Under such conditions, there is complete
dissipation of the rents and the loss to society of the monopolist may be even greater
than H + T, counting the loss of all losers in addition. The following clarifies the
possible loss to society that might result. The loss (L) can be written as:
Eq. 6.1
j = 1;i ^ 1
N	 O<a^1
L=H+aT+flT
a+fl^1
where:
= fraction of T expended by win ner.
= fraction of T expended by losser
Eq. 6.1 conveys helpful information. For instance it informs that if a = 1, this is the
case where the winner dissipates all T to gain the rents;
Eq. 6.2
L > (H + T).	 (for a = 1)
Also the mean expenditure of the losers can be obtained as:
Eq. 6.3
Furthermore, the size of T and H depend on the elasticity of demand for the product
in question. Moving from a case where the monopoly is introduced into a hitherto
fairly competitive market represented by Figure 6.111, to one where monopoly power
is introduced into one characterised by an extremely inelastic demand, Figure 6.IV,
the size of T increases while that of H diminishes. But a movement to the other
extreme where demand is infinitely elastic, Figure 6.V, leads to both T and H
diminishing Thus the more inelastic the demand for the product (the smaller the
absolute value of elasticity, e), the bigger is T, the amount of rent available to be
competed for. Conversely the more elastic the demand (the more competitive the
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Figure 6.V: Very Elastic Demand
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market) the smaller are both H and T. Specifically; as e —^ 0, T-* , H-*0; and as
e —^ c , T-O, H-*O. Several factors, including the availability or otherwise of
substitute goods, and the relative power to coerce consumers and producers to
conform with the regulation, in the case of bureaucratic monopolies, may combine to
determine the elasticity of demand and hence the level of monopoly power.
Figure 6.111: Fairly Elastic Demand
Figure 6.lV: Very Inelastic Demand
0
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To be sure, there is an unresolved debate at the operational level as to the
measurement of rent-seeking costs particularly in relation to the proportion of T that
is dissipated. For the various views and experiments see, Posner (1975); Buchanan
(1980a & b); Rogerson (1982); Hillman and Katz (1984); Higgins, Shughart, and
Tollison (1985); Congleton (1988); Higgins and Tollison (1988); Murphy eta! (1991);
and Laband and Sophocleus (1992). It should be pointed out also that only the
winner of this game gets the chance to earn the rents. Resources spent by firms
who fail to win are not recoupable. They are sunk costs. Any reform of this state of
affairs may restore competition but may never recoup sunk costs. The economy is
therefore left permanently poorer (McCormick et a!, 1984; p. 1075).
6. 2. 2. Identifying Rent-Seeking Activities.
A clearer definition of rent-seeking is in order at this stage. The concept of rent-
seeking is to be distinguished from that implied in say, economic rent or quasi rents.
Unlike rent-seeking, these senses of rent are fundamental to the effective
functioning of the competitive market process. The existence of rents in the sense
that factors of production, at some given point in time, earn returns in excess of their
opportunity costs is the driving force behind factor movements in competitive
environments. Factors move to gain the advantage of earning rents. This is
normally achieved through improved production techniques or the identification and
meeting of a hitherto unmet demand. Thus in a competitive market like the
customary land market in Accra, it is possible, for example, to observe a landowner
earning some rents above what might be the supply price as a result of the
introduction of, say, some innovative way of parcelling the land for sale. The
important point here is, the enjoyment of such rents attracts more factors into the
industry: innovations get copied; other firms learn of new opportunities; and old
production techniques get up-dated to stay competitive. As a result, over time, any
rents are completely eliminated. Factors then earn just enough to bring them into
production. Efficient allocation of resources is achieved. This leads to lower prices
and/or improved product quality. Consumer surplus is increased. The process is
therefore welfare-enhancing.
On the contrary, rents in the rent-seeking sense are artificially contrived. The
distinguishing feature is that rents here are earned through the employment of
resources in lobbying governments to create artificial barriers for entry or exit. Such
resources which are employed to seek contrived rents (or to create rents) are not
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employed in increasing production. Nor are they employed in improving product
quality or production techniques. They are a waste to society in the sense that these
resources could have been employed more productively in the economy. Rent-
seeking theory is exclusively directed at contrived rents as distinct from the natural
rents arising from profit seeking. The theory is also concerned with the use of
interest group power to manipulate government (McNutt, 1996; p. 139). In other
words, rent-seeking implies the competition for rents when resources are invested to
do something for which the net effect will actuaHy lower the national product, rather
than, raise it (Tullock, 1996; p. 179).
Thus rent seeking activities include the employment of real resources to undertake
both legal and illegal activities that will influence the expected allocation of rents
resulting from government redistributive policies. Normally, the concept of rent
seeking is applied to cases where governmental intervention in the economy leads to
the creation of artificial or contrived rents. But it is not restricted to governmentally
contrived rents. It is quite possible to conceive of rent-seeking as taking place in a
non-governmental setting (Tollison, 1995 p. xii). Adopting a less optimistic view of
the world, Olson (1982) suggests that there often will not be competitive markets
even if the government does not intervene. His observation is that the government is
by no means the only source of coercion or social pressure in society. There will be
cartelization of many markets even if the government does not help (Olson, 1982; p.
177). Indeed in Tullock's (1967) paper, theft was used to advance the rent-seeking
concept. In a traditional analysis, theft is posited as having no dead-weight cost to
society at large. Much as some households may suffer losses as a result, their loss
is a direct transfer to the thieves. From the point of view of society therefore, there is
no real loss: what happens in the process is a mere redistribution of society's
resources. Tullock (1967) argues that this is a wrong view. Thieves spend real
resources in specialising as well as acquiring tools of their trade. Owners of assets
that are potentially in danger of being stolen spend resources to counter the efforts
of thieves. For example, to improve their chances of breaking into people's homes,
thieves spend resources to acquire door breaking tools. Homeowners on the other
hand, spend resources on advanced locking systems, insurance, burglar alarms and
so on to minimise the chance of break-ins. On a broader scale, society spends tax
revenues on police forces to minimise the incidence of the activities of thieves. To
the extent that these resources are diverted from the economy and do not contribute
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to production, it is waste to society. Theft, apart from being morally undesirable,
imposes welfare losses on society as well.
Nevertheless, rent-seeking waste resulting from the manipulation of the political
system is significantly more serious than those that may arise in private markets. As
the next section makes clear, the attributes of the environment in which rent-seeking
thrives are better provided by government intervention.
6. 2. 3. The Rent-Seeking Environment
One should remember that rent-seeking activities result from the self-seeking
behaviour of economic agents; the very behaviour which, under an appropriate
institutional framework, yields welfare-enhancing results. Adam Smith (1776) drew
attention to the proposition that the behaviour of persons in trying to maximise
returns on their own capacities or opportunities can be socially beneficial in an
ordered market structure. Buchanan (1980a) describes this behaviour as profit
seeking. It is this same behaviour, under a different set of institutions, that produces
socially perverse consequences. Thus:
"The unintended results of individual efforts at maximising returns on
opportunities may be "bad" rather than "good". The term rent seeking is
designed to describe behaviour in institutional settings where individual efforts
to maximise value generate social waste rather than social surplus..........at
the level of the individual decision makers, the behaviour, as such, is not
different from that of profit seeking in market interactions. The unintended
consequences of individual value maximisation shift from those that may be
classified as 'good" to those that seem clearly to be "bad," not because
individuals become different moral beings and modify their actions accordingly,
but because institutional structure changes. The setting within which individual
choices are made is transformed. As institutions have moved away from
ordered markets toward the near chaos of direct political allocation, rent
seeking has emerged as a significant social phenomenon" (Buchanan, 1980a;
p.4).
A helpful way of thinking about the issue is therefore to distinguish rent-seeking, the
wasteful employment of resources to gain rents, from profit-seeking, the welfare-
enhancing employment of resources in order to increase resource earnings which
underlies competition in an ordered market. The important point here for anyone
calling for government intervention in the Accra land market to note is as follows.
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Competition which leads to welfare enhancing benefits to society under ordered
market conditions, leads to waste of resources under institutional set-ups where
government controls dominate. To the extent that these policies create
environments where monopoly rents accrue to factor owners, resources would be
spent in a wasteful competition in the attempt to capture or defend those rents. In
the words of Mueller (1989);
'The iron law of rent-seeking is that wherever a rent is to be found, a rent-
seeker will be there trying to get it' (Mueller 1989; p. 241).
The main problem with redistributive activities, it should be stressed, is not that they
directly inflict welfare losses (though they may), but that they lead people to employ
resources in attempting to obtain or prevent such transfers (Tullock, 1967; p. 231).
Chapter 7 provides evidence of how landowners are compelled to spend resources
in wasteful activities to counter any threat of compulsory acquisition of their lands.
Rent-seeking activities when dominant and most rewarding, attracts the most
innovative in an economy. The payment of bribes, like theft, though not a social
waste at the first instance - they involve only a direct transfer - constitutes a social
waste to the extent that they shift resources into training and development of skills
that enables bureaucrats to compete for the promotion that places them in the
position to receive the bribes (Krueger, 1974; Mueller 1989; Murphy et a!, 1991;
McCormick et a!, 1984; p. 1078). An attempt to acquire and redistribute urban land
without prompt and adequate compensation of owners will inspire landowners to
initiate hasty demarcation and sale to households capable of undertaking immediate,
and unauthorised housing development which may trigger off expensive demolition
activities on the part of government or lead to downgrading of entire
neighbourhoods. These are its social costs, and they can be sizeable.
Some crude attempts at measuring rent-seeking costs come out with figures which
are significant enough to warrant the attention of policy makers. Krueger's (1974)
paper calculates that 7% of GNP in India and 15% in Turkey is wasted through
wasteful expenditures to secure licenses created by tariffs. Laband and Sophocleus
(1988; p. 269) estimate that rent-seeking costs the United States economy some
22.6% of GNP. Mohammad and Whalley (1984) indicate that redistributive activity
might consume as much as 24-40% of Indian GNP. Ross (1984) finds that rent
seeking accounts for approximately 38% of the gross domestic product in Kenya
(see Magee, Brock and Young, 1989; p. 217). And, as discussed in section 6. 4. 1
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below, the entire market price of land in the Accra market is potentially available to
be wasted through rent-seeking competition. These proportions of resources wasted
through rent-seeking are large enough to warrant reform.
How does all this relate to land management in Accra? Government intervention is
as prevalent in the urban land market in Accra more than in other markets of the
country. Can we identify any perverse rent-seeking outcomes?
6. 3. Application to Urban Land Management in Accra.
It has been established that intervention in the land market is an attenuation of
property rights in urban land (Chapter 4). To the extent that they set artificial limits
on the supply of officially sanctioned property rights, monopoly rents will be
conferred on owners of land with those rights. Under such an allocative mechanism,
rent-seeking theory predicts that rational agents will expend resources in a
continuous competition to influence their chances of obtaining rent conferring lands.
Beside the traditional loss of consumer surplus, probably, in the form of high land
prices and limited choice of rights in developable land that these policies bring about,
there may be losses resulting from the use of real resources by rational agents in
competing for and defending monopoly rents. Additionally there may be loss to the
land sector emanating from second level costs of rent-seeking such as the diversion
of talents into value-reducing administrative practices and so on. The total loss to
the urban built environment may therefore be sizeable. Are there any indications of
these in the Accra land market?
6. 3. 1. The Use of Compulsory Acquisition Powers
Consider the use of compulsory purchase powers in Accra. In the main this power
has been used to acquire land from customary landowners without prompt and
adequate compensation (Brobby, 1991), and redistribute at highly subsidised prices
(Larbi, 1995; Antwi 1995; Kasanga eta!, 1996). Thus the losers from this policy are
the indigenous urban society whose lands are acquired without adequate
compensation while the main beneficiaries are the educated elite, military officers
and politicians (Asiama, 1984; Brobby, 1991; Larbi, 1994; Antwi, 1995). In the
absence of similar serviced plots in the market, beneficiaries of this policy gain
immediate monopoly profits by selling in the open market. Antwi (1995) provides an
indication of levels of nominal profits gained in these transactions. An adapted
version of the figures, discounted at 37.58% p. a (the estimated annual rate of land
price appreciation in the unrecorded market, see Chapter 8) to reflect 1987 land
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prices, is shown as Table 6.1. As can be seen from the table, profits in the order of
up to 16 million could be made by a beneficiary who made no improvements on the
land but sold it over in the open market in the same year as it was allocated to
him/her10
Table 6.1: Some Indication of Contrived Rents
Extracted from Antwi (1995; Table, 2) and discounted to reflect 1987
land prices ( '000'000)
Year of	 Year of Sale
Purchase 1987
	 1988	 1989	 1990	 1991	 1992
1987	 16.00	 13.23	 11.30	 9.37	 8.04	 6.51
1988	 -	 13.23	 11.30	 9.37	 8.04	 6.51
1989	 -	 -	 11.24	 9.32	 8.00	 6.49
1990	 -	 -	 -	 9.32	 8.00	 6.49
1991	 -	 -	 -	 -	 7.90	 6.41
1992	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 6.36
In the presence of such phenomenal artificially created profits, rent-seeking theory
would predict the following: agents would expend real resources to influence their
chance of obtaining plots; bureaucrats would compete to occupy the rent conferring
positions; allocation of resources within the bureaucracy would be biased in favour of
this activity to the exclusion of (economically) more efficient but not so rewarding (to
the bureaucrat) aspects of land administration; customary landowners and non-elite
consumers of housing land would spend real resources to counter the impacts of the
policy. Does the evidence confirm any of these predictions?
Against the background of the very ellusive nature of rent-seeking activities, it is
difficult to provide evidence based on systematic analysis. Nonetheless anecdotal
indications of costly rent-seeking activities induced by this policy abound. In the
Lands Commission Secretariat (LCS) where a substantial part of the processes
involved in the acquisition and allocation of government lands is located, it could be
said 1 ', for example, that officers directly involved in the allocation of government land
are in a more privileged position than their counterparts in the same department
assigned to the overseeing of non-controversial customary land (market)
transactions. At the time of the field survey for this study virtually all the land officers
in the Accra office of the LOS had been transferred to other regions of Ghana by a
It must be stated that covenants in the lease prevents the sale of these
lands until they are substantially developed, but as expected, sales go
ahead. The competition for appropriation of rents that these "illegal" sales
generate only pushes the rent-seeking argument to another level.
First hand knowledge gained from working in the department
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newly appointed boss. Apparently this was to minimise rent-seeking activities which
have emanated precisely because of the contrived rents created by this and similar
land administrative policies. More tellingly, there has been competition between the
Lands Commission Secretariat and the Land Valuation Board (a sister body
responsible for advice on the valuation of government landed property), concerning
which body should be responsible for the assessment of ground rents to be assigned
under government leases created from the use of this policy. In the light of perpetual
complaints concerning shortage of trained staff and work loads (see Larbi, 1994), it
is hard, on the face of things, to understand why there should be competition for
extra work. Such behaviour is however rational in the rent seeking framework; the
presence of rents lead to bureaucratic competition to occupy rent conferring
positions. Once successful, bureaucrats, or at least some key members, hope to get
the chance of privately appropriating some of the rents created.
It is also true that incentives presented by the allocation of government plots and
activities incidental to this process have led to an inefficient concentration of qualified
personnel time in this activity to the exclusion of certain fundamental estate
management functions in the LCS. For example, the revision and collection of rents
reserved under leases are left not attended to. In 1994, Larbi (1994) found that rent
reviews did not form part of the normal routine of the estate management staff of the
secretariat and that since 1990 no rents had been reviewed. Neither were rents due
collected. In fact there was effectively no system in place in the entire secretariat to
see to rent reviews and collection. Discussions with officers in the secretariat during
the field survey of this study (July-September 1999) revealed that not much has
changed since Larbi (1994) made those observations. The aggregate loss of
income resulting is enormous. Larbi (1994; Chapter 8) estimated that some 78
million cedis (about £78,000 at 1994 exchange rates) was owed in rent arrears in
just three of the many industrial and residential estates in Accra. He (Larbi, 1994)
attributes the inability to review and collect rents to the shortage of professional staff
and increased work load! However, it is not hard to identify the real cause of this
behaviour, considering that activities relating to acquisition and allocation of
government land and the granting of consent/concurrence on stool land transactions,
for example, attract far more professional attention than this direct income
generation activity. Given the nature of incentives presented to the bureaucrat, the
potential private benefits in the review and collection of rents is far below those
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offered by the allocation of government plots. It is in the interest of the bureaucrat
therefore to allocate personnel resources in this way.
Evidence that the policy induces customary landowners to (indirectly) undertake
costly activities to defend their lands, like hastily selling off illegal12 plots of land, can
be found in post-independence government acquisitions in Accra. Furthermore, the
absence of formal recognition induces landowners to protect and enforce property
rights through costly employment of, what has become known as, 'land guards' in
Accra. See for example a front page article in the Daily Graphic (Ghanaian
newspaper) of 15 July 1999 where it was reported that 55 guards have been
guarding land which was initially acquired for the state on behalf of the Weija stool.
These constitute waste of resources.
Individuals who buy these lands hastily construct buildings to defeat the
governmental process. As noted above, occasionally government land agencies
spend resources in demolishing some of these constructions to assert their authority
over the lands. Of particular relevance to the attainment of a recorded urban land
market, all properties in the neighbourhood are prevented from being recorded
precisely because the government actions render them illegal (see the evidence in
Chapter 7). There is a loss to house owners from this in that unrecorded titles are
not accepted as security in formal transactions. The loss to households if their
houses are demolished is direct. A further loss to the tax payer is the expenditure on
staff and equipment in the attempt to ensure the termination of construction works;
expenditure on demolishing works and inscriptions on construction works. The sum
of these household costs, those of landowners and those of government land
agencies, constitute a diversion of real resources into directly unproductive activities
(Bhagwati, 1982).
An example that epitomises all these is the acquisition of 1,161 .45 ha of land in 1975
in Accra for a national sports stadium complex. No compensation was paid, the
project could not be implemented and the land retained by government. The
customary landowners sold developable plots to prospective developers. At the time
of the field survey the entire area had been fully built up. Yet only one respondent
12 Illegal only in the sense that the Government claims legal ownership
through compulsory acquisition whether or not compensation (a requirement
for the acquisition to be legally effective) has been paid to the customary
owners.
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out of a total of 80 surveyed in this neighbourhood obtained the land through a
government agency. None of the owners had formal title documents on their
property rights in the land. All transactions in the entire neighbourhood have to be
undertaken in the unrecorded market. And, as some of the households interviewed
commented, 'one cannot use one's own property to secure a loan"(more on this in
the discriminant analysis in Chapter 8).
6. 4. Activities of Government Land Agencies in General
At the risk of overstating the case, it may be nearer the truth to state that a great
deal of activities of government land agencies persist precisely because of rent-
seeking. Their behaviour depicts all the theoretical predictions. The processing for
formal documentation of customary land transactions demonstrates how rent-
seeking tendencies operate to devastating effects in the market.
6. 4. 1. Documentation of customary land transactions
Two areas under this heading demand attention. One is the insistence on the
requirement for the concurrence of the Lands Commission before stool land
transactions in land are formalised. The other is the assessment and management
of ground rents that are brought about by the constitutional stipulation that all stool
land transactions must be restricted to leases for 50 years or 99 years depending on
whether the lessee is a foreigner or Ghanaian respectively. Under the Office of the
Administrator of Stool Lands Act, 1994, (Act 481) the Administrator of Stool lands is
charged to receive rents from Stool land transactions and distribute as follows:
. 10 per cent of the gross revenue to the Administrator of Stool Lands for
administrative expenses; and of the remainder;
. 25 per cent to the stool through the traditional authority,
. 20 per cent to the traditional authority,
. 55 per cent to the District Assembly.
By complying with this Act the supplier of the land, the stool, is to effectively receive
22.5% (25% of 90%) of the market price of the transaction. There is a clear
incentive for suppliers not to comply. Rent-seeking waste of resources that emerge
in avoiding compliance is discussed below.
The household survey conducted shows that agents' behaviour have rendered these
requirements irrelevant as far as the land transactions of the majority of households
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are concerned. As much as 76.9% of all households surveyed have not attempted
to seek formal documentation of their title to allow the authorities to ensure
compliance of these regulations (see section 7.3.1, Chapter 7). There is therefore
no way that the concurrence procedure can achieve its goal: orderly management of
lands. The fact that bureaucrats still insist on this can only be explained in the context
of rent-seeking. With the aid of Figure 6.Vl below, a fuller insight of this and other
behaviour of players in the market can be gained.
Figure 6.Vl: Analysis of Stool Land Transactions
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Figure 6.Vl can be viewed as a superimposition of two rent-seeking competition
scenarios triggered off by the consent and concurrence requirement. One
competition is between landowners and bureaucrats resulting from the artificial
restriction of the price of de facto interest in land below the market clearing price; the
other is between land purchasing households and bureaucrats resulting from
contrived rents brought about by formal registration of de facto interests. For
landowners the requirement creates a rent, 12, for which they compete against
bureaucrats to appropriate. TI is the corresponding rent available for purchasers
and bureaucrats to compete for. Similarly, H2 and HI represent corresponding
associated dead-weight losses. These losses result from, for example, the limitation
of consumer choice emerging from the restriction of permissible interests in land.
On the supply side they relate to losses emerging from the prevention of landowners
from employing efficient sales tactics precisely because their activities are illegal.
The following clarifies these points.
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In the diagram P 0 represents the market clearing price at which stools convey de
facto rights. Keep in mind that enforcement of the constitutional provision restricting
transactions to leases is effected only if transactions are presented to be recorded in
government books. The sale of perpetual property rights in plots of lands that grant
physical possession to purchasers but with no formal governmental recognition can
(and overwhelmingly does) take place. The market for this bundle of property rights
clears at P0 . Since the receipt of this price is illegal by virtue of the constitutional
stipulation, it is referred to only as 'drink money' 13 and goes unreported in
government books (see analysis in Chapter 8). At this price a total of Q0 plots are
willingly supplied and purchased. P 2 represents the price (ground rents, GR, to be
apportioned to the stool, capitalised at i, the capitalisation rate, into perpetuity) stools
would receive if they were to comply fully with government regulations. At this price
stools would be willing to supply only Q1 plots of land while purchasers would
demand Q2 plots. Given this shortfall between demand for and supply of plots, some
purchasers would be prepared to pay up to P 1 to obtain the Q1 plots available. By
implication, the Q1 plots supplied would be acceptable for formal documentation
because the transactions meet the government requirements. P 1 therefore
corresponds to the price of stool lands with formally registered documents and can
be estimated by adding the price of unrecorded lands to the actual total cost of
achieving complete registration. It is important to point out that under normal market
circumstances P 1 would induce the supply of Q3 plots of land as shown in dotted
lines in Figure 6.VI. But this set of circumstances is not attainable in this case since
to supply Q3 landowners would have to flout the government regulation the
observance of which restricts supply to Q1 which triggered the payment of P 1 in the
first place. That is to say the payment of P 1 is conditional on the supply of up to Q1
quantities of plots and no more. Landowners can obtain prices above P 2 and supply
any quantities > Q1 only through rent-seeking behaviour. Once purchasers buy 'de
facto' interests from stools (at P 0), they can only obtain formal recognition of the
transaction by expending additional real resources which takes the effective price of
the land to P 1 . Herein lies the origin of the rent-seeking activities of players in the
land market in Accra. The entire difference between the government stipulated
price, P 2 , and the price some consumers will be prepared to pay if supply is
restricted to Q1 as a result (P 1 - P2), constitutes contrived rents available to be
3 Drink money in Ghanaian custom is only a token gesture to a stool to show
ones respect and acknowledge appreciation of a paternal service rendered.
This is not illegal, yet!
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competed for. As shown in Figure 6.Vl this rent, T= Q 1 (P 1 - P2), can be decomposed
into that available for competition between household purchasers and bureaucrats,
TI = Q 1 (P 1 - P0), and that between bureaucrats and landowners 12 = Q 1 (P0- P2).
From the field survey it is possible to put some figures on these theoretical prices.
Table 7.3 in Chapter 7 presents estimates of prices and registration costs provided
by consultants surveyed for the study. From this table the minimum average price of
Stool/family lands where rent-seeking activities by market players is at the maximum
(problem areas [column 4]) is 3.8 million. Thus P 0= 3.8 million. Figures compiled
from the Lands Commission Secretariat (LCS) (see Table 6.2) show that a purchaser
of stool land from Ashalley Botwe Stool is charged a 1 000 ground rent for a typical
plot. Using the annual land appreciation rate of the market, 37.58% (estimated in
Chapter 8), as the discount rate to capitalise the ground rent into perpetuity 14 , P2
= 0.225(1,000) 
= 599. Again from Table 7.3 (Chapter 7) the average registration
0.3758
cost through the Lands Commission is 1.6 million. Hence P 1 = P 0 + P 2 +
Registration Cost = 3,8OO,OOO ^ 599 + 1,600,OOO = 5,400,599. Based on these
estimates, for a given stool land transaction to be formally documented the total rent
available to be competed for (P1 - P2) is 5,4OO,599 - 599 = 5,4O0,00O. For the
285 of the 286 households surveyed who do not possess formal documents on their
lands (Q1 = 285), the rent available for competition, T= Q 1 (P 1- P2), = 285 x
5,400,O00 = 1,539,O00,00O. This can be decomposed into that available for
households and bureaucrats to compete for, TI = Q 1 (P 1 - P0) = 285 x (5,400,599 -
3,80O,0OO) = 456,170,715 and that available for competition between landowners
and bureaucrats, T2 = Q 1 (P0- P2) = 285 x (^ 3 , 800 , 000 - 599) = 1,082,829,285.
These levels of resource waste added to losses due to loss of consumer choice
(dead-weight losses) constitute the waste brought to bear by the regulations.
Observe that T2 would be part of the supply price and received by landowners in the
absence of the constitutional stipulation. Thus the constitutional requirement
transforms a significant proportion of the price that landowners would have obtained
under normal market conditions into rents for which they now have to undertake rent-
seeking activities to obtain and/or protect. Clearly any costs they incur to obtain and
protect this rent therefore constitute resource waste to the land sector brought to
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bear by the policy. Costs incurred to hire land guards to physically protect the lands
fall under this heading.
Table 6.2: Evidence of Ground Rents from LCS
File	 Transaction Size	 Ground Rent
Date	 (Acre)
AR3495/97 31/07/97
	
0.23	 1,000.00
AR1940/97 07/01/96
	
0.23	 1,000.00
AR2302/96 22/05/95	 0.23	 1,000.00
AR23000196 22/05/95	 0.23	 1,000.00
AR2301/96 21/04/95	 0.23	 1,000.00
AR178/98 24/06/93	 0.23	 1,000.00
AR177/98	 19/06/93	 0.23	 1,000.00
AR176198 04/04/89	 0.23	 1,000.00
AR1288/96 12/12/95	 0.23	 1,000.00
Source: Compiled from LCS during field survey (6 July- 10 September 1999)
In general what proportion of the rent that is transferred directly to bureaucrats, what
proportion kept by purchasers and landowners and what proportion is dissipated in
the process (rent-seeking costs) all depend on the demand and supply forces in the
market as explored in section 6. 2. 1(Figure 6.111 -- Figure 6.V). The extent of waste
of resources depends on how much of the rent at stake needed to be dissipated
through the competition. It is impossible to estimate this aspect from the data
available.
These insights help to explain some observed behaviour of parties in the Accra land
market. First, it explains why practically all the households surveyed do not posses
formal documents on their property ownership. Furthermore, it explains a strange
behaviour in the market where purchasers go to the extent of spending resources to
get lease documents prepared for the signature of landowners when as much as
58.5% believe that the interest they have purchased is perpetual.
The insights also explain why customary land suppflers spend resources in ensuring
that transactions are documented as leases even though they have no intention,
indeed no structures in place, to see to rent collection let alone compliance of other
lease provisions. All 100% of land suppliers surveyed had never collected or
received any ground rent for leases they had granted. Indeed not a single one of
4 In property valuation practice it is standard practice to capitalise any
interest of more than 40 years as if it is a perpetual interest. See, for
example, Baum and Mackmin (1989; p.115)
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them even bothers to keep copies of leases granted. Also, as Chapter 7 will show,
instead of relying on registered documents to protect their lands, they undertake
costly activities like regular visits and employment of land guards to protect their
lands. These are rational but wasteful expenditure that results precisely because of
the artificial rents created by the particular nature of government regulation.
On waste of resources resulting from bureaucrats' attempt to gain rents, evidence of
inefficient but complicated procedures (Larbi, 1994: pp. 286-88) that lead to extensive
delays has been found to be employed by agency officials. Conclusions from
consultants interviewed for this study suggests that it can take as much as five years
to get one's documents formally processed. The expenditure of effort and resources
on the part of government agencies (staff, equipment etc.) to design complicated
procedures and practices; the cost associated with bureaucrats' wasteful behaviour
to devise mechanisms of attracting and hiding bribes and so on constitute waste.
These are resources that could be better employed, not least, in efficiency enhancing
land regulation.
In addition, since rent-seeking behaviour results in true market prices going
unreported, the efficiency functions of open market prices (see chapter 5, section
5.1.1) are lost. More on this in Chapter 8 In the context of the neo-classical sense
of markets where reported prices are the result of demand and supply interacting and
serving to inform suppliers and demanders, the World Bank is probably right in
observing that there is no effective market for land in Ghana (see Becker eta!, 1994;
p. 227). But this state of affairs persists because of (not in spite of) the particular
blend of land market regulation in Accra. If a market in property rights in urban land
is defined as one which equates demand for and supply of de facto rights, there is a
dynamic market in Accra on which relevant information abounds outside government
records. Chapter 7 discusses this in some detail.
6. 4. 2. Measuring the Costs
The loss to the land sector and to the whole economy as a result of rent-seeking
activities generated by government intervention may be large indeed. The examples
above are by no means the only evidence of wasteful activities in the competition for
contrived profits in the urban land market of Accra. The resources wasted by
bureaucrats in lobbying to occupy rent conferring positions are a waste of resources.
So are resources involved in designing ways of extracting and hiding illegal income
(bribes). They are resources taken away from productive sectors of the economy
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without producing any output. But it is difficult to measure the full extent of this
resource waste. As Tullock (1967) points out, the problem of identifying and
measuring these resources is a difficult one, partly because the activity of bribery is
illegal. Lengthy negotiations and visits to the land agencies to identify and pay
bribes to relevant front persons to expedite action may be in real terms very
expensive, but one cannot provide direct measures of their cost. Similarly, the whole
system of allotting government plots or processing documents on stool land
transactions are possibly designed not for maximum efficiency but to induce transfer
of rents in the form of bribes (Tullock, 1967; Rose-Ackerman, 1978, p. 184). Again,
no measure is possible. As a further problem, probably much of the cost is spread
through households that have not benefited from government land or officially
approved written documents on their private land transactions but have gambled
resources on the hopes of one. It may be almost impossible to measure these
costs. Construction works by households that got completely demolished by
government agencies in an attempt to assert authority are physically untraceable.
They represent costs to those households and society but are incapable of
measurement. Much of the costs may also be hidden in the diminution of land and
property values that haphazard developments triggered by these activities produce.
There seems to be no way of measuring most of these costs. They however indicate
the likely avenues and causes of inefficiency in the market. The empirical analysis of
these issues in the Accra land market pursues further the attempts to find evidence
of more aspects of these costs. This is undertaken in the next two chapters through
the test of the five stated hypotheses of the study.
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Chapter 7: Discussion and Test of Hypotheses
7. 0. Introduction
Having developed the theoretical foundations of the study in the preceding chapters
and indicated some resource waste brought to bear as a result of government
intervention in the customary land market in Accra (Chapter 6), the present Chapter
discusses the main findings of the survey on which conclusions of this study are
based. This is achieved in this Chapter by explaining the background of some
computations applied to the results of the survey in the section immediately following
(7. 1). Section 7. 2 provides a summary picture of the workings of the market. A test
of four of the five main hypotheses of the study is provided in section 7. 3. The
chapter is concluded with a summary (section 7. 4).
7. 1. Background Computations
Before proceeding to use the survey results to test the hypotheses, it is necessary to
explain some basic computations applied to the data collected. All three survey
instruments used are provided in Appendices 1-3. An inspection of the household
and supplier's questionnaire (Appendix 1A & 2A) shows that, apart from questions
seeking factual information, they comprise of two main types of questions: (a)
categorical questions seeking to group respondents into appropriate categories; and
(b) multiple response questions intending to estimate how intense respondents feel
about a phenomena of the market. Answers to factual questions are in the form that
can be readily applied in analysis of the market. Analysis of responses of the
categorical questions was straight forward: frequency tables were constructed and
inferences based on the results. Analysis of the multiple response questions required
intensity scores to be computed. This is explained in 7. 1. 1. Part of the postal
survey of consultants utilised questions which ask respondents to rank aspects of the
market on a scale. Computation of these responses is discussed in 7. 1. 2.
7. 1. 1. Computation of Intensity Scores
As explained in Chapter 3, an innovation introduced in this study is an adaptation of
the Likert (1932) scale that enables measurement of degrees of perceptions and
attitudes of land market transactions using jargons employed in the market. The
reasoning behind this adaptation is simple: the more intense a respondent perceives
an aspect of the market the more of the answers in the domain he/she is likely to
agree with. Hence the need, at the analysis stage, to deal with multiple responses.
Based on answers given therefore, intensity scores, designed to measure how
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intense a respondent's attitude or perception is toward phenomena of the market
being measured, was computed for each multiple response question. Using
Question 3.g (reproduced below) of the household survey to illustrate, the
computation of intensity scores is achieved as follows:
3.g What was your main source of finance for acquiring the plot or property?
('-)
Response	 Assigned Weight
1. Bank loan	 4
2. Money from relative abroad	 -1
3. Earnings from abroad	 -2
4. Loan from relative/friend	 -4
5. Personal gradual savings	 -3
6. Other (please state)	 0
First, a carefully considered weight (-4 ^a ^ 4), reflecting the degree and direction
(sign) of impact of a particular answer to the aspect being measured is assigned to
each answer. In the question 3.g example, "Bank loan" is assigned a weight of 4
because this answer conveys the maximum positive information about the impact of
banks in the market. If a respondent relied on a bank loan then banks are having full
impact in the market. At the opposite end, "Loan from relative/friend" is assigned -4
because it conveys the maximum negative impact that banks can have in the
market: a respondent's reliance on this source of finance demonstrates the existence
of demand for loans which, for whatever reason, is not being supplied by existing
banks. "Personal gradual savings" is assigned a weight of -3 on the following basis. It
demonstrates existence of demand for loans which is not being supplied by banks (-
sing) but to a lesser degree than that conveyed by "Loan from relative/friend" in the
sense that since the purchaser in this case is prepared to postpone the purchase until
enough savings are accumulated, the demand is not as immediate though availability
of efficient and reliable financial source could have persuaded him/her to bring forward
the purchase. In the same sense, though "Earnings from abroad" signifies the fact
that local banks are not meeting the finance needs of households (- sign), it conveys
a lesser information of banks' impact since many factors behind why a significant
number of Ghanaians find it necessary to travel abroad to earn before considering to
enter the property market is outside the sole control of banks. Relying on "Money
from relative abroad", principally a gift, indicates the absence of bank finance (- sign)
but to an even lesser degree.
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Similar reasoning is behind the weights assigned to answers in all the relevant
questions. Depending on whether the relative impacts of answers in the domain are
considered equal or not in particular questions, equal weights and the same signs
can be assigned to all answers. Question 3.d of the household survey is an example
where equal positive weights is assigned to all answers in the domain while 8.c of
the same survey is an example of equal negative weights. Appendices lB and 2B
provide weights assigned to answers of all the relevant questions for both the
household and suppliers' survey.
After assigning weights as described, raw intensity scores, S,, are computed for
each respondent's response to each of these questions as the sum of weights of
their selected answers. For example, for 3.g, a respondent who relied on (a) a bank
loan, (b) accumulated savings and (c) money from relative abroad, to buy his/her
property, Sn = 4 + (-3) + (-1) = 0.	 Banks' impact on the market from this
respondent's perspective is neutral. It should be pointed out that the way the
weights have been assigned - relative to each other's impact within a given answer
domain - means that the Sn so calculated has meaning only as far as the particular
question is concerned and comparison is being made between different respondents
on that particular question. Direct comparisons cannot be made between different
sets of questions based on these raw intensity scores.
To allow such comparisons across variables, the raw intensity scores are converted
into standardised intensity scores (L1i) with a range of 10. This is achieved as
follows:
1. Possible maximum (Smax) and minimum (5mm) raw intensity scores are
calculated for each question. From these the range of raw intensity score is
derived as S max S mm . For question 3g, for example, the possible maximum
raw intensity score is 4 ( a purchaser relying only on bank loan) and the possible
minimum is -10, (a purchaser relying on money from relative abroad, earnings
from abroad, loan from relative/friend and personal gradual savings). The range of
raw intensity score is thus; S max Sm n = 4 (-10) = 14
2. A given raw intensity score is converted to a standardised intensity score with a
maximum range of 10 employing Eq. 7.1.
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Eq. 7.1
SJa=	 xlO.
S max - S mm
As an example, for question 3g, the minimum (S =-10) and maximum (S =4) raw
intensity scores are converted into the standardised version respectively employing
Eq. 7.1 as follows:
Isa=	 10 x10=-7.14 and I,d=	 xlO=2.86.	 The range of the
4—(-10)	 4—(-10)
standardised intensity score thus —2.86 —(-7.14) = 10 (these results are highlighted
in Table 7.4).
Table 7.4 at page 132 provides a list of, maximum and minimum raw and
standardised intensity scores of the relevant questions for households. That for
customary landowners is provided in Table 7.5 (page 132). The standardised
intensity score provides a perception measure on a scale starting from —10, through
0 (the origin) to + 10. The questions for which intensity scores are calculated divide
into three groups: (1) those measuring negative perceptions -- radiate from zero
towards —10; (2) those measuring perception through the origin -- radiate from the
negative end through the origin towards the positive end; and (3) those measuring
positive perceptions -- radiate from the origin towards +10.
The Lia calculated are used to compile frequency tables for households (details in
Table 7.6, page 133)and suppliers (Table 7.7, page 137). Some variables so
obtained are also included in multivariate analysis (Chapter 8) to test the fifth
hypothesis.
One could flaw the intensity scores calculation on the subjective nature of the weight
assignment strategy employed. But since the subjectivity is consistently applied, any
inherent bias is evened out. The system uses consistent dimensionality in the
measurement of perceptions. A completely different system of weightings does
indeed produce exactly the same outcomes.15
7. 1. 2. Computation of Rank Scores
Questions 1.e, 1.h, 2.d, 3.a, and 3.b of the consultants' postal survey (Appendix 3A)
asked respondents to rank aspects of the market. These responses were converted
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into scores which are later plotted to provide a summary view of the market.
Assigning weight 1, 2, 3..........m, to corresponding rank R 1, P2 ,R3 ........Rm, where
m is the maximum ranking, the total score for an item, k, was computed as follows:
Eq. 7.2
Score k =	 in1 where;
fli = total number of respondents assigning rank R 1 to item k.
As an illustration, consider question 3.b of the consultants survey which asks
respondents to rank problems of the market from 1, the least serious to 10, the most
serious. Details of this question and a table (Table 7.1) of the rankings provided by
the consultant respondents are provided at page 109 below. From the table, the
item, "Problems caused by general interference of government departments in land
transactions" is rated as RI by I respondent, R2 by 4 respondents, R3 by 1 respondent,
R4 by 2 respondents, R5 by 0 respondent, R6 by 0 respondent, R7 by 0 respondent, R8
by 0 respondent, R9 by 0 respondent and RiO by I respondent. Thus for Ri, n = 1;
R2, n, = 4; R3, n—i; R4, n =2; R5.....R9, ii = 0; and RiO, n, = 1. From Eq. 7.2,
the score for this item
= yin, = ( lxi) + (2x4) + (3x1) + (4x2) + (5x0) + (6x0) + (7x0) + (8x0) + (9x0) + (1 Oxi) = 30.
Figure 7.1 (page 112) and Figure 7.11 (page 128) are graphs created from these
scores. At the appropriate stage of the discussion they are combined with frequency
tables of intensity scores of households and landowners to test the research
questions.
Throughout the discussion references are made to the question number and the
particular questionnaire from which inference is being made to allow ease of cross
checking. Cross checking of questions for which intensity scores were computed
can be achieved using Table 7.6 at page 133 for households and Table 7.7 at page
137 for land suppliers. A summary picture of the market under investigation is
provided below.
Several weighting strategies tested produced similar results.
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7.2. Nature of the Market
The unrecorded property market is predominantly that of the purchase of bare land
on which a residential structure is subsequently developed. From the responses to
question 2.a (household questionnaire) as much as 237 (84.6%) of a total of 280
who answered this question acquired a plot of land and developed from scratch. 22
(7.9%) acquired an uncompleted structure and developed. Thus as much as 92.5%
of respondents acquired a site and developed their house. Only 10 respondents,
constituting 3.5% of all respondents, bought a fully developed house. This confirms
assertions in the literature that there is almost no market for completed houses (see,
for example, Tipple eta!, 1998) in Accra.
From household responses to question 2.c, the market is predominantly supplied by
traditional land owners. As much as 209 (75.2%) of the 282 who answered this
question bought their land directly from a customary stool or family. Second level
transactions, that is lands bought from a purchaser who had earlier bought from a
stool is trivial. Only 66 (23.4%) bought from a private person. Government as a
supplier of housing land is virtually non-existent even in neighbourhoods purported to
have been acquired by government. Only 1 purchaser out of the entire 282
respondents reported to have obtained the land from a government agency. On flow
of information in the market household responses to question 3.a makes it clear that
this is by word of mouth through close relations. When asked how purchasers came
to know of the availability of the plot for sale, 223 (77.4%) said they obtained the
information solely through friends, colleagues or relatives. Added to another 10 who
obtained the information from this source as well as other sources like advice from a
professional or approached by the owner, a total of 233 (80.9%) obtained the
information from a somewhat informal source. Only 13 (4.5%) bought the plot as a
sole result of advice by a professional and 19 (6.6%) as a sole result of an approach
by the vendor. Buying a property as a result of information gained from an
advertisement was the case for only 6 (2.1%) purchasers.
Once a traditional landowner has been approached, it takes a rather short time to
agree the terms of transaction and gain access to the plot purchased. Responses
obtained for question 2.d show that 180 out of 270 purchasers who replied (66.7%)
gained access to their land within a period of under three months from the day they
approached the landowner. 21.1% (57 respondents) gained access within 3-6
months. As much as 87.8% gained access to their land within 6 months of
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approaching the landowner. This evidence contradicts the conventional notion that
informal land transactions are time consuming (see Becker, et all 994; p. 34)
Finance for property purchase is predominantly through long term personal savings
(3.g). As many as 176 of the 288 respondents (61.1%) relied solely on gradual
personal savings to fund the plot purchase. Only 7 (2.4%) relied on a bank loan to
fully fund the purchase. There are others who relied on a bank loan to fund part of
the purchase after obtaining funding from other sources. Thus, only 12 respondents
(4.0%) relied either fully or partially on bank loans to finance the purchase of their
residential plot. Money from relatives abroad is the second most important source of
finance for plot purchase; 32(11.1%) of respondents relied on this source.
Prices paid for plots of land (question 3.b) vary as widely as the date of purchase
(2.b). Indeed the date of purchase appears to be the single most important factor
explaining price paid (see multivariate analysis in Chapter 8). A minimum nominal
price of 3 ( is the sign for cedi the local currency) paid in 1974, and a maximum of
48 million, paid in 1997, were reported (4,000 -4,300 = £1 at time of survey).
Reported prices in the sampled neighbourhoods had a modal nominal price of 20,
000, a median of 150,000 and a mean of 1,103,958. Date of purchase spans a
period of 60 years with the earliest purchase in the sample made in 1938 and the
most recent, (as at date of survey July-September 1999) made in 1998. One is likely
to have a distorted picture of the prices if government sources are relied upon. The
majority of consultants surveyed think that government sources give lower versions
of market prices. Out of nine who responded to Q2.f of the consultants'
questionnaire, 7 (77.8%) think that prices documented by the Lands Commission
Secretariat and the Land Valuation Board are at least some 50% below actual prices
in the market.
Information from suppliers (question 4.e, Appendix 2A) indicates that plots on sale,
on average, measure about 100 feet by 70 feet (7,000sq. ft).
There are some major problems in the way the market works. Figure 7.1 is a graph
showing the rank scores (computed as explained in 7. 1. 1) attributed to the ten most
important problems by consultants surveyed. Out of the ten problems, the most
important one is the sale of the same piece of land to more than one purchaser by
some unscrupulous landowners (double allocations). The next four important
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problems are (a) unresolved title disputes between stools and government; (b) the
general lack of registered documents in the market; (c) the absence of reliable
database of ownership and (d) the ineffectiveness of courts in resolving land
disputes. It is against such a background that hypotheses about the rationality of
agents, constraints faced, efficiency aspects of the market and the impacts of
bureaucratic intervention are tested below.
Figure 7.1: Score of Market Problems (Created From Consultants' Rankings,
Q.3.b; Appendix 3A)16
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7. 3. Testing the Hypotheses
It should be recalled that the central questions of the study revolve around five
related hypotheses itemised in Chapter 2. These are:
1 Urban land in SSA is principally allocated through markets characterised by
rational agents whose economic decisions are shaped by constraints of formal and
informal institutions of land holding.
2	 Apparent irrational and illegal behaviour of agents is optimal given the
constraints imposed by formal and informal land institutions.
16 See Table 7.1, page 109
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3	 Current activities of formal institutions limit the efficiency attainable by
informal institutions and agents, hence reducing gains from trade.
4	 Without interference of government land agencies, property rights under
customary institutions are clear and secure.
5	 Holding incomes constant, improvements in allocative efficiency remains the
only equitable way of improving urban housing and neighbourhood standards.
Operational versions of these hypotheses are tested in the order listed using findings
from the survey combined into frequency tables in Table 7.6 page 133 for
households and Table 7.7 page 137 for suppliers. A hypothesis is considered as
supported if the sign and magnitude of the standardised intensity score of the
majority of respondents agrees with it.
7. 3. 1. Hypothesis 1.
This hypothesis states that urban land in SSA is principally allocated through
markets characterised by rational agents whose economic decisions are shaped by
constraints of formal and informal institutions of land holding. The test is in two
parts. First there is the need to show that agents are rational. Second, the need to
demonstrate any institutional constraints. On the first part, the best candidate for
investigating rationality of agents' property dealings is price. Economic rationality
implies that respondent purchasers would consider the price paid to be the minimum
to pay for the land, ceteris par/bus. Also purchasers are expected to demonstrate
rational behaviour concerning investigation of the market before settling on the
particular property bought. On the other hand respondent suppliers would want to
achieve the highest possible price for a particular land, all things equal, if they were
rational. A test of this is through investigation of suppliers behaviour relating to; their
price fixing processes, factors they consider in fixing price, maximisation of sales
through advertising and consumer incentives. Note that references to question
numbers are to corresponding questions in Appendix 1A for households, 2A for
suppliers and 3A for consultants.
Question 3.h of the household survey investigated the demand side through a
straight forward Likert type question. It asks whether in comparison with market
price of comparable plots the purchaser considers the price paid for his/her plot a fair
market price. The responses were converted to standardised intensity scores with a
range of —5 to +5 (-5 indicating unfair market price and +5 fair: 0 unsure). As can be
inferred from Table 7.6, the majority (77.8%) of the 261 valid responses recorded a
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positive score meaning that they considered the price paid to be the best (fair)
achievable. Only 15 (5.7%) considered the price not to be a fair market price, while
43 (16.5%) were not sure about the fairness of price (0 score). To investigate the
economic rationality of price further, Q. 3.i investigated the assertion by Asiama
(1984 and 1990) that land price is not based purely on an economic basis. Here a
negative score implies that a purchaser considers the price to reflect non-economic
attributes like ethnic origin and social status of the purchaser. Only 13% of the 262
respondents scored a negative. In fact the average and modal score was 2.86.
Purchasers therefore consider price paid to reflect mainly the economic attributes of
land. Furthermore, if purchasers are rational one would expect them to conduct
some sort of search or investigate a number of the commodity before settling on the
one eventually purchased. Q.2.e tried to investigate this. Based on responses
achieved, many respondents do not demonstrate economic rationality on this count.
Less than half (109 = 38.7% of 270) of respondents actually considered another plot
before eventually purchasing the one they did, leaving 161 (57.1%) who did not. But
the behaviour of those who did not investigate other properties might not be irrational
if they have reason to believe that such investigation yields no significant
improvement on prices achieved. There is some proof that this is the case. The
regression analysis in Chapter 8 employed to model the decision process of agents
revealed that undertaking a search of the market does not lead to any statistically
significant reduction in price. Even though not investigated in this study, one expects
some costs to associate with searching the market. In this state of affairs it is
perfectly rational to minimise cost of purchase by not undertaking any extensive
search. All those who considered another property scored a positive on Q. 2.f
implying that there was some rational reason why they selected the one they did.
The bigger the score the more intense the economic rationality of purchaser's
selection criteria.
Another area where purchasers demonstrate rational behaviour concerns
government plots. Considering that government plots are, in theory, virtually free to
all Ghanaians of the appropriate age, one would expect a purchaser to have
considered obtaining government plots. When purchasers were asked whether or
not they had ever applied for government plots (2.g), 253 (92.7%) had in fact never
applied for a government plot. Their reasons for not doing so is indicated by their
intensity score on question 2.j. Here a negative score indicates the respondent has
negative perception of government plots as being impossible to obtain without the
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right "connections", available for only "big" people, having to pay a lot of money to
obtain and so on. A score of 0 means the respondent is not aware of government
plots. As expected as much as 63 7% of the 256 valid responses scored negative
with the remaining 35.9% scoring 0 (There was 1 [0.4%] inconsistent response).
Purchasers demonstrate a rational behaviour by not applying for government plots
given their perception of the low probability and/or relatively high cost of obtaining
one.
Suppliers of land also exhibit economically rational behaviour. Respondents were
questioned on various aspects of price as an indicator of their land sale decisions.
Question 7.b (Appendix 2A) investigated the processes through which respondent
vendors arrive at the price of land for sale (the supply side corollary of Q. 3.i of the
household survey to test the non-economic basis assertion by Asiama (1984 and
1990). A positive intensity score implies the price of plots is determined through a
process that is conditioned by market factors such as bargaining with purchasers.
Negative implies price is set arbitrarily. All 9 suppliers interviewed scored a positive
3.3 (Table 7.7 page 137). This result is reinforced by scores obtained for Q.7.c
which investigates the specific factors respondents take into consideration in arriving
at price per plot. Once again a positive score implies an economically rational
approach in setting price All 9 scored positive with a mean score (intensity level) of
3.06 and a mode of 2.5.
Rationality demands that a supplier maximises profits by maximising sales at market
determined prices. Q. 6.c provides an investigation of this. Asked whether they
would not sell to a given purchaser on some non-economic reasons like ethnic group
and so on, all nine suppliers obtained a positive score meaning that they would sell
to anyone prepared to pay the appropriate price to ensure maximum sales. Scores
to Q6.f which specifically asks whether there are instances when a purchaser
prepared to pay the appropriate price would be turned away on some non-economic
reason, reinforces the earlier finding. Only 1 scored negative with 7 scoring 3.3 the
maximum possible for this question. A further investigation of suppliers' behaviour
was on advertising (6.e). When asked, all nine respondents do not advertise
because they considered advertisement was not necessary since purchasers
"somehow came to know" about their plots eventually. This demonstrates how
aware landowners are of the market they are serving in the light of the finding above
that only 2.1% of purchasers sampled bought their land through advertisements. It
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also further confirms the rationality argument of suppliers. Also, 44.4% of them
would sell as many plots as a purchaser would want to take at the appropriate
market determined price, the same as the percentage who sell only 2 plots maximum
to a single purchaser (6.g). A mean intensity score of 6.45 on 7.e concerning
allowing purchasers flexible mode of payments go further to show that landowners
operate as one would expect any economically rational supplier in a market.
What constraints do institutions impose on market participants? An activity is
considered an institutional constraint if parties to a transaction are compelled by a
formal or informal institution governing land transactions to undertake or refrain from
undertaking it. Further, that activity is a constraint if market participants, left on their
own, would either (a) not undertake the said activity or (b) undertake it differently.
The enquiry was conducted around market participants' behaviour resulting from
formal land administration such as, documentation of interests, planning, building
permits and permissible property rights. For purchasers, a test of institutional
constraint of their operations was conducted first by investigating the registration
process. Given that registration allows the use of formal institutions to defend one's
property rights, all things being equal, a purchaser enhances the security of their
property rights in lands purchased by formally registering them. Responses to
questions under "INTEREST IN PROPERTY" in the household survey (Appendix 1A)
combine to provide some insights into this.
From scores on Q 4.b, 4.d, 4.i the following can be deduced. As much as 76.9% of
those questioned had not registered their interest in the property (scored 0 on 4.b).
The remainder either (i) have their documents still lodged with the government
department for registration (in the 'process'); or (ii) don't know there is the need to
register. 44.6% have not registered because they consider the registration process
to be either too expensive, cumbersome, time consuming, too much trouble or just
simply not necessary (negative score on 4.i). And there is some evidence to support
their claim. Of 27 whose documents are in the process', 22 (81.5%) have been
waiting for more than a year and 13 (48.2%) over 5 years to get the papers
registered (4.h). The Lands Commission brochure "Concurrence Procedure For
Stool Lands Grants" states that it takes 20-30 working days for documents to be
"processed and ready for collection" (see Appendix 3B1). Respondents' experience
show how far off the official line is from reality.
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From the score on 4.f, 59.7% (40 out of 67) of those who have submitted documents
have a negative score implying that they had to influence the system somewhat by
paying regular visits to the offices to tip' officers; or paid a worker at the office to
follow the document. Only one respondent in the entire sample of 286 purchasers
could report having conclusive formal documents on his/her property interest. By
their actions land purchasers in the sample demonstrate that the formal registration
process is a constraint and they are doing everything to avoid it.
The next aspect of institutional constraint investigated concerns permissible property
rights. Land transactions between stools and non-Stool subject Ghanaians are
limited by formal policy to 99 year leases. An indication of whether this constitutes
an institutional constraint is offered through question 4.a of the household survey
schedule. The contention here is that if purchasers consider this to be a constraint,
they would demonstrate it by acting explicitly or implicitly to avoid it. Purchasers
were quizzed on what interest they think they posses in the property. Out of the total
of 272 valid responses to this question, 159 or 58.5% consider purchasing perpetual
property rights in the land. Only 80 respondents (29.4%) perceived the interest as a
99 year lease. But even these respondents appear to say so merely because they
are aware that documents prepared on the transaction stipulates a 99 year lease.
For all practical purposes they operate as if they have entered into a transaction of
an outright purchase of perpetual property rights in the land. This can be inferred
from responses to Q5 a If transactions are true leases, purchasers should be
paying periodic ground rents to the appropriate body stipulated by formal policy.
When asked, only 15 out of the 272 pay ground rents. Thus as much as 65 out of
the 80 (81.3%) respondents who perceive their interest to be a 99 year lease in
practice possess property rights of a somewhat different nature to the extent that no
periodic rent is paid. The simple conclusion is that the policy restriction of
transactions to leases is demonstrated to be a constraint in the market and is being
avoided by agents.
This conclusion is reinforced by responses to the question why purchasers do not
pay ground rents (Q5.d). Only a little over half (177 respondents out of 282)
answered this question, presumably because it is meaningless to purchasers who
deem their interest as perpetual (freehold). On the intensity score, where a negative
score implies that the purchaser: (a) does not know there is the need to pay ground
rent and/or (b) nobody asks for it and/or (c) does not know where to pay it and/or (d)
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ignores demand notices; as much as 99.4% of those responding scored a negative.
Indeed 14.7% scored —10 (the possible minimum score is -11). Purchasers'
behaviour clearly demonstrate the constraint this stipulation poses and their
willingness and ability to avoid it.
Other requirements of formal institutions that constitute constraints to households in
their property dealings are to do with permits relating to development of the land, in
terms of the cost involved and the delays. Questions under "Physical Development"
on the household questionnaire (Appendix 1A) investigated this. Between responses
to Q. 6a and 6b it can be inferred that some 162 (57.4%) of 243 respondents did not
have building permits (6.a). 60 out of 220 (27.3%) are still waiting for the outcome of
their application and 25 (11.4%) had their application refused (6.b). Of those who
had building permits, 17 had to wait for more than a year to obtain it. On the whole
only 46 (13% of 245) respondents were requested by the city authorities, at some
stage of constructing their buildings, to stop work (6.c), but as much as 44 of them
(88.6%) either ignored it or 'tipped' the inspector and continued development. On this
evidence households consider building permits as a constraint and do their best to
avoid it especially in the context of low level of enforcement.
Land suppliers were also questioned on their behaviour concerning restriction of
transactions to 99 year leases. When asked how they comply with this requirement
(Q.9.a), 7 (77.8%) answered. Of these all scored a negative intensity score
signifying that they view the requirement as a constraint. In particular, the negative
score implies that they took actions such as, not providing documents for lands sold
and/or evidenced lands sold as leases to satisfy the formal policy prescription even
though full market price for a direct sale was received. This is confirmed by the
intensity score on 9.e with 6 respondents considering the prescription a constraint
(negative intensity score) while the remaining 3 were indifferent (0 score).
Thus on very important aspects of the unrecorded market it can be concluded, based
on this evidence, that agents generally behave rationally given constraints imposed
by formal institutional requirements. Property rights economics teaches that rational
agents evolve cost effective ways of undertaking economic activities within
constraints imposed by institutional frameworks in which they operate. The evidence
discussed so far is a testimony to this. Indeed given the constraints imposed,
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rationality might imply behaving illegally, a hypothesis which is investigated further
below.
7. 3. 2. Hypothesis 2.
This hypothesis contends that apparent irrational and illegal behaviour of agents is
optimal given constraints imposed by formal and informal land institutions. Insights
from the behaviour of politicians and bureaucrats suggest that it is possible for
governments to prescribe particular ways of undertaking transactions and sometimes
make it illegal to do otherwise. Private agents however may design ways around
such regulations and, indeed, flout them if the costs relative to the benefits of
complying are too high. The hypothesis tests the existence of such behaviour in the
Accra land market. For the test it is necessary to show apparently irrational and/or
illegal behaviour of market players and then demonstrate how such behaviour is, in
fact, rational and optimal given the circumstances created by formal and informal
institutions governing land transactions.
A convenient starting point is to use the evidence on registration of property
interests. For purchasers it is, prima fade, irrational (if not illegal) not to take
advantage of formal registration mechanism to secure their property rights. As has
been shown above, as much as 206 (76.3%) of the 270 respondents had not
registered their interests (4.b). The irrational nature of this behaviour is worsened if
they proceed to develop the land without first formally securing title to land. But this
is exactly what 76.3% of respondents achieving a negative intensity score on 4.c did.
In fact as much as 68.2 % (182 of 267 valid responses) had finished and occupied
the property but had not even bothered to submit papers on the property to the
appropriate institution for registration.
Another behaviour of households which is both irrational and illegal is that of
constructing a house without building permits. Question 6.b investigated the extent
to which properties are developed without the necessary permits. As has been
discussed above, of the 220 who responded only 78 (35.5%) reported they have
permits. 60 (27.3%) have their application in the process. The rest just do not have
any permits to develop the property which they occupy as their homes. Another
direct illegal activity relates to the purchase from stools of land that the government
claims to have compulsorily acquired. This activity was investigated through Q8.a.
and applied to respondents sampled from Sports Complex. When asked, not a
single purchaser from Sports Complex obtained the land from any agent of
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government. Indeed all 75 who were prepared to answer this question gave a no'
answer to 8.a 73 of them answered Q8.b relating to whether they knew that the
government claims ownership before they bought the land. Of these 65 (89%)
reported that they did not know the government claims ownership of the land when
they were buying it. Only 27 answered 8.c which asked for reasons why they bought
the land from someone other than an arm of the government when they knew the
government claimed ownership of the lands. 25 (92.6%) of these stated that the
stool/vendor was know by everyone to be the one selling lands in the area. In effect
though they knew the government claimed ownership, they were confident in the
Stools' ability to convey to them the rights entailed in taking possession and
occupying the land.
Yet another aspect of behaviour of purchasers that may be deemed irrational or
even illegal is the fact that most purchasers presume they possess property rights
which are inconsistent with formal policy. As has already been explained above,
purchasers behaviour concerning this policy relating to payment of ground rent and
so on, lead to the conclusion that, for all practical purposes, almost all purchasers
have acquired a perpetual interest (see page 117). This situation is a direct
consequence of the feuding between formal and informal systems. Customary land
suppliers are being forced to sell only leases but in practice they flout this by
disposing of perpetual interests even though they may clothe this up as leases in
documents provided.
On the supply side there are indications of illegal and irrational behaviour of
customary landowners. The best Indicator of this is customary owners' behaviour
towards compulsorily acquired lands. The score of landowners on question 10.g
(Appendix 2A) explain this. The question applied to landowners who had some
portions of their lands compulsorily acquired. A positive score implies the
respondent undertook some action, including selling plots carved from the land to
frustrate the acquisition. There were only three out of the nine respondents to which
this question was applicable. All three scored positive. Question 10.h asked what
landowners would do if their lands were to be acquired. Six out of the nine
responded. Only 1 out of the six said they would do nothing. The rest would
frustrate the acquisition with three of them stating that they would frustrate the
acquisition by resorting to more than one of the actions provided which included;
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selling plots, harassing government allottees, taking government to court, locating
subjects on unoccupied lands.
What makes these activities economically rational and optimum, from the agents
point of view? The case of registration can be used to explain the latter. This is
inextricably linked with the issue of permissible property rights. All interests bought
from stools are automatically converted to 99 year leases and periodic ground rents
imposed by the government agency when they are registered. On the evidence
above (see page 117), purchasers prefer and buy perpetual interests. Thus the
58.5% of respondents who perceive to have purchased perpetual property rights
from stools would have their interests converted to 99 year leases and would have to
pay ground rents. Ignoring registration costs, registration to these purchasers will
lead to a loss of value to the extent that their preference for perpetual interests
convey some utility value. Furthermore, with the exception of the 15 who claimed to
pay ground rents when answering Q.5.a (see page 117), all respondents would be
exposing themselves to paying periodic ground rents if they were to register their
interests. This constitutes an additional cost to the transaction which is avoided by
not formally registering interests. Worse still, the actual 17 (land price invariant) cost
of registration is prohibitive to the purchaser of city peripheral customary lands. As
Table 7.3 (page 125) shows, consultants in the market estimate that, excluding
stamp duty charges, it can cost an average of 01.6 - 01.68 million to formally
register interests in land, depending on which of the two systems is used. This
translates to between 42.11% - 44.15% of the mean estimate (also by consultants)
of the purchase price of land for such purchasers. This level of actual cost of
documentation is in tune with the levels reported in other SSA countries (see for
example, Mattingly 1933; p. 11). And if a purchaser is unwilling to spend these order
of amounts to follow up' (to use the market jargon), they may have to wait a long
time to get the documents registered. Table 7.2 (page 125) shows the number of
consultants against their estimate of the likely time it will take to get one's documents
registered through the two formal systems available. As the Table shows, the
majority of consultants estimate that it will take well over five years to get the
documents registered in either of the two systems. It should be noted in passing that
the official estimate is 20-30 working days for documents to be "processed and ready
for collection" (see Appendix 3B1). Thus a purchaser saves this order of costs if
he/she refrains from registering the interest.
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Of course there is the possibility that by not registering their interests, purchasers
might be sacrificing some benefits which might outweigh these costs. The evidence
does not appear to support this view. In the context of the evidence above
concerning the level of bank finance (page 111) and trivial second level transactions
(page 110), the main post-transaction benefits that formally registered documents
may bring to purchasers is the ability to invoke formal institutions to defend rights, in
the event of any disputes. Questions under "Litigation" on the household
questionnaire investigated this. From answers to Q.7a, litigation (defined in the
survey to include any disagreement whatsoever with any party) concerning property
holdings is not an important factor for a great majority of households to worry about.
Only 25 out of 274 (9.1%) respondents have ever been involved in any kind of
litigation concerning their interest in their property. But even if they did, they do not
perceive any gains to be obtained by being able to rely on the governmental system
to defend their property rights. Purchasers' perception of the formal machinery
(courts) for defending property rights in land is dismal. When asked to rate the
governmental machinery in settling land disputes on a scale of 0 to 10, where 0
signifies the worst and 10 the most satisfactory view, as much as 85.8% of the 268
who responded rated it below 5, the halfway mark of the scale. 60.8% rated it up to
2. Indeed 20.9% (56 respondents) gave the minimum rating, that is to say they
consider the performance of formal land dispute settlement machinery as the worst
possible. On average, purchasers rated the formal land dispute settlement
mechanism at 2.3 (mean rating) with the majority (modal rating) giving a rating of 1.
On this evidence it is indeed rational and optimal not to incur the costs of formally
registering one's documents on one's property interests.
The illegal behaviour of suppliers in selling lands that government claims to own by
virtue of compulsory acquisition can be explained to be the rational and optimum
thing to do in the context of how these acquisitions are made. The law enabling
compulsory acquisition in Ghana (Act 125) requires that compensation, based on
the estimated market value of the interests acquired, is to be paid to the owners.
The issue of injustice and non-payment of compensation for such supposedly
acquired lands is well known and debated in the literature (see, for example, Brobby,
1991). It is clear from these studies that any landowner whose interest in land has
As against official fees quoted to be between
	 4O,OOO	 6O,OOO
(Appendix 3B2)
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been subject to compulsory acquisition can expect no compensation for a long time,
if at all. From the point of view of these suppliers therefore it is economically rational
to sell the lands off if purchasers can be found. Indeed six out of the nine suppliers
questioned said they would sell the lands to frustrate the acquisition if their lands
were acquired. As to demand for such lands, the investigation of respondents from
Sports Complex suggests that there will be purchasers prepared to buy such lands
either because (a) they would not be aware of the purported acquisition, and/or (b)
the stool is perceived to be the credible owner by everyone in the market (see the
evidence at page 120). Furthermore, the analysis in Chapter 8 suggests that
landowners can expect to obtain similar levels of prices that they would have
obtained if the lands were not subjected to the compulsory acquisition order. On the
other hand the ability of government agencies to exact costs on suppliers and
purchasers alike through enforcement of the acquisition is almost non existent. The
landowner thus maximises profits by selling those lands even though this action is
illegal.
7. 3. 3. Hypothesis 3.
This hypothesis posits that current activities of formal institutions limit the efficiency
attainable by informal institutions and agents, hence reducing gains from trade. It is
derived from knowledge gained from analysis of rent-seeking behaviour. Bureaucrats
in government land agencies are presented with incentives to intervene in the
informal market. By so doing they expect to appropriate some rents which the
intervention contrives. This activity however possesses the potential to lower output
of the sector in question. The test of the hypothesis involves demonstrating aspects
of government agencies which act to diminish the efficiency of land transactions or
which could be improved to improve efficiency of land transactions. By efficiency in
land transactions is meant the need to spend the minimum possible to achieve a
transaction or, what amounts to the same thing, achieving the maximum amount of
transactions at a given level of costs.
As has been explained in the previous chapter, rent-seeking activities resulting from
the bureaucratic interference in aspects of the market constitute the main route via
which efficiency is compromised. This point is further developed by picking on some
specific activities of formal institutions that reduce efficiency. Consider the limitation
of choice on property rights that could be transacted between customary owners and
purchasers. The evidence above demonstrates that the main demand in the market
is for perpetual rights in urban land for residential developments. Given this is not
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allowed, parties to land transactions have a choice between either ignoring the
requirement completely or undertaking some activities to present the transaction as
required. Either choice entails costs which constitute a diversion of resources into
unproductive activities and thus diminish efficiency (see the analysis in Chapter 6).
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At the transaction level purchasers incur costs of preparing documents which
describe the transaction as leases. To those who do not proceed to have the
transaction formally registered, these are costs which do not bring any benefits to
the transaction. On those who attempt to and are able to register their interests, a
periodic ground rent (= discounted periodic equivalent of the price) is imposed. But
as responses to Q3.c show, of 265 purchasers who answered this question, 205
(77.4%) paid the price of land to the landowner. 59 of them paid it to someone other
than the owner, presumably an agent. Only 1 paid to a government department as
requested. Given that they would be made to pay periodic ground rents, these
purchasers would be made to pay twice for the commodity purchased if they decided
to formally register their interest. To be added to this is the estimated cost of
registration much of which might be rent-seeking costs. In either case efficiency is
diminished. As has been shown above, economically rational purchasers avoid
these costs by not registering their documents, an action which also introduces
another form of inefficiency at the land market level.
At the market level, efficiency could be enhanced if purchasers' interest could be
costlessly registered as early as possible as they purchase them. As has been
discussed above, the problem of double sale of land by unscrupulous customary
land owners is rated the most important problem in the Accra market (Figure 7.1) by
consultants' surveyed. The absence of a reliable database of ownership is rated the
fourth most important. There is a direct link between the failure of purchasers to
register their interests and the absence of credible sources of data on land
ownership. The greater the number of transactions that are organised informally the
more difficult it becomes for any central agency to compile records of ownership.
This situation in turn makes it easier for unscrupulous landowners to exploit the
market by selling the same plot to more than one purchaser. Combined with the
evidence that over 77.4% of land purchasers obtain information about land they
purchase by word of mouth, through friends, colleagues and relatives, it is apparent
how an improvement in the formal registration process, to the extent that it could
record and disseminate land ownership information, could improve efficiency with
which the market operates. Thus the policies and activities of government agencies
that tend to increase costs of registration and therefore render it irrational and sub-
optimal for purchasers to register their interests in land (see above), lead to lowering
the efficiency at which the market operates.
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A related issue is to do with activities of government agencies involved in the
granting of planning permission and building permits to ensure that buildings are
constructed to meet prevailing standards. Purchasers estimate the cost of obtaining
building permits, for instance, to be in the region of 0300,000 max. At the same time
enforcement is practically absent. As much as 66% of 244 respondents providing
answers for Q 6.a did not have building permits. As to enforcement, Q.6.c and 6.d
provides some insights. Only 46 (18.8% ) respondents were asked at some stage of
the development process to stop work by the city authorities because they did not
possess building permits. Of these ten ignored the warning completely and
continued building, 25 bribed the inspector (tipped' the inspector) and continued the
construction. Only 3 went to get a permit. From the household's point of view it is
rational to avoid building permits since one saves the cost and time involved knowing
that the chances of being made to pay for such avoidance is almost none. However,
efficiency losses result for the following reasons. In principle planning and building
permits, if properly operated, ensure that some public goods needed to enhance the
performance of neighbourhoods (and cities) are provided. These are generally the
kind of neighbourhood-wide facilities that no single household deems rational to
provide simply because others cannot be excluded from using them once provided.
To the extent that activities of the formal agencies concerned makes it economically
irrational for purchasers to conform, much of these public goods are not provided in
new neighbourhoods.
But when households eventually demand to have electricity, access roads, pipe
water, and many such facilities as they are wont to (and it becomes politically rational
to provide them because politicians become aware of the vote wining potential of
doing so, see Chapter 5), it costs society more to supply these facilities. Some
fence walls or even entire houses may have to be pulled down to provide or expand
access roads, for example. Viewed from another stand point, purchasers of land in
neighbourhoods where these facilities have been provided may be paying more for a
given plot of residential land than they would if the activities of the agencies involved
ensured that every neighbourhood in the city has those facilities. Figure 7.11 (page
128) is a plot of the scores placed by consultants surveyed on the most important
factors that determine customary land prices in Accra. As can be seen, location and
level of development aside, the three most important factors are access road
availability, electricity, and pipe water, overtaking factors relating to security of title -
litigation history, approved layout, or whether or not documents obtained can be
127
C
G)
E
C
a,
0
C.)
C,)
100
90
80
70
60
50-
40
30
20
10
0-
processed through the formal system. This is an indication that the general lack or
inadequate level of these facilities in many neighbourhoods in Accra ensures that
purchasers pay more than they would need to pay in the form of high land prices in
neighbourhoods where the facilities are provided. To this extent the informal land
market is not operating at its most efficient level.
Figure 7.11: Score of Price Determining Factors (Created From Consultants'
Rankings, Q.2.d; Appendix 3A)18
Factors Determining Land Prices
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The low perception of the government's machinery for settling land disputes exact
costs on customary landowners. Objective and efficient dispute resolution
machinery, quite apart from the gains they provide to litigating parties, have positive
external benefits (Main and Peacock, 2000). Conscious of the power of courts to
enforce contracts, parties enter and honour them. When this state of affairs does
not exist opportunistic behaviour results. Enforcement of contracts and dispute
resolution become a costly business. Landowners responses to Q3.c on the
supplier's questionnaire provide some clues in this respect. All nine landowners
interviewed scored a negative intensity score on Q3.c. A negative score means that
because land suppliers do not trust the formal legal system in enforcing their
For computation of the scores see section 7. 1. 2, page 107
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property rights, they resort to costly alternatives like employing land guards, paying
regular visits or locating stool subjects on unoccupied lands rather than relying on
registered title to protect their lands from encroachment. But these activities are
costlier ways of enforcing property rights than would be the case if objective and
reliable formal dispute resolution machinery was in place. To the extent that agents
are pushed to undertaking these costs some level of efficiency is compromised.
7. 3. 4. Hypothesis 4.
It is contended in this hypothesis that without interference of government land
agencies, property rights under customary institutions are clear and secure. From
the property rights literature, one learns that what eventually evolves to constitute
appropriate property rights systems are those rules and norms that, in fact, enable
agents to make decisions they want to make about utilisation of their own resources.
It is perfectly normal to find these rules to comprise mainly of informal norms, If this
were the case it would be because those informal norms are better attuned to the
level and nature of opportunities available to agents. Clear and secure property
rights could therefore prevail in the absence of formal laws. This hypothesis
therefore tests the assumption in the literature that informal property transactions
covey insecure and unclear property rights. For the test, it is sufficient to show how
it is the main tools of government intervention in the market that lead to observed
insecurity of title.
Two main tools of bureaucratic intervention in the land market that impact on title are
the restriction of stool land transactions to leases through the formal registration
process and the use of compulsory purchase powers of the government.
Considering first the restriction of stool land transactions to leases, results of the
survey make it clear that this introduces ambiguities to the nature of property rights
held by residential land purchasers in Accra. As discussed above (page 117) the
majority of purchasers believe they hold perpetual interests in their land whereas
formal policy has it that these purchasers hold 99 or 50 year leases depending on
whether they are Ghanaians or foreigners. The transaction between customary
owners and household purchasers is transparent and clear on both price and
interests conveyed. Prices paid in customary land transactions are lump sum capital
values of interests passed (implied by responses to Q5.a see page 117). Interests
conveyed comprise of all the bundle of rights entailed in taking immediate
possession, developing and occupying the land free from payment of any further
monies to the vendor at any future date with no time limit. This conclusion can be
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inferred from intensity scores on Q9.a (Table 7.7) where a negative score indicates
that the supplier avoided the directive of the policy. Seven out of 9 respondents who
answered scored a negative. Answers to 9 b and 9.d confirm this position. Five out
of the nine interviewed answered these questions. They are aware that ground rents
are to be paid to the Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands (9.b) but have not
collected any ground rents from the said Office (9.d). Their transactions are
organised as perpetual interests for which full payments are received at the level of
the transaction. Documents prepared on these transactions which describe them as
leases are done just to satisfy conditions for formal registration. Thus in the absence
of the implications introduced by formal policy (government intervention), prices and
property rights conveyed in these transactions are clear.
On security of title the evidence shows that in the absence of government
intervention through the use of compulsory purchase powers purchasers' property
rights are secure. An indication of this is provided by the level of litigation
concerning property interests of households. If titles are insecure one should find
evidence of this through the level of disputes and litigation. As has been shown
above (page 122) the level of post purchase litigation concerning households'
property interests is trivial in the sampled areas. This is the case even at Sports
Complex, the area subject to a compulsory acquisition order Out of the 80 valid
respondents in Sports Complex 76 answered Q 2.c asking from whom they
purchased their property. 43 (56.6%) bought it from a Stool or Family, 31(40.8%)
bought from a private person. Not a single respondent obtained the land from a
government agency. But because of the compulsory acquisition order the title to
land of these purchasers are rendered insecure because there is always the threat
that government may demolish the properties. None of the purchasers can register
their property interests even if they wanted to do so. Thus without the compulsory
acquisition encumbrance, property rights of these purchasers are no different from
purchasers of customary lands in other neighbourhoods. To the extent that it has
been argued that those interests are clear and secure, the government intervention
through compulsory purchase is causing insecurity of title.
7. 4. Summary
In this chapter, the results of the field survey have been employed to answer four of
the five main research questions that the study originally set out to pursue.
SpecificalTy, the findings confirm the contention that the unrecorded land/property
market of Accra obeys conventional economic laws of demand and supply. It has
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been shown that agents' behaviour follow patterns expected from economically
rational ones whose decisions are bounded by institutions of the market. Though
their behaviour might contravene formal land policies in the Country, the evidence
demonstrates that such behaviour turns out to be the rational and economically
optimum thing to do given transaction cost implications vis a vis enforcement levels
of those policies. Yet in avoiding those costs, agents' behaviour leads to diversion of
resources into wasteful activities which, in the end, diminish the level of efficiency at
which the market can operate. Piecing these findings together in multivariate
analysis will enable a test of the contention that improvements in allocative efficiency
remains the only equitable way of improving urban housing and neighbourhood
standards. That is the subject of the next Chapter.
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Max. Range
1000 1000
0.00 1000
10.00 1000
10.00	 1000
000	 1000
2.86	 1000
5.00 - 1000
286	 1000
588	 1000
7.89	 1000
286	 10.00
000	 1000
-1.00	 1000
0.71	 10.00
364	 1000
0.00	 10.00
Table 7.5 : Context of Intensity Score Calculation (Suppliers)
Test	 IRaw Intensity Score
Item
2.a	 Prevalence of formal title among suppliers
of land
2.b
	
Confidence in formal title I
2.c	 Perception of benefits of formal title
2.d
	
Perception of constraints of obtaining
formal title
3.a	 Prevalence of cadastral surveys among
suppliers
3.b
	
Perception of benefits of cadastral surveys
among suppliers
3.c	 Confidence in utilising formal institutions to
enforce property rights in land I
3.f
	
Causes of encroachment
3.g	 Perception of ability of formal institutions in
enforcing property rights in land
4.a	 Economic rationality of decisions of land
sales
4.c	 Perceived constraints in complying with
planning regulations.
4.d
	
Compliance with planning regulations
4.f
	
Economic rationa ity of parcelling land
4.g	 Level of record keeping
4.j	 Level of unscrupulousness in land sales
6.c	 Economic rationality of supply of plots
6.d
	
Flow of information in market
6.e	 Effciency of level of market information
provided
6.f
	
Economic rationality of supply I
Table 7.4: Context of Intensity Score Calculation (Households)
I Raw Intensity Score	 Standardised Intensity
Item	 Test
	
Score
__________________________________________ Mm.
	 Max.	 Range Mm.
2.f	 Economic rationality of selection criterion
	 0 00	 28.00	 28 00
	 0.00
2.j	 View on government lands.
	
-13.00	 0.00	 13 00	 -10.00
3.a	 Flowof Information	 0.00	 16.00	 16.00	 0.00
3.d	 Flexibility of payment
	 0.00	 24 00
	 24 00
	 0.00
3.e	 Level of additional expend ture to land
	 -24 00
	 0 00	 24 00
	 -10 00
- price	 -	 -	
-
3.g	 Impactofoperationof banks
	 -1000	 400	 14.00	 -7.14
3.h	 Significance of price property choices
	 -6 00	 6 00	 -12.00	 -500
3.i	 Economic basis of pricing
	
-10 00
	 4 00	 14 00
	 -7 14
4.c	 Purchasers confidence in formal title
	 -700	 10 00
	 17 00
	 -4 12
4.d	 Practical importance of title registration to -400
	 1500	 1900	 -2.11
purchasers
4.f	 Confidence on operation of documentation -1000
	 400	 14.00	 -7.14
process
4.i	 Perception on cost' of documentation	 -21.00	 0.00	 21.00	 -10.00
5.d	 Efficacyofpolicyrestrictingtransactionsto -11.00
	 -1.00	 10.00	 -11.00
leases
6.b	 Effectiveness of Building permit process I -13 00
	 1.00	 14.00	 -9.29
6.d	 Effectiveness of Building permit process II -7 00
	 4.00	 11.00	 -6.36
8.c	 Confidence in governments ability in
	 -20.00	 0.00	 20.00	 -10.00
supplying rights of physical possession in
land
Mm.	 Max.	 Range
-4.00	 1400 1800
-4.00	 8.00	 1200
-4.00	 17.00 21 00
-12.00 0.00	 1200
-8.00	 4.00	 12.00
-12.00 2.00	 14.00
-12.00 400	 1600
-16.00 0.00	 1600
-5.00	 4.00	 9.00
000	 2000 2000
-20 00 0 00	 20.00
-7.00	 1200 1900
000	 1500 1500
000	 800	 800
-16.00 0.00
	 16 00
-800 400
	 1200
000	 2800 2800
-800 400	 1200
-6.00	 6.00	 12 00
Standardised Intensity
Score
Mm.	 Max.	 Range
-2.22	 7.78	 10 00
-333 667
	 1000
-1.90	 810	 1000
-10.00 0.00	 1000
-6.67	 3.33	 1000
-857	 1.43	 1000
-7.50	 2.50	 1000
-10.00 0.00
	 1000
-5.56	 444	 1000
000	 1000 1000
-10.00 000
	 1000
-368 632
	 1000
000	 1000 1000
0.00	 1000 1000
-10.00 000
	 1000
-667 333
	 1000
0.00	 1000 1000
-667 333
	 1000
-500 500
	 1000
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7.b
7.c
7.d
7.e
8.b
B.c
8.d
8.f
9.a
9.e
I O.f
I O.g
IO.h
I Di
IO.m
Economic rationality of pricing
Economic rationality II
quoted price as indicator of clearing price
Flexibility of payment - customer orientation
Society's recognition of supplier's title
Causes of disputes
Confidence in formal judiciary system
Perception of formal institutions settling
land disputes
Impact of leasing prescription by
government
Perception on lease prescription
Feuding between formal and informal
institutions I
Indicator of feuding between formal and
informal institutions
Perception on feuding between formal and
informal system
Perception of use of compulsory acquisition
powers
Perception of use of vesting legislation
-400 800
	
1200 -333 667	 1000
-1200 2000 3200 -3.75	 625	 1000
-1600 000
	
1600 -1000 000
	
1000
D 00	 20.00 20 00 0.00	 10 00	 10 00
20.00 0.00
	 20 00 -10.00 0.00	 10.00
-1600 0.00
	 16.00 -1000 000	 1000
-4.00	 4 00	 8.00	 -5.00	 5.00	 10 00
-6.00	 6.00	 12.00 -5.00	 5 00	 10 00
-1200 000
	 1200 -1000 000	 1000
-20.00 0 00
	 20 00 -10.00 0 00	 10 00
-600	 0.00	 6.00	 -10.00 0 00	 10 00
000	 2000 20.00 000	 1000	 1000
0.00	 20.00 20.00 0.00	 10.00	 10 00
-6.00	 600	 12 00 -5.00	 5.00	 10 00
-6.00	 6.00	 12.00	 -5.00	 5.00	 10.00
Table 7.6: Frequency Table of Intensity Scores (Households)
2.F	 Score	 Frequency	 %	 Valid %	 Cumulative %
0.00	 1	 0.35	 0.83	 0.83
1.43	 30	 10.64	 25.00	 25.83
2.14	 3	 1.06	 2.50	 28.33
2.86	 29	 10.28	 24.17	 52.50
4.29	 32	 11.35	 26.67	 79.17
5.71	 16	 5.67	 13.33	 92.50
714	 8	 2.84	 667	 99.17
8.57	 1	 0.35	 0.83	 100.00
Total	 120	 42.55	 100.00
Missing	 162	 57.45
Total	 282	 100.00
2.J	 Score	 Frequency	 %	 Valid %	 Cumulative %
-10.00	 5	 1.77	 1.95	 1.95
-9.23	 16	 5.67	 6.25	 8.20
-6.92	 15	 5.32	 5 86	 14.06
-6.15	 19	 6.74	 742	 21.48
-3 85	 21	 7 45	 8.20	 29.69
-3.08	 35	 12 41	 13.67	 43.36
-0.77	 52	 18 44	 20.31	 63 67
000	 92	 3262	 3594	 99.61
2.31	 1	 0.35	 0.39	 100.00
Total	 256	 90.78	 100.00
Missing	 26	 9.22
Total	 282	 10000
3.A	 Score	 Frequency	 o	 Valid o	 Cumulative /
2 50	 261	 92 55	 96.31	 96.31
500	 9	 319	 3.32	 9963
7.50	 1	 0.35	 0.37	 100.00
Total	 271	 96 10	 100.00
Missing	 11	 3.90
Total	 282	 10000
3D	 Score	 Frequency	 00	 Valid 0	 Cumulative %
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0.00	 13	 4.61	 4.66	 4.66
1.67	 257	 91.13	 92.11	 96.77
3.33	 7	 2.48	 2.51	 99.28
5.00	 2	 0.71	 0.72	 100.00
Total	 279	 98.94	 100.00
Missing	 3	 1.06
Total	 282	 100.00
3.E	 Score	 Frequency	 %	 Valid %	 Cumulative %
-8.33	 9	 3.19	 3.41	 3.41
-6.67	 26	 9.22	 9.85	 13.26
-5.00	 46	 16.31	 17.42	 3068
-3.33	 86	 30.50	 32.58	 63.26
-1.67	 55	 19.50	 20.83	 8409
000	 42	 14.89	 15.91	 100.00
Total	 264	 93.62	 100.00
Missing	 18	 6 38
Total	 282	 10000
3.G'	 Score	 Frequency	 Valid %
	
Cumulative %
-10.00	 4	 1.42	 1.50	 1.50
-8.57	 7	 2.48	 2.63	 4.14
-7.14	 4	 1.42	 1.50	 5.64
-5.71	 44	 15.60	 16.54	 22.18
-5.00	 3	 1.06	 1.13	 23.31
-4.29	 5	 1.77	 1.88	 25.19
-3.57	 3	 1.06	 1.13	 26.32
-2.86	 136	 48.23	 51.13	 77.44
-2.14	 10	 3.55	 3.76	 81.20
-1.43	 28	 9.93	 10.53	 91.73
-0.71	 8	 2.84	 3.01	 94.74
0 00	 6	 2.13	 2.26	 96.99
0.71	 1	 0.35	 0.38	 97.37
1.43	 1	 0.35	 0.38	 97.74
2.86	 4	 1.42	 1.50	 99.25
5.71	 2	 0.71	 0.75	 100.00
Total	 266	 94.33	 100.00
Missing	 16	 5.67
Total	 282	 100.00
3.1-I'	 Score	 Frequency	 Valid %	 Cumulative %
-3.33	 8	 2.84	 3.07	 3.07
-1.67	 7	 2.48	 2.68	 5.75
0.00	 43	 15.25	 16.48	 22.22
167	 106	 37.59	 4061	 62.84
3.33	 79	 28.01	 30.27	 93.10
6.67	 18	 6.38	 6.90	 100.00
Total	 261	 92.55	 100.00
Missing	 21	 7.45
Total	 282	 100.00
3.1	 Score	 Frequency	 %	 Valid %	 Cumulative %
-7.14	 1	 035	 038	 038
-571	 4	 1.42	 1.53	 1.91
-2.86	 12	 426	 4.58	 649
-1.43	 6	 2.13	 2.29	 878
-0 71	 12	 4.26	 4.58	 13.36
0.00	 8	 2.84	 3.05	 16.41
2 86	 163	 57.80	 62.21	 78.63
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571	 56	 1986	 2137	 10000
Total	 262	 9291	 10000
Missing	 20	 7 09
Total	 282	 10000
4.C'	 Score	 Frequency	 0	 Valid o	 Cumu ative o
-4 71	 64	 22.70	 24 06	 24 06
-3 53	 3	 1 06	 113	 25.19
-2.35	 117	 41 49	 43.98	 69.17
-1.76	 19	 674	 7.14	 7632
059	 10	 355	 3.76	 80.08
1.18	 13	 461	 4.89	 84.96
1.76	 11	 3.90	 414	 89.10
2.35	 25	 8.87	 9.40	 98.50
353	 1	 035	 038	 9887
4.71	 3	 1.06	 113	 10000
Total	 266	 9433	 10000
Missing	 16	 5.67
Total	 282	 100.00
4.D	 Score	 Frequency	 0	 Valid %	 Cumulative %
-2.11	 1	 0.35	 0.37	 0.37
-1.58	 2	 0.71	 0.75	 1.12
-0.53	 1	 0.35	 0.37	 1.49
0.00	 206	 73.05	 76.87	 78.36
0.53	 5	 1.77	 1.87	 80.22
1.05	 7	 2.48	 2.61	 82.84
1.58	 1	 0.35	 0.37	 83.21
2.11	 3	 1.06	 1.12	 84.33
2.63	 12	 4.26	 4.48	 88.81
3.16	 10	 3.55	 3.73	 92.54
3.68	 2	 0.71	 0.75	 93.28
421	 3	 1.06	 1.12	 94.40
474	 3	 1.06	 1.12	 95.52
5.26	 6	 2.13	 2.24	 97.76
5.79	 3	 1.06	 1.12	 98.88
6.32	 2	 0.71	 0 75	 99.63
6.84	 1	 0.35	 0.37	 100.00
Total	 268	 95.04	 100.00
Missing	 14	 4.96
Total	 282	 100.00
4.F	 Score	 Frequency	 00	 Valid %	 Cumulative o
-7.14	 1	 035	 040	 040
-5.00	 7	 2 48	 2.77	 3.16
-429	 7	 248	 277	 593
-2 86	 2	 0.71	 0.79	 6.72
-214	 23	 8.16	 9.09	 15.81
000	 186	 6596	 7352	 89.33
286	 27	 957	 1067	 10000
Total	 253	 8972	 10000
Missing	 29	 10 28
Total	 282	 10000
4.1	 Score	 Frequency	 Val d 0	 Cumulative 0o
-619	 1	 035	 040	 040
-571	 3	 1.06	 1.20	 1 59
-4.29	 8	 284	 3.19	 478
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-381	 13	 4.61	 518	 996
-238	 18	 638	 7.17	 1713
-190	 32	 1135	 12.75	 2988
-0.48	 37	 13.12	 14.74	 44.62
000	 139	 49.29	 55.38	 10000
Total	 251	 89.01	 10000
Missing	 31	 10 99
Total	 282	 100.00
5.D	 Score	 Frequency	 %	 Valid %	 Cumulative %
-10.00	 26	 922	 14.69	 1469
-7.00	 54	 19.15	 30.51	 45.20
-600	 1	 035	 0.56	 4576
-4.00	 29	 10.28	 16.38	 62 15
-3.00	 59	 20.92	 33.33	 95.48
-1.00	 7	 2 48	 3.95	 99.44
000	 1	 035	 0.56	 100.00
Total	 177	 62.77	 100.00
Missing	 105	 37 23
Total	 282	 100.00
6.B	 Score	 Frequency	 %	 Valid %	 Cumulative %
-5.71	 17	 6.03	 7.14	 7.14
-5 00	 1	 0.35	 0.42	 7.56
-4.29	 7	 2.48	 2.94	 10.50
-3.57	 2	 0.71	 0.84	 11.34
-2.86	 19	 6.74	 7.98	 19.33
-2.14	 18	 6.38	 7.56	 26.89
-1.43	 20	 7.09	 8.40	 35.29
-0.71	 3	 1.06	 1.26	 36.55
0.00	 89	 31.56	 37.39	 73.95
0.71	 58	 20.57	 24.37	 98.32
1.43	 3	 1.06	 1.26	 99.58
5.00	 1	 0.35	 0.42	 100.00
Total	 238	 84.40	 100.00
Missing	 44	 1560
Total	 282	 100.00
6.D	 Score	 Frequency	 %	 Valid %	 Cumulative %
-6.36	 3	 1.06	 6.82	 6.82
-364	 10	 3.55	 22.73	 2955
-2 73	 25	 8.87	 56 82	 86 36
000	 1	 0.35	 2.27	 8864
091	 2	 0.71	 455	 9318
364	 3	 1.06	 682	 10000
Total	 44	 1560	 10000
Missing	 238	 8440
Total	 282	 100.00
8.0	 Score	 Frequency	 %	 Valid %	 Cumulative %
-2 00	 5	 1.77	 18 52	 18.52
050	 22	 7.80	 81.48	 100.00
Total	 27	 957	 10000
Missing	 255	 90 43
Total	 282	 10000
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Table 7.7: Frequency Table of Intensity Scores (Suppliers)
2 A	 Score	 Frequency	 Valid 00	 Cumulative 00
	0.00	 1.00	 11.11	 11.11	 1111
	
1.11	 200	 22.22	 2222	 3333
	
2.22	 6.00	 66.67	 66.67	 100.00
	
Total	 900	 10000	 10000
2 B	 Score	 Frequency	 %	 Valid %	 Cumulative %
	
000	 1.00	 11.11	 1250	 1250
	
3.33	 5.00	 55.56	 62 50	 75.00
	
6.67	 2.00	 22.22	 25.00	 100 00
	
Total	 800	 88.89	 100.00
	
Missing	 1.00	 11.11
	
Total	 9.00	 100 00
2.0	 Score	 Frequency	 %	 Valid %
	
Cumulative %
	
-1.90	 100	 11.11	 11.11	 11.11
	
2.38	 1.00	 11.11	 11.11	 22.22
	
3.81	 1.00	 11.11	 11.11	 33.33
	
4.29	 2.00	 22.22	 22.22	 55.56
	
5.71	 1.00	 11.11	 11.11	 66.67
	
6.19	 3.00	 33.33	 33.33	 100.00
	
Total	 900	 100.00	 100.00
2.D	 Score	 Frequency	 %	 Valid %	 Cumulative %
	
-3.33	 2.00	 22.22	 22.22	 22.22
	
0.00	 7.00	 77.78	 77.78	 100 00
	
Total	 900	 100.00	 100.00
3.A'	 Score	 Frequency	 %	 Valid %	 Cumulative %
	
-3.33	 3.00	 33.33	 33.33	 33.33
	
0.00	 1.00	 11.11	 11.11	 4444
	
3.33	 5.00	 55.56	 55.56	 100.00
	
Total	 9.00	 100.00	 100.00
3.B	 Score	 Frequency	 %	 Valid %	 Cumulative %
	
-2.86	 3.00	 33.33	 33.33	 33.33
	
0.00	 6.00	 66.67	 66.67	 100.00
	
Total	 9.00	 100.00	 100.00
3 C	 Score	 Frequency	 %	 Valid %	 Cumulative %
	
-7.50	 1.00	 11.11	 11.11	 11.11
	
-5.00	 6.00	 66.67	 66.67	 77.78
	
-2.50	 200	 22.22	 2222	 100.00
	
Total	 9.00	 10000	 100.00
3 F	 Score	 Frequency	 /0	 Valid %	 Cumulative %
	
-7.50	 1.00	 11.11	 1429	 1429
	
-2.50	 600	 6667	 8571	 10000
	
Total	 700	 77.78	 100.00
	
Missing	 2.00	 22 22
	
Total	 900	 10000
3.G	 Score	 Frequency	 Valid %	 Cumulative %
	
-1.11	 2.00	 22.22	 100.00	 100.00
	
Missing	 7.00	 77.78
	
Total	 900	 100.00
4 A
	
Score	 Frequency	 %	 Valid %	 Cumulative %
	
0.50	 100	 11.11	 11.11	 11.11
	
2 00	 3 00	 33 33	 33 33	 44 44
	
4 00	 3 00	 33 33	 33 33	 77 78
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6.C'
6. D
6E
6.F
7B
7.0
4 C
4 D
4 F
4.G
4.J
8 00
1000
Total
Score
0 00
Missing
Total
Score
-1.58
0 53
211
4.21
Total
Score
1.33
2.00
4.00
4.67
6.00
7.33
Total
Score
5.00
10.00
Total
Score
-10.00
-7.50
-5.00
-2.50
0.00
Total
Score
3.33
Score
2.86
4.29
5 71
7 14
Total
Score
3 33
Score
-3.33
1.67
3.33
Total
Score
3 33
Score
1.25
2 50
3 75
6.25
1 00
1 00
9 00
Frequency
1 00
8 00
9 00
Frequency
1.00
3.00
4 00
1.00
9 00
Frequency
3.00
1.00
2.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
9 00
Frequency
5.00
4.00
9.00
Frequency
1.00
1.00
1.00
5.00
1.00
9 00
Frequency
9.00
Frequency
1.00
1.00
4 00
3 00
9.00
Frequency
9 00
Frequency
1.00
1.00
7.00
9 00
Frequency
9 00
Frequency
2 00
3 00
3 00
1 00
1111
1111
100 00
%
1111
88 89
10000
11.11
33.33
4444
11.11
100 00
/0
33.33
11.11
22.22
11.11
11.11
11.11
100.00
%
55.56
44.44
100.00
%
11.11
11.11
11.11
55.56
11.11
100.00
%
100.00
11.11
11.11
4444
33.33
100 00
100 00
00
11.11
11.11
77.78
100 00
10000
2222
3333
3333
1111
11.11
1111
100 00
Valid 0
10000
Valid %
1111
33.33
4444
11.11
10000
Valid %
33.33
11.11
22.22
11.11
11.11
11.11
100.00
Valid %
55.56
4444
100.00
Valid %
11.11
11.11
11.11
55.56
11.11
100.00
Valid %
100.00
Valid %
11.11
11.11
44.44
33.33
100.00
Va id o
100.00
Valid %
11.11
11.11
77.78
10000
Val d 00
100 00
Valid /
22.22
33.33
3333
11.11
88.89
100.00
Cumulative 00
100 00
Cumulative /
11.11
44.44
88.89
100.00
Cumulative %
33.33
44.44
66.67
77.78
88.89
100.00
Cumulative %
55.56
100.00
Cumulative %
11.11
22.22
33.33
88.89
100.00
Cumulative /o
100.00
Cumulative %
11.11
22.22
66.67
100.00
Cumulative 0
100.00
Cumulative %
11.11
22.22
100.00
Cumulative 0
10000
Cumulative 0
22.22
55.56
8889
10000
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Total	 9.00	 100.00	 10000
7 D	 Score	 Frequency	 00	 Va id o	Cumulative /
-750	 1.00	 11.11	 3333	 33.33
-250	 100	 1111	 3333	 6667
0.00	 100	 11.11	 3333	 10000
Total	 3 00	 33.33	 100.00
Missing	 6.00	 66.67
Total	 900	 10000
7 E	 Score	 Frequency	 %	 Valid o	Cumulative 0
2.00	 100	 11.11	 11.11	 11.11
4 00	 2 00	 22 22
	 22 22	 33 33
6 00	 2.00	 22.22	 22.22	 55.56
8.00	 2 00	 22.22	 22.22	 77 78
10.00	 2.00	 22.22	 22.22	 100 00
Total	 9.00	 100.00	 100.00
8.B	 Score	 Frequency	 %	 Valid %	 Cumulative %
-6.00	 1.00	 11.11	 11.11	 11.11
-4.00	 5.00	 55.56	 55.56	 66.67
-2.00	 1.00	 11.11	 11.11	 77.78
1.00	 1.00	 11.11	 11.11	 8889
2.50	 1.00	 11.11	 11.11	 100.00
Total	 9.00	 100.00	 100 00
8.0	 Score	 Frequency	 %	 Valid %	 Cumulative %
-7.50	 100	 11.11	 11.11	 1111
-5.00	 3.00	 33.33	 33.33	 44.44
-2 50	 5.00	 55.56	 55.56	 100.00
Total	 9.00	 100.00	 100.00
8 D'	 Score	 Frequency	 %	 Valid %	 Cumulative %
-5.00	 1.00	 11.11	 11.11	 11.11
0.00	 4.00	 44.44	 44.44	 55.56
5.00	 4.00	 44.44	 44.44	 100.00
Total	 9.00	 100.00	 100.00
8.F	 Score	 Frequency	 %	 Valid /	 Cumulative /
-3.33	 8.00	 88.89	 88.89	 88.89
1.67	 1.00	 11.11	 11.11	 100.00
Total	 9.00	 100.00	 100.00
9 A	 Score	 Frequency	 %	 Valid %	 Cumulative %
-3.33	 7.00	 77.78	 100.00	 10000
Missing	 2.00	 22.22
Total	 9.00	 100.00
9 E	 Score	 Frequency	 o	 Valid o	Cumulative %
-6.00	 2.00	 22.22	 22.22	 22.22
-2.00	 400	 4444	 4444	 66.67
0.00	 3.00	 3333	 33.33	 100.00
Total	 900	 10000	 100.00
10 F	 Score	 Frequency	 %	 Valid %
	
Cumulative %
-667	 5.00	 55.56	 6250	 62.50
667	 300	 3333	 3750	 100.00
Total	 800	 8889	 10000
Missing	 1 00	 1111
Total	 9.00	 10000
10.G	 Score	 Frequency	 00	 Valid 0	 Cumulative 0
200	 1.00	 11.11	 33.33	 3333
400	 100	 1111	 33.33	 66.67
6.00	 1.00	 1111	 33.33	 100.00
139
Total	 3.00	 33.33	 100.00
Missing	 6.00	 66.67
Total	 900	 10000
10 H	 Score	 Frequency	 %	 Valid %	 Cumulative %
0.00	 1.00	 1111	 16.67	 1667
2.00	 2.00	 22.22	 33.33	 50.00
4.00	 2.00	 22.22	 33.33	 83.33
6.00	 1.00	 11.11	 16.67	 100.00
Total	 6.00	 66.67	 100.00
Missing	 3.00	 33.33
Total	 9.00	 100 00
10.1	 Score	 Frequency	 %	 Valid %	 Cumulative %
-3.33	 6.00	 66.67	 66.67	 66.67
-1.67	 2.00	 22.22	 22.22	 88.89
1.67	 1.00	 11.11	 11.11	 100.00
Total	 900	 100.00	 100.00
10.M'	 Score	 Frequency	 %	 Valid %	 Cumulative %
-3.33	 7.00	 77.78	 77.78	 77.78
-1.67	 1.00	 11.11	 11.11	 88.89
3.33	 1.00	 11.11	 11.11	 100.00
Total	 9.00	 100.00	 100.00
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Chapter 8: Multivariate Analyses of The Survey Data
8. 0. Introduction
To gain further insights, aspects of the findings in Chapter 7 are combined in
multivariate analyses. The latter is used to test the fifth hypothesis that holding
incomes constant, improvements in allocative efficiency remains the only equitable
way of improving urban housing and neighbourhood standards. The two main
statistical methods employed are (a) multiple regression analysis and (b)
discriminant analysis In section 8. 1 multiple regression analysis is used to gain
insights into which variables account for changes in price levels in the unrecorded
land market of Accra, at the market level (section 8. 1. 1) and at the individual
neighbourhood levels (section 8. 1. 4). Following this, discriminant analysis is used
to further investigate the market on other aspects of transactions beyond price such
as the sex; age; educational attainment; employment status; source of finance of
purchasers (8. 2). A brief summary of the findings is provided in section 8. 2. 2.
8. 1. The Multiple Regression Analysis
Multiple regression analysis is employed to investigate, inter a/ia, some of the
arguments in the literature concerning the importance of formal documentation of
title, escalating land prices, and their effects on residential land prices and
households' housing investment decisions (see Chapter 2). The use of multiple
regression analysis in enquiries of this nature is well established. In the urban
property market literature, it is the analytical base of hedonic analysis of property
data to investigate implicit prices of housing attributes. For more on this see, Antwi
and Henneberry (1995), Arimah (1992), and Rosen (1974).
To begin the enquiry, Eq. 8.1 is posited. Drawing on the finding that agents are
rational and their operations bounded by constraints of formal and informal
institutions, the price of a plot is posited to depend on: the date of purchase (time),
state of development of the land (pstate (2.a)), the neighbourhood within which the
land is situated (nbhood), whether the land is obtained from government or
customary land owners (vendor (2.c)), the extent of market search undertaken
before buying (search (2.e)), source of finance for the purchase (finance (3.g)),
source of market information (inf (3.a)), perception of property rights being
purchased (prights(3.i)), and the cost of registration (creg 4.g)). Formally this is
written as;
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Eq. 8.1
Pr ice - f (Time, psraie , nbhood ,vendor ,search ,finance , inf, prights , creg)
The equation was tested using the ordinary feast squares (OLS) method. After many
trials semi-log equations emerged as the best specification. The test of the equation
was undertaken for the entire sample of households (pooled data) as well as for
each of the five neighbourhoods. Preferred equations (for both pooled and
neighbourhood data) revealed, at the outset, that prights, inf, and vendor, are not
important variables in explaining price in the sample. Indeed including these
variables resulted, in most cases, in an inability to derive efficient estimators due to
violations of some of the OLS assumptions. These variables were therefore
excluded.
One expects this outcome given the information conveyed by the intensity scores of
these variables. Since practically all purchasers perceive to buy perpetual property
rights, they do not face any choices in the selection of bundle of rights (zero
variance). As a determinant of price, prights is thus not an important variable. The
same explanation goes for inf and vendor since all information about land to
purchase is informally acquired (Chapter 7, section 7.7.2) hence, this should not be
important in explaining land prices in this particular market. And since the
government as a supplier of land is not an option available to purchasers, the
variable does not explain land prices in this market (see section 7.2 of Chapter 7).
8.1. 1.Pooled Data Regressions
For the pooled data the formulated semi-log equation (as explained above) using the
remaining variables in Eq. 8.1 is;
Eq. 8.2
Pr ice = Aet1me + /J2pstate + /i3nbhood + /34search + /35 finance + /i6creg + e)
where
/3 ( -1 6 = parameters to be estimated;
A = a constant conveying information about the price if all of the independent
variables did not apply to a plot.
= an error term which captures the effects of all other variables not included in the
equation and the random error implicit in the observed data.
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A linear transformation of Eq. 8.2 to allow OLS estimation is achieved by taking logs
of both sides to yield.
Eq. 8.3
In price = a + /3 time + /32pstate + /J3nbhood + /34search + /35 finance + /J6creg + e
where
alnA
In this functional form the background to interpreting /3, is as follows. Letting
X represent a given independent variable and V the dependent variable, Berry and
Feldman (1985; p. 64) explain that for any two values of X, say, X' and X ", that
are a fixed distance apart the ratio of the associated expected values of Y - E( Y')
and E(Y") - equals a constant value. In particular if X' and X" are a unit
distance apart (X'-X " = 1, i e. a unit change in X), then:
Eq. 8.4
E(Y')
= e t'. Thus for the dichotomous neighbourhood variables, a change in price
E(Y")
resulting from the presence of a given neighbourhood variable over the excluded
(standard) variable is e1'
Since by definition E(Y') = E(Y") + AY, the change in V as a result of the unit
change in X, Eq. 8.4 can be rewritten as:
E(Y")
+1=e
E(Y")
Eq. 8.5
LV = e —1. Thus for continuous variables, a unit change leads to (e —1)xlOO
E(Y")
percent change in price, the dependent variable. For some more details of
interpreting and using regression specifications see Achen (1982) and Berry and
Feldman (1985).
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Before proceeding to discuss the results of the tests the following explanation of the
variables is in order:
1. The variable, time, is derived from the year of purchase. Though reported year
of purchase spans between 1938 and 1998 (60 year period) only 4.55% (13) of
all the transactions were achieved before 1970. To avoid distortions that this
could cause in the analysis time is calculated to range between 0 (1970) to 28
(1998). All transactions achieved before 1970 are set to 0, that is, as if
purchased in 1970. The a priori expectation of this variable is positive: land
prices are expected to have been appreciating at a positive constant rate19
between the years.
2. pstate is categorical (3 valid groupings) increasing from 1, purchase of bare
land, through 2, purchase of an uncompleted structure, to 3, purchase of fully
completed house. It is expected to have a positive influence on price.
3. The a priori expectation of the impact on price of search -- dichotomous (yes [1]
or no [0]) - is negative: the more a purchaser searches the market before
concluding a transaction the less the price he/she is expected to pay for the
eventually selected land, ceteris par/bus.
4. creg is continuous in cedis () and expected to have a negative sign. Purchasers
should pay less for a given land if they expect the cost of registration to be
higher.
5. finance, derived via intensity score calculation (see Chapter 7; section 7.1 1) is
continuous. Its a priori expectation is ambiguous: relying on a formal source of
finance might lead to paying far more than one should, given the relative ease at
which a purchaser can have access to the needed funds and the pressures
imposed by the need to find suitable land in time to meet loan agreement
deadlines. On the other hand the discipline introduced by formal finance through
the need to justify to the bank manager that price paid is a fair market price,
could lead a purchaser to bargain harder to achieve a lower price than would
otherwise be the case.
6. For nbhood, five dichotomous dummy variables, SANTMR (for Santa Maria),
AWOSHIE (for Awoshie), GBAWE (for Mallam/Gbawe), COMPLEX (for Sports
complex), and BOTWE (for Sraha Ashalley Botwe) were derived to take the
value 1, if a given property is in a neighbourhood of interest, and 0 if otherwise.
For example a property in Sports Complex will assume the value 1 for the
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variable COMPLEX and 0 for all the other neighbourhood variables, and so on.
In the regression one of these dummy variables has to be excluded. The
excluded variable becomes the 'standard neighbourhood' from which the
contribution to price of the included neighbourhoods are measured.
In the first tests, BOTWE, on average the most recent among the sampled
neighbourhoods (mean date of purchase is 1988 [= 1970+18] see Table 8.4, page
151), was excluded. Results of the three preferred equations are reported in panel
(a) of Table 8.3 (page 147). Given the particular interest in COMPLEX, the
neighbourhood where lands purchased are technically illegal by virtue of the
government's compulsory purchase order, tests excluding COMPLEX were run to
permit direct interpretation of price effects of customary land trading in compulsorily
acquired lands. It would also enable a test of the effects of a direct interventionist
tool by government - compulsory acquisition. The results of these tests are reported
in panel (b) of Table 8.3. Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 8.1. To identify
and minimise unwarranted multicoliinearity problems, a correlation matrix of the
variables in the equation was constructed and reported in Table 8.2.
Table 8.1: Descriptive Statistics (Pooled Data)
Variable	 Mean	 StDev.
Lgprice	 11.4891	 2.5736
time	 13.8653	 7.2504
state(2.a)	 1.1673	 0.4881
nance(3.g)	 -0.277	 2.2631
reg(4.g)	 472203	 988014.2802
' The constant rate of change expectation results from the interpretation of
the coefficient as explained above.
145
Co
0
Co
w
U)
C,
.
Co
I-
Co
>
I.-0
)<
I-
Co
0
.4-I
Co
C,
00
N
c
C)
.
CoI-
	
— N C) () c) N- (N v- cc c cc N- (Y) (.0 (0 c) c) (0 c) C)	 c	 C) c C)	 C") —
	
OC'ç\J(.J(') )	 C')
dd (DC) C)Q (DC) C)C) C)C) CDQ LUC) -
I	 I	 I	 I	
o
C) C) C) (0 C) (N C) (N C) N C) N C) (N 0 N C) )
LU C) cc C) (0 0 cc 0 (0 C) (0 0 cc -. C) cc C)	 C) r)N
C)	 CD	 C)	 9	 9	 C)	 C)0
0]
CD C) CD (0 N- (0 N C) N C) N C) N CD N C) N C) (0 C)
>< .- C) CO	 0 (0 Q "	 N-	 '	 -	 0 cc C) C) C)NdNdd
QC)	 0	 C)	 C)	 C)	 C)
I	 I	 I	 I
0
0
N- C) C) C) (0 C) LX') N
	
v- N
	
v N C)	 (N	 CD N
	 C) N C") (0 Ce')C) (0(0 - C) (0 C) v—	 .-	 LU	 zi- C)	 - C) ° "-N(NdN(NdNdd
0	 0	 cD	 0
I	 I	 I	 I
0]
LIJ C') N- C) CO N (0 C) (N v- (N C) N	 - N C) N C) N (0 CC) C')
NdNNdNNdNdd
	
0	 0	 0	 C)	 0
	
I	 I	 I	 S
N- C) "-• (0 0 (N C) N v- N	 - N C) N C) N 03 N- C"')
CC)LUccC)(0C)cOC) (0N-C)(0N-C)(0N-C)(0C)(0C)(000NdNdN(NdNNdNddI-'	 C)	 0	 C)	 C)	 C)	 C)
z	
I 	 p	 I 	 I 	 I
(I)
CO N- C) (V) - (0 C) (N C) N C) N C) LX') N N- (0 N C) N v- CO C"')WC)"03000 (0C)(0C)(0C)v-(0C)NCOC)(0C'')C)c'
dd N dd N , (NdNd(NdoNdN,dNdd
—	 C)	 C)	 C)	 ----I-	 I	 I	 -
(N (0 C) (0 C') (0	 v- (0 CO N CO C) C) CO	 C) (0	 C) (0 C") N- N .92 .92LX') (0 C) (0 C) (0 (0 (0 0 (0 C) N (0 - C) (0 C) CO it,. C) (0 C) CO C')
NddNdNddNddNdCNdNOd
C') ,
	 C)	 C)	 C)	 NN
ii
C) C) (N (0 (0 N- C) C') N- C) C') N- C) C") N- C) C) C) C) C) (N C) c) (4) v"
..-,.C)
C_ N,_dNOd(NddNOdNOONNdNNdNOd °C)(N	 '	 I	 Q I	 CC
(I)
CC
CC
C	 C	 C	 C	 C	 C	 C	 C	 C
2	 .2	 .2	 .2	 .2	 .2	 .2	 2	 2	 E E
-	
j5	
-	
j5	 j5	 WU)L	 r.	 L,	 ,,L	 L-	 D	 LD	 I_
0-	 0	 d	 o	 o-	 o-	 o	 o-	 o-
C4	 C	 C	 C	 C	 C	 C	 C	 C
o '
	 a'	 o '	 0'	 0'	 0'	 0'	 0	 0'	 (C
	
.	
_i5_3
_zwzou)zzzozozazac/)zç9
><
N	 I	 LU	 LU
w
	
W	 0	 F-	 0)
C	 0]	 0	 0
___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ o cc o
(0
a)
00
I-
0
U)
U)
a)
0
U)
U)
a)
a)
a)
a)
I-
LU	 CD0	 0	 0	 0N	 Z c	 c)
N	 NC)	 0)	 CO	 0)0)	 N-	 CD	 -	 N-	 CD
CO	 C)
	Li..	 c') •	 N- •	 CD	 U..	 0)	 N-	 CD
()	 CD	 N
CO	 C)	 N	 0)CD	 CD	 CD	 CD
0	 0	 0 •	 0	 0	 0
uJ
	
U.j 	-
CD	 QC)	 Q'
c-i	 N-	 0)	 0	 0
	
( CD	 (N	 Q	 OQ
0 .	 0	 0	 0 -	 0
U.j
	(/) 	 c-,N	 CD	 (N
o9 o9 o9
	
I-.	 0)
g0)	 O)	 w CD	 0)	 CO
	
C/)	 CD	 N
	
I- 0	 0	 0
N-
0
	
0)	 w	 W	 -	 -	 -
0)	 0)	 CD
C)	 (N	 0)
	
-	 L
w
	
O)	 CD	 Q
C)	 <'	 CD	 0)
	
I	 S	 I	 I	 S	 0	 I	 I	 -0
CD	 CD5	 0)0	 -
C)	 C) .	 N-	 U) 0C)	 C'J	 0CD
0	 N	 c-)	 - 0 N	 N-	 CO0	 CD 0) > 0	 0	 0)1
LU	 -.	 ()
0 .-	 0	 0)	 CD C	 N- C)	 CDN	 '-	 0	 C Z LU	 c-)	 N-	 -
0	 N	 c-)	 N	 L1)	 IC)	 CD	 - a) >
0.	 Q2	 0	 C]) CIC.	 c-Dc	 c-)-
-	 in	 •
" -
	
> o
	
N-	 CD 0 o -	 0
CDL.	 CD0C) 0)2.	 C)2.	 CO
a)	 0	 ( 0	 C])Nr)	 O.	 -q	 CD	 CD	 ________
Reported equations in Table 8.3 are those that performed better on diagnostic
statistics, namely, I?-, N, F-test and minimisation of multicollinearity problems. A
point about multicollinearity is appropriate. Multicollinearity when it exists, leads to
insignificant variables even when a high i? is achieved. In a sense it blurs the
contribution of particular independent variables to changes in the dependent
variable. It could be avoided or minimised by removing one or more of the variables
found to correlate with each other. Multicollinearity is a common problem in
regression analysis and cannot be entirely avoided (see Achen, 1982; pp.82-83). In
practice, depending on the objectives of the regression exercise, pragmatic
decisions have to be made as to some level of the problem that is allowed. From
Table 8.2 there is significant correlation between the Time variable and three of the
five neighbourhood variables, Ideally it would be enough to include only one or two
of the neighbourhood variables to capture the required effects in the equations. But
since part of the objective of the exercise is to identify whether prices in various
neighbourhoods differ significantly, all neighbourhood variables were included. By
so doing insights as to the price effects, if any, of the various neighbourhoods are
gained. Also, keeping the Time variable ensures that land price appreciation rates,
an indication of the efficiency level of the market, could be computed.
As Table 8.3 shows, the power of the independent variables in explaining changes in
land price levels ranges from a low of 43.5% (i = 0.435) [model 3] to a high of
62.4% [model 4]. That is to say, as much as 62.4% of changes in the price of land in
the informal unrecorded market can be explained by the included variables. This
compares favourably with studies of the recorded market (Asabere, 1981a & b)
where R of between 0.49 to 0.65 was achieved for Accra and 0.53 for Kumasi, the
second biggest city in Ghana. The combined contribution of the independent
variables in explaining changes in land prices in all the models is statistically
significant at all the conventional levels (F-test).
8. 1. 2. Panel (a) Models.
Based on the three models of panel (a) of Table 8.3, all things the same, it makes no
difference in price whether a property is situated in any of the five neighbourhoods
(statistically insignificant coefficients [t-test] of the variables SANTMR, AWOSHIE,
GBAWE, COMPLEX over BOTWE). This has significant implications for
compulsorily acquired lands, a feature which is investigated further in the panel (b)
models below. Cost of registration has the right sign but not statistically significant
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(model 2). This should be expected and confirms earlier findings (see section 7.3.2
of Chapter 7). Given that practically all purchasers in the market are dissuaded by
the sheer costs involved in registration, the variable has no impact on market
clearing prices. The negative sign of the source of finance variable [model 3]
indicates that relying on bank finance might lead to purchasers bargaining for lower
prices. But as expected, it has an insignificant co-efficient: given how unimportant
bank finance is as a source of finance in the market (see section 7.2; Chapter 7) it
has no real impact on average land prices. In models 1 and 2 the state of property
variable, pstate, has the right sign and statistically significant co-efficient (at all
conventional levels). The more developed the land being purchased the higher the
price: an expected outcome which confirms the argument of rational agents.
Specifically (evaluated on model 3), on average, the price of acquiring an
uncompleted structure, all things given, is 394% (e1 372) that of acquiring a bare plot.
Time emerges consistently as the most important explanatory variable, the constant
term excepted. It is statistically significant at all the conventional levels in all the
equations estimated. Its positive sign is consistent with a priori expectations. The
magnitude of the coefficient provides information on land price appreciation.
Evaluating model 2, (model with highest R in a), land prices appreciated, on
average, by an annual rate of 37.58% (e° 319-1, see Eq. 8.5). Interestingly, this rate
is fairly consistent across models achieving a high R (see panel b models). Though,
on the face of it, this rate of land price appreciation might appear astronomical,
government inflation figures (GSS, 1998) obtained for the years 1994 to 1997
suggest that land prices have been, at best, managing to keep their real values over
time (see Table 8.7, page 156). Claims of land price escalation on the basis of
which government intervention is advocated (see, for example, Asiama, 1980) are
thus unjustified at least during the period covered by this analysis. It has been
asserted in earlier chapters (see Chapter 2 for example) that price information
recorded in government agencies are lower and distorted versions of what actually
pertains in the market. This has been confirmed by the results from consultants
surveyed (see section 7.2 of Chapter 7). The rate of land price appreciation
estimated here provides partial support for the assertion. Based on recorded data,
Asabere (1981a) found a 22% annual land appreciation rate in Accra for the period
1974-1978, a far lower rate than the 37.58% found here for the period 1970-1 998.
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8. 1. 3. Panel (b) Models.
It should be recalled that the models here were estimated to allow immediate
investigation of price effects of customary land trading in compulsorily acquired
lands. The three models here show that but for AWOSHIE, all the neighbourhood
variables have statistically insignificant coefficients: average prices of those
neighbourhoods do not differ in any statistically significant sense from those of
COMPLEX. All things accounted for, lands in neighbourhoods purported to have
been acquired by the government achieve similar average prices as those in other
areas that do not suffer from such encumbrance. AWOSHIE presents an interesting
case that further confirms the above proposition. It has significant coefficients in all
three models and shows that on average lands in Awoshie sold at some 1.8% (e402)
discount on those at Sports Complex (evaluating model 4). Awoshie as a
neighbourhood abuts Sports complex to the periphery of Accra. Thus Sports
Complex is more central in terms of access to the city centre than Awoshie in the
same direction. All things being equal, Sports Complex lands therefore should sell at
higher prices unless the compulsory acquisition is having some effect. The
significant and negative coefficient of AWOSHIE is consistent with this expectation.
Indeed, though not significant, the negative coefficients of GBAWE and BOTWE are
encouraging for the same reason as being more peripheral lands than Sports
Complex. All other findings in these models are consistent with those in panel (a)
discussed above with the time variable confirming the finding in earlier models as the
single most important variable in explaining land prices in the unrecorded market.
8. 1. 4. Neighbourhood Regressions
Further investigations of neighbourhood specific impacts of the variables modelled at
market-wide levels were undertaken. The logic here was to explore whether factors
that explain land price changes in particular informal neighbourhoods of the city differ
from neighbourhood to neighbourhood and, indeed, from market wide findings. It is
possible, for instance, to envisage source of finance, say, being more important to
purchasers of land in BOTWE but not important in AWOSHIE. Results of the tests
are provided in Table 8.5, page 152. Table 8.4 provides descriptive statistics. Once
again reported equations are those that performed better on the diagnostic tests (if,
N, F-test and minimisation of multicollinearity problems). Note that N, the number of
valid observations in these equations reduces substantially (to as low as 29 in
AWOSHIE) and limits the degrees of freedom of making inferences from the
equations.
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Table 8.4: Descriptive Statistics (Neighbourhoods)
Neighbourhood	 Var abe	 Mean	 StDev.
Awoshie	 Lgprice	 9 3983	 3 86
pstate (2 a)
	
11724	 06017
Search(2e)	 1 8276	 0 3844
Tme	 103448	 83933
MaIlam/Gbawe	 Lgprice	 11.7973	 2 8505
pstate (2 a)	 1 2667	 06915
Search(2 e)	 1 3333	 0.4795
Time	 147333	 70659
Santa Maria	 Lgprice	 10 7288	 2.5523
pstate (2 a)	 11389	 0 4245
Search (2 e)	 1 5556	 0.5040
Time	 73514	 63123
SrahaAshalley Botwe 	 Lgprice	 11 7181	 1.4352
pstate (2.a)	 1	 0
Search (2 e)
	
1.6071	 0.4913
Time	 181905	 37335
Sports Complex	 Lgprice	 124166	 2.3268
pstate (2.a)
	
1.3438	 0.5968
Search (2 e)
	
1.5781	 0.4978
Time	 130156	 7.1035
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On the whole the neighbourhood specific regressions are consistent with those of
the pooled data with time proving to be the most important variable that
systematically explains changes in land prices in all neighbourhoods. Notice that the
search variable which was excluded from the pooled data regressions because it
was very insignificant, was included here because it performed better than the
source of finance and registration cost variables which were so insignificant at the
neighbourhood level as to lead to actually lowering R when included. There is thus
the confirmation at the neighbourhood level that source of finance, registration cost
and the extent of search conducted before buying a plot are not important in
explaining changes in price levels of plots in all five neighbourhoods sampled. The
state of development of the land is significant in three of the neighbourhoods but not
significant in two, Awoshie and Sraha Ashalley Botwe, because transactions in these
neighbourhoods are exclusively those for bare lands. That is certainly the case in
BOTWE (mean score of the search variable =1 and standard deviation = 0; see
Table 8.4) where the variable was excluded because no statistic could be computed
for it.
All told, the included variables explained price changes in the neighbourhoods of
Mallam/Gbawe and Sraha Ashalley Botwe better (R of 0.755 to 0.854) than they did
those in Awoshie, Santa Maria and Sports Complex (R of 0.015 to 0.393). A pattern
emerges here. It would appear the included variables explain less of price changes
in western neighbourhoods of Accra than they do in neighbourhoods in the north and
east. Mallam/Gbawe and Sraha Ashalley Botwe happen to be neighbourhoods in
the north and east respectively of the city while Awoshie, Santa Maria and Sports
Complex all lie in the west (see Table 3.1 of Chapter 3). Just what causes this
difference to occur is unclear and cannot be inferred from the models estimated.
One conjectural explanation might be that offered anecdotally; the majority of
migrants to Accra who engage in commerce (Ashantis and Kwahus), possess
considerable amounts of money which they spend in developing houses. They
prefer to buy and develop plots in the eastern and north-eastern peripheries of Accra
so as to avoid city centre traffic during their regular weekend travels to their
hometowns in the Eastern and Ashanti regions.
Based on the coefficients of the time variable (using the model with highest R
values) for each neighbourhood, land price appreciation rates are computed and
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provided as Table 8.6 (page 156). As can be observed from the table, the annual
rate of growth of land prices in three of the five neighbourhoods, Awoshie (34.31%),
Mallam/Gbawe (32.98%), Sraha Ashalley Botwe (42.76%) are consistent with the
general trend of the market as indicated by that estimated for the pooled data
(37.58%) and manage to keep their real value over time (in the context of inflation
figures of Table 8.7). That for Sports Complex (14.22%) however, is 28 odd
percentage points less than that of Sraha Ashalley Botwe (42.76%), for example.
It is possible that the compulsory acquisition encumbrance of Sports Complex is
having a deleterious effect on land price appreciation levels. However, one cannot
be completely sure of this from the results of the analysis. Santa Maria, a
neighbourhood that does not suffer from a similar encumbrance shows an even
lower rate of 13.09%. Probably the anecdotal explanation offered above relating to
the difference between potential demand for eastern and western lands is at play
once again. Still this explanation is not intact since Awoshie lies in the west but
shows a rate of 34.31%.
The following, however, is absolutely clear. The analysis shows, among other
things, that, at least on achieved prices, there is no real differences between
supposed government lands traded illegally by customary owners and others that are
classified legal. This has major public policy implications. In the present
circumstances, customary landowners are presented with an incentive to frustrate
any acquisition of their lands by Central Government through selling to purchasers.
When they do, they expect to be able to trade the lands as if no compulsory
purchase order is hanging over the lands. Therefore the use of compulsory
acquisition powers to create neighbourhoods, ostensibly to provide lands at
'affordable prices' is not a feasible option. One might argue that price alone does
not convey all information about the workings of the market. In particular the
literature on Latin American squatter settlements indicate that other aspects of the
transaction might be different and socially undesirable. In order to be conclusive
about whether or not any differences exist in 'illegal' customary trading of lands in
Sports Complex and the other areas, therefore, a further enquiry employing
discriminant analysis was conducted. This is discussed in section 8. 2 below.
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Table 8.6 Land Price Appreciation at Neighbourhood Level (1 970-1 998)
Neighbourhood
Awosh ie
Mallam/Gbawe
Santa Maria
Sraha Ashalley Botwe
Sports Complex
Model
Adopted
1
3
3
1
3
Coefficient of
Time
0.295
0.285
0.123
0.356
0.133
Annual Land Price
Appreciation Rate
34.31%
32.98%
13.09%
42.76%
14.22%
Table 8.7: Annual Inflation Figures
Yearly Inflation
Annual Average	 Non-Food (%)
1994	 24.43
1995	 39.74
1996	 61.38
1997	 39.38
Source: Ghana Statistical Service (1998). Table
53a.
8.2. Discriminant Analysis
Discriminant analysis is a multivariate statistical technique that can be used to study
differences between two or more groups of respondents. It has been employed in a
number of studies in fields as wide as sociology, political science and education (see
Klecka, 1980 and references therein). In the Ghanaian land market, Sinai (1998) has
employed it to investigate the use of homes for income generation in Kumasi.
To follow the discussion of its application in this study some explanations are
offered. The characteristics used to distinguish among the groups are called
"discriminating variables". To find out how they discriminate between the groups,
cononical discriminant functions -- linear combinations of the discriminating
variables -- are derived to satisfy certain conditions A canonical discriminant function
has the form:
Eq. 8.6
fim = Uo + UlXlkm + U2X2km + ......................JApXpkin
where
= the value (score) on the canonical discriminant function for case m in group k;
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Ukm = coefficients which produce the desired characteristics in the function; and
X k = the value on discriminating variable X for case m in group k.
For every k groups, a maximum k-i valid canonical discriminant functions can be
derived. On each function, a coefficient (0 <u < 1) is derived for each discriminating
variable. The larger the magnitude of the standardized coefficient the greater is that
discriminating variable's contribution in discriminating among the groups. These
coefficients are directly comparable across variables. Thus a value of 0.6, for
instance, indicates three times the discriminating ability of a value of 0.2. Diagnostic
test statistics such as canonical correlation, eigenvalue, Wilks' lambda, and chi-
square, guide in achieving the best performing and significant functions. A strong
correlation coefficient indicates that a strong relationship exists between the groups
and the discriminant function; the function with the largest eigenvalue is the most
powerful discriminator, while Wilks' lambda and the chi-square indicate the
significance of the function at the usual levels.
This analytical technique offers a powerful tool to investigate a number of issues
pertinent to testing the hypothesis that allocative efficiency remains the only equitable
way of improving urban housing and neighbourhood standards given present income
levels. Of particular interest is to generate statistical evidence of whether or not there
are any characteristics of purchasers' background and/or their land buying decision
process that can statistically distinguish the two groupings of respondents who
bought government lands 'illegally' from customary land owners on the one hand, and
other customary land purchasers in the sample. Are there, for example, any
statistically significant variables that discriminate between those who trade 'illegally' in
compulsorily acquired lands and other players of the informal land market offered by
their; (1) sex; (2) age; (3) educational attainment; (4) employment status; (5) source
of finance; (6) perceived property rights purchased; (7) perception of formal land
dispute settlement machinery and; (8) building permit enforcement notices?
To gain this insight discriminant analysis was employed with COMPLEX (0, 1) as the
left hand side (LHS) of the canonical function (Eq. 8.6) and many potential
discriminating variables (examples listed above) on the right hand side (RHS). After
many trials ten RHS variables were selected to derive the function. Results of this
function are reported as Function 1 in Table 8.8, page 158. The choice of this
function was guided by the diagnostics tests: Function I was the function with the
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Function 2
0.30
0.10
0.96
0.17
0.39
0.16
1.40
0 76
0 42
201 20
235
6
<0 001
largest eigenvalue, indicating that it is the most powerful discriminating function. The
Wilks' lambda and chi-square indicate the function is significant at the 99% level. A
canonical correlation co-efficient of 0.77 (max 1) indicates the existence of a strong
relationship. A subsequent function (Function 2, Table 8.8) was derived to comprise
only RHS variables that demonstrated large enough coefficients in the first instance.
The logic here was to identify and highlight more clearly the most important
discriminating variables. Function 2 therefore does not produce any improvements
on the diagnostics tests - the correlation coefficient and eigenvalue are actually lower
than those in Function 1 - but it is helpful in emphasising the most discriminating
variables.
Table 8.8: Standadized Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients
Discriminating Variable	 Coefficient
Function 1
3.B	 Land Price	 -0.09
1.D
	
Employment Status	 0.35
1.0
	
Educational Attainment	 0.11
3 D'
	
Mode of Payment
	 0.15
3.G'	 Source of Finance
	 0.95
4.A
	
Perceived Property Rights
	 0.18
2.G	 Government Land Applications
	 0.08
6.0
	
Building Permit Enforcement Notice 0.33
7.A
	
Involvement in Litigation 	 0.11
7.G	 Perception of formal land dispute 	 0.14
settlement machinery
Eigenvalue	 1.46
Canonical Correlation	 o 77
VVilks Lambda	 041
Chi-square	 186 96
N	 215
10
nil cant	 <0 001
8. 2. 1. Interpreting the Results
As Table 8.8 shows, among the ten discriminating variables, source of finance (3.g)
is the most powerful discriminating variable (0.95). That is to say, the most
important variable that distinguishes between the purchasers of Sports Complex
lands (illegal) and other purchasers of customary lands, is whether or not they can
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rely on bank finance to fund the acquisition. Other variables of some importance are
building permit enforcement notices and employment status. The contribution of the
remaining variables is trivial, at best. Indeed deriving the function again to exclude
four variables with coefficients of ^ 0.11, the discriminating power of the source of
finance variable increases to 0.96 (Table 8.8; column 4). Based on this function, the
source of finance variable possesses 2.47 times the discriminating ability of the
second important variable, building permit enforcement notice, 3.15 that of
employment status, 5.73 that of perceived property rights, 6.15 that of perception of
formal land dispute settlement machinery, and 9.57 that of mode of payment, in that
order. This result is not surprising. Given the treatment of trading in these lands as
illegal, bank finance is out of the question and anybody wanting to rely on such a
source of finance never comes to this market. To a limited extent, those in influential
government positions may obtain these lands legally through the government
department. Hence the non-trivial discriminating power of employment status.
Otherwise these lands are traded just like all customary lands. As Kelcka (1980)
explains, when the absolute value of the coefficient of a variable is very large (near
±1) the function is carrying nearly the same information as the variable. Thus it can
be concluded from this analysis that, apart from bank finance, players in the 'illegal'
customary market are no different in respect of their sex, age, educational
background and the other variables from those in other customary markets.
Coupled with the regression results above that average prices in the market do not
differ statistically on account of whether or not they are in neighbourhoods where the
lands are traded 'illegally', this result confirms the futility of attempting to influence
the allocation of urban land in the city through compulsory acquisition in present
circumstances.
Given these results and the evidence that suppliers have the incentive to frustrate
acquisitions; that when they do they are going to find willing purchasers, that
activities relating to documentation and other regulation of the market lead to rent-
seeking waste of resources, it is clear that the only option available is to improve
efficiency levels at which the market operates. It is through such improvements that
land price levels could be contained at affordable levels, and neighbourhood and
housing standards improved through gains from elimination of resource waste.
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8. 2. 2. Summary
The analyses in this chapter have confirmed and extended the findings in the
previous one. In particular the regression analysis provides some information on the
workings of the market in terms of the important variables that explain changes in
price levels in the unrecorded market. From the results the claim of land price
escalation can be refuted. Also there is strong support for the hypothesis that
players in these markets are rational and confirms findings about the efficiency
reducing effects of cost of registration and other activities of government agencies in
the land market in Ghana.
The discriminant analysis conveys the powerful information that intervention in the
customary market through the use of compulsory purchase powers does one thing.
It takes away the very slim chance of bank finance that might exist for those in other
markets. The workings of the market of the illegally' traded government lands are
no different on price levels, age, sex, educational background, and perception of
property rights conveyed. They are different only to the certain extent that one
cannot obtain bank finance for those plots and to a lesser extent, that one might
experience a higher level of enforcement of building permits by the authorities. To
this extent efficiency is being compromised once again through intervention in the
customary market. These and other findings in earlier chapters are pooled together
to suggest pubic policy recommendations in the concluding chapter that follows.
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Chapter 9: Conclusions
9. 0. Introduction
The central aim of this study has been to enquire into why, despite what appears to
be concerted efforts by SSA governments and donor agencies to eradicate problems
of sub-standard urban neighbourhoods, the problems still exist and appear to be
getting worse. From the outset, the study contended that it is helpful to view the
observed problems from an economic perspective. This yields helpful insights. An
enquiry designed to investigate the economic forces behind the issues has therefore
been employed. Bringing to bear analyses and insights from various branches of
economics (viz, property rights, transaction costs and public choice economics), the
real reasons behind observed problems are revealed. From these, helpful
conclusions emerge. This Chapter draws together these main findings and
conclusions. Useful theoretical insights that emerge to explain the prevalence of
land market interventions are discussed in section 9. 1. A discussion of specific
findings of the empirical survey follows in section 9. 2. Section 9. 3 summarises the
main conclusions. Policy recommendations are offered in section 9. 4 while section
9. 5 highlights limitations of the study. This provides a lead into suggested areas for
further research which is discussed in section 9. 6.
9. 1. Theoretical Insights
Why do governments and bureaucrats in SSA continue to intervene in urban land
markets despite obvious evidence of the failure of these attempts? Conventional
answers imply that because SSA urbanites gain possession of land on which they
build their houses through traditional informal arrangements, they do not possess
secure and clear property rights. This in turn leads to sub-standard and haphazard
development of neighbourhoods because households refrain from undertaking the
required investment in housing that they would otherwise undertake if they
possessed clear and secure property rights. Furthermore, the argument goes, the
informal nature of transactions enables landowners to manipulate the market
through the charging of arbitrary prices and the determination of who gains access to
land. In short, there is market failure. Hence the necessity for governments to
intervene (see, for example, Asiama, 1980; p. 257: & 1990 and Acquaye and
Asiama, 1986). The current study found these views to be flawed and misconceived.
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Why they persist at all and dominate political and bureaucratic rhetoric are explained
as follows.
Property rights economics teaches that rules and regulations (both formal and
informal) that eventually evolve to regulate agents - the property rights system - are
determined by the relative actual or imputed prices of the benefits and costs such
regulations bring to bear on transacting parties (De Alessi, 1980; see Chapter 4).
But since governments posses the power to coerce agents into complying with laws,
often, inefficient laws and regulations are observed to be enforced by government
agencies as part of the property rights system. It is possible for a given property
rights system therefore to comprise of formal regulations which are not the optimum
in terms of the cost/benefit implications to agents. In such situations agents may
design ways and means of avoiding them. Property rights systems that, in fact,
evolve to regulate actual transactions may therefore be different and possibly illegal.
From the agents' point of view the illegal system provides optimum outcomes.
This begs the question why are bureaucrats and politicians prone to enforcing
inefficient laws? Insights from public choice economics offer answers. Economic
forces are more likely to induce politicians and bureaucrats to enforce inefficient and
wasteful laws because:
1. Governments are not omniscient but lack the complete knowledge and
information required to enact efficient laws to lead to efficient property rights
systems.
2. Far from being impartial and benevolent seeking equitable outcomes for citizens,
often governments, through bureaucrats, politicians and interest groups, are
manipulated into pursuing agendas which benefit these political agents rather
than society at large.
3. Governments' involvement in the economy is effected through the activities of
politicians and bureaucrats. Being self-seeking individuals like everyone else,
these individuals operate to maximise their personal utilities. Therefore faced
with the incentive structure that occupation of government office presents -- viz.
the absence of any direct link between costs and benefits of their decisions -
they tend to employ cost inefficient operations, seek the expansion of their
budget, and design unnecessarily complex and complicated systems to hide
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shirking and ineptitude. Such complicated systems also enhance appropriation
of rents through (sometimes) illegal means (corruption).
4. As a result of the above, bureaucrats have the incentive to argue for government
intervention even when it is not necessary or, even worse, when it is inimical to
agents and society at large. A sure way of doing this is through the market
failure argument in all its guises, such as on grounds of imperfect competition,
externalities and equity (see Chapter 5).
These insights lead to the conclusion that land market intervention, though
presented as a way of helping the poor and meeting social objectives, often further
the interests of political agents. Specific findings of the study confirm these
reservations of government interventions in the residential land market of Accra.
9. 2. Specific Findings
The enquiry of the study has been pursued around five related hypotheses which
together tested four key aspects of the informal market relating to:
1. rationality of agents and relative efficiency of the market;
2. constraints and efficiency retarding bureaucratic intervention;
3. irrational and/or illegal but optimal behaviours of agents in the market and;
4. market imperfections.
Findings regarding these headings are discussed in turn below.
9. 2. 1. Rationality of Agents and Relative Efficiency of the Market
The study found that the market operates remarkably well and obeys fundamental
laws of economics. The survey found evidence to this effect through price levels,
purchasers perception of prices and suppliers price setting behaviour. Prices
respond principally to demand and supply signals. From the point of view of
purchasers (the point of view that matters) the price paid for plots is the fair market
price, considering similar lands with similar amenities. Results from the survey of
suppliers indicate that prices they charge for plots are market determined. What is
more, suppliers were found to employ customer satisfaction strategies such as
allowing flexible modes of payments. These strategies are not the sort of strategies
that one would associate with landowners who posses the power to manipulate the
market, as has been asserted in some earlier studies. Nor is there any evidence of
monopolistic landowners manipulating the market. Neither purchasers nor suppliers
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think that non-economic factors such as ethnicity and social status influence the
market.
The reliability of these findings is reinforced by the results obtained through the
regression modelling of the market. From the regression analysis land prices
appreciated, on average, at the rate of 37.58% per annum between the years 1970-
1998. For the same period, government figures suggest inflation rates in the region
of 40% p.a. Impressions of land price escalation are therefore misguided. Rates of
land price increases in the region of 38% a year may appear too high but if prices in
general are increasing at the rate of 40%, it is a misconception to blame landowners
or the land market, for that matter, for simply keeping up with general price
increases. Indeed this ability of the market to track inflation is an indication of the
efficiency of the informal market. But efficiency of the market is currently being
curtailed through costly intervention.
9. 2. 2. Constraints and Efficiency Retarding Bureaucratic Intervention
The study identified two main areas of government intervention that introduce
constraints on agents of customary land markets. One is intervention through
compulsory acquisition (or, what amounts to the same thing in practice, the vesting
of customary lands in government) where government bureaucrats attempt to
completely supplant the market and supply lands. The other is through attempts to
control and regulate the market by stipulating and prescribing the format informal
transactions should take in order to be formally recognised. In both cases the survey
revealed that the practical impacts of these policy instruments have been to impose
constraints on agents and limit efficiency gains achievable.
Compulsory acquisition introduces constraints through the distortion of incentives it
presents to agents. It transforms a perfectly legal activity of voluntary trading of
interests in customary lands into an illegal one. As values of land have increased,
the potential rents available have ensured that the illegality so introduced fails to
prevent owners from trading the lands. But the illegality leads to perverse outcomes.
It ensures that none of the transactions are formally recognised. As a result the
nature of the property rights possessed in these transactions are rendered unclear.
Since the government possesses the power to enforce the acquisition at any time by
demolishing houses on lands obtained through these transactions, a degree of
insecurity of title is introduced. Insecurity and confusion in property rights in these
circumstances thus result precisely because of intervention through compulsory
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acquisition. And such confusion and insecurity reduce efficiency. Efficiency is
reduced since households cannot tap into capital markets to fund investments in
housing.
Constraints from market regulation result from costs they impose on agents relative
to benefits. These relate to: (a) costs of taking actions required by government in
order that transactions are formally recognised and; (b) costs incurred as a result of
prescriptions restraining agents from organising transactions in ways preferred by
them. As will be apparent below, it is important to recognise this distinction in any
recommendations for reform of the system.
Regulations under (a) requesting agents to expend money in order that transactions
are formally recognised relate to planning permission, building permits, and
documentation and registration of title. On the face of things these aspects of
regulation possess potential efficiency improving attributes. Planning and building
permits aim to provide public goods which private households and landowners are
unwilling to supply because of free riding' problems. Similarly documentation of
titles possesses positive externalities in terms of enhancing information flow and
minimising fraud (see 9. 2. 4).
Costs induced by attempts to restrain agents from organising transactions in
preferred ways - regulations under (b) -- relate to the restriction of permissible
interests to leases, the need for consent and concurrence and the formula and
modalities for payment and receipt of incomes (rents) resulting from customary
transactions (see Chapters 6 & 7). This study found no justifications for these
regulations. The reasons behind them have not been well articulated either by
bureaucrats 2° or politicians. Nor has any theoretical justification been derived to
support them by studies which advocate bureaucratic intervention.
At the operational level, it was found that regulations under (a) and (b) above are
often bundled together to devastating effects. It was found, for example, that the
documentation of title of customary land transactions is inextricably tied to the need
for consent and concurrence from the Lands Commission, formula and modalities for
payment, receipt and management of incomes from the transactions, and planning
approvals. The result is a complex, confusing, time consuming web of bureaucratic
165
regulations that is difficult even for professional consultants to understand let alone
the average market participant. This is a predictable outcome of market regulation
resulting from the incentive for bureaucrats to expand their budgets and rent-seek.
To maximise the utility of their offices, they have the incentive to design complex
systems for undertaking simple tasks. But the bundling together of regulative
instruments seeking different and, sometimes, conflicting objectives has blunted their
beneficial impacts. It has, therefore, ensured that the costs to agents of complying
are too high to be of any benefit.
The study found that actual cost of documentation and registration, for example, may
be as high as 44.15% of purchase price of city peripheral lands while the benefits are
not readily apparent. The costs associated take the form of rent-seeking costs.
Subjected to rent-seeking analysis, the waste induced by the bundling together of
formal documentation and registration of customary transactions, with other
regulations became apparent.
Estimates in Chapter 6 indicate that for the 285 of the 286 households surveyed who
bought their lands from customary land owners to obtain formal documents on their
lands, as much as 1.54bn (in September 1999 prices; 4,OOO - 4,3OO = £1) is
potentially available to be wasted through rent-seeking competition. Since it is
feasible for the total rent-seeking waste to exceed the rent available (see Chapter 6),
one is looking at potential diversion of resources into wasteful activities which could
exceed 1.54bn. It is these orders of diversion of real resources into wasteful rent-
seeking activities brought about by intervention that shift resources away from
investment in housing and improvements in neighbourhood qualities. Also,
ineptitude in professionals is generated since instead of specialising in efficiency
improving regulations, technocrats in the relevant bureaux are induced to specialise
in designing complex systems that enhance their chances in the rent-seeking
competition. Rational attempts of market agents to resist effects of bureaucratic
rent-seeking lead them into wasting resources themselves, through behaviour which
may sometimes be illegal. Further still, for these transactions, the lack of clarity of
property rights conveyed is a bureaucratic contrivance brought about by the need for
consent and concurrence and the restrictions to leases of all interests transacted.
20 None of the key officers in the LCS could provide any reasons to this
effect during the field survey
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9. 2. 3. Irrational and/or Illegal But Optimal Behaviours
As has been described above, the sheer complexity of market regulation that
bureaucrats have put in place imposes costs on agents. In important areas of
purchasers behaviour investigated, the survey revealed that behaviours that might,
at first, appear irrational or indeed illegal are the optimal ones given the cost
implications of the regulative regime. It was found, for example, that as much as
68.2 % of purchasers had finished and occupied their properties but had not even
bothered to submit papers on them to the appropriate institutions for formal
documentation and registration. An irrational behaviour given the security that a
government guaranteed registered title is supposed to provide. Furthermore, the
majority (64.5%) did not possess building permits for constructing the houses they
were occupying, an illegal behaviour. Another direct illegal activity relates to the
purchase from stools of land that the government claims to have compulsorily
acquired. In this regard the entire sample of households drawn from the
neighbourhood of Sports Complex possess illegal interest in the lands on which their
houses stand by virtue of the fact that they obtained the lands from customary
owners rather than from Government. On the supply side landowners operate
illegally by selling lands compulsorily acquired by government. But in all these cases
analysis reveals that the cost and benefit implications to purchasers and landowners
(see Chapter 7) make illegality the rational and optimum option available. Yet in
avoiding those costs, agents' behaviour leads to diversion of resources into wasteful
activities which, in the end, diminish the level of efficiency at which the market can
operate. These, rather than concepts of market failure, in fact, explain observed
imperfections in the market which translates into low quality standards of housing
and neighbourhoods.
9. 2. 4. Market Imperfections
The findings discussed so far may suggest that the market is a perfect one which is
only plagued by government intervention. In part this is true. Many of the observed
problems can, in fact, be explained in terms of one aspect of market regulation or
another. But, to be sure, the market, like many markets, is not a perfect one. The
study identified major problems through the survey of consultants. These relate to,
in order of seriousness: (1) the unscrupulous sale by some customary owners of the
same piece of land to multiple purchasers (double allocation); (2) unresolved title
disputes between customary owners and government, (3) lack of registered
documents; (4) absence of reliable database of ownership and; (5) ineffectiveness of
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courts in resolving land disputes. It is interesting to point out that clarity (or the lack
of it) of title which is one excuse politicians, bureaucrats and some academics have
used to argue for government intervention, was rated below all these problems.
The problems enumerated are serious ones and contribute to constraining the
efficiency level attainable. However, they are not symptoms of market failure. One
cannot call for market intervention because of these problems. Indeed most of the
imperfections exist precisely because of intervention. The sale of the same piece of
land by some unscrupulous landowners is possible because of the inefficient way
the recording and dissemination of information on property ownership is managed.
This in turn is a result of the overwhelming avoidance of the formal documentation
systems by agents. The main reason for avoidance is the prohibitive costs involved
relative to potential benefits to agents. The recording and dissemination of
information on transactions in interests in land is in principle an efficiency enhancing
statistical exercise. But, as has already been explained, this activity has been
bundled together with regulations on permissible rights and others to blunt any
potential benefits while at the same time inducing rent-seeking behaviour. From
these findings main conclusions of the study emerge.
9. 3. Main Conc'usions
The main conclusion of the study is that land administration/land policy as
implemented by the various government agencies, instead of achieving efficient
urban land allocation does the contrary. The residential land market of Accra is a
morass of regulations that strangles agents, discourages innovation and induces
waste of resources. This state of affairs eventuates from many discrete sources of
government intervention. Rather than contributing to solving the problems of
haphazard developments, clarifying and securing property rights, leading to orderly
development and ensuring acceptable standards of housing, governmental
interventions are, in fact, the cause of these problems. Planning and building
regulations are implemented in such a way as to actually lead to sub-standard and
haphazard development of neighbourhoods. This is achieved through the excessive
costs of compliance. The cost to agents of complying with planning, building
regulation and formal documentation and registration of interests in land are high
because of rent-seeking waste that particular regimes of regulation engender. It is
such induced waste of resources which compel rational informal agents into avoiding
compliance of these regulations. In the end therefore, it is the particular nature of
interventions that combine to produce the spatial problems observed in the
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neighbourhoods of Accra. Specific areas of intervention that wrought the most harm
are the use of compulsory acquisition to create residential neighbourhoods and
restrictions on permissible interests capable of exchange in customary transactions.
Compulsory acquisition of customary lands transforms neighbourhoods into illegal
settlements thereby driving away corporate finance. It presents distorted incentives
to both suppliers and purchasers of urban land. Because it renders the perfectly
normal economic transaction of legitimately recognised land owners illegal, they are
induced into organising transactions inefficiently. Landowners are forced into
undertaking inefficient and costly ways of protecting land rather than relying on the
legal framework. Purchasers are prevented from using their property holdings to
support any formal economic activity. The apparent insecurity of property rights in
this circumstance is a direct result of the encumbrances that flow from the trading by
customary owners of compulsorily acquired lands.
The restriction of permissible interests capable of disposal in informal land
transactions, against agents preferred choices, is the root cause of apparent
confusion in property rights. Because agents find it economicaUy rational to avoid
the prescriptions, the 'de facto' interests traded are different from what land policy
deems them to have traded. Hence the apparent confusion in the true nature of
property rights conveyed in informal land transactions. It is only in land transactions
in Accra and Ghana that capital sums are paid for lands bought but lease documents
are drawn up with notional amounts inserted for rent and other covenants listed even
though none of the parties have no intention of ever enforcing the lease. In fact the
purported lessors (the landowners) do not even keep copies of leases they are
supposed to have granted. This abounds because of bureaucratic interventions in
the market. The associated intervention through the prescriptions on the receipt and
management of incomes from customary land transactions leads to rent-seeking
behaviour.
As to assertions of high prices and market manipulation by landowners, the study
found no evidence for these. Indeed the findings contradict many of the assertions
concerning prices and players in the market. From the evidence the market
responds remarkably well to fundamental demand and supply conditions. Suppliers
are conditioned to charge market clearing prices for their lands as their price fixing
decision processes are bounded by purchasers' willingness to pay. Purchasers
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perceive price paid to be fair and determined solely by economic factors. What is
more, bureaucratically supplied attributes of land transactions are completely
irrelevant to the market. Thus land title documentation and registration, the planning
regime, and policies on limits on tradable interests, all show no statistically significant
impact on prices. There is no supporting evidence from both suppliers and
purchasers that price of land is determined by non-economic factors. From the
results of the regression modelling of households' land purchasing behaviour the
claim of land price escalation can be refuted.
The need for agents in the rent-seeking competition to conceal actual prices (see
Chapter 6) and the consequent distortion of prices reported by government land
agents has damaging effects. As discussed in Chapter 5, among other functions,
prices in competitive markets reveal to agents the necessary information needed to
achieve efficient utilisation of resources. The extent to which regulation leads to
concealed prices in the Accra land market prevents agents from obtaining the
needed information to make the right choices concerning their housing needs. This
may explain the reasons behind many (permanently) uncompleted housing
structures in informal neighbourhoods. Because households are presented with
distorted and lower versions of prices (see Chapter 7) they under-estimate the actual
cost of constructing a house. These are only revealed to them after they have spent
substantial amounts in undertaking part of the construction. If they realise at this
stage that actual costs may be beyond their budget the project is abandoned, in
most cases, never to be completed. The resources tied up in such uncompleted
structures prevent the households from fully meeting their housing needs. This is
another source of inefficient use of resources brought about indirectly through
regulation.
Considering the level of waste that results from market intervention and the vested
interests of bureaucrats in this state of affairs, improvements in housing and
neighbourhood standards may be achieved only through improvements in the
allocative efficiency of the informal market. It is often the case (or argued to be) that
efficiency improvements are achieved at the expense of equity. In the rent-seeking
environment prevailing in the residential land market of Accra, efficiency
improvements coincide with equity improvements. To see how, consider the
following.
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Rent-seeking waste that results from extant market interventions harms the less
well-ofif members of the society most. Compulsory acquisition when employed
successfully to dispossess customary landowners benefits exclusively people in
influential positions (Brobby 1991; Larbi, 1994; Antwi, 1995; Kasanga et a!, 1996).
When they enter the customary land markets, the well-connected are likely to get
titles documented, planning and building permits approved, without having to expend
much resources. Their influential connections see to that. As the estimates in
Chapters 6 and 7 demonstrate, much of the (land price invariant) actual costs of
obtaining these permits derive from rent-seeking costs emanating from regular visits
to the offices to chase applications', secure the acquaintance of key bureaucrats, 'tip
officers' and undertake similar (mostly illegal) fuzzy expenditures. Due to their
professional positions, educational attainments, political clout, and occupation of
other government offices, the well-connected already possess the attributes that
enable them direct access to the agencies responsible for the necessary permits
without having to purchase such access. On the contrary, the less well-offf, who
constitute the majority of purchasers of low priced urban peripheral lands, need to
spend the most resources (in both relative and absolute terms) to purchase the
necessary access. Precisely because they arise from rent-seeking behaviour, the
costs of securing official ratification and permits for informal transactions is
disproportionately higher for the less well-off than they are for the well-off.
Improvements in efficiency of the informal market through the removal of rent-
seeking waste thus benefits the less well-off most and are therefore equitable. This
can be achieved through the removal of interventionist policies.
Though these are conclusions derived from a survey in Accra, the pattern of the
findings lead firmly to a conclusion that similar causes lie behind the observed
problems across SSA cities. Recall from Chapter 2 that SSA countries, regarding
land policy, divide into two: those in which land ownership held by traditional
customary institutions are legal, of which Ghana, and for that matter Accra, belongs
and; those in which urban land ownership is nationalised, of which most of the
French speaking countries and Nigeria belongs. Of the former, the findings of rent-
seeking waste resulting from various attempts of market regulation of informal
transactions applies. In all these countries, the need to obtain formal title and the
complex procedures introduced by bureaux established for the purpose exist and
render the cost of obtaining the necessary permits prohibitive (see the evidence in
Chapter 2). In Malawi, for example, survey costs alone could be as much as five
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times the value of the plot (Mattingly, 1993; p. 111). Of the latter, the findings of the
damaging market effects of compulsory acquisition, where the amounts of money at
stake compels customary owners to act contrary to the government intentions
applies. Thus in Nigeria, for example, making customary transactions illegal by
virtue of the Land Use Decree has not prevented the need to pay the market price to
local customary land owners before possession can be taken of lands allocated by
government officials. The illegality does not prevent customary transactions but
leads to perverse outcomes just like the use of compulsory acquisition in Accra.
Policy recommendations to remove rent-seeking waste and other efficiency retarding
market interventions found in Accra, tweaked to reflect particular circumstances
where necessary, therefore apply to SSA countries across the board.
9. 4. Policy Implications and Recommendations
Many implications for existing policy practices and recommendations for policy
reform flow from the above conclusions. On existing policies the following comments
can be made.
9. 4. 1. Comments on Existing Policies
• The use of compulsory purchase as a direct interventionist tool, apart from
observed problems of injustice and other corrupt practices in allocation reported
by other studies, leads to further perverse outcomes. It drives the potential for
corporate finance away from development. To this extent efficiency gains that
could emerge if capital markets are improved could be missed. It also ensures
that transactions can never be recorded and prevents any efficiency gains that
can be derived from improved flow of ownership information.
• Formal documentation and registration of interests in land, as they operate in
Accra, are having no impact on the market, at least, to the extent that price
conveys information on the operation of the market. This calls for a
comprehensive appraisal of the title documentation regimes. An area worthy of
serious and immediate attention is the de-coupling of this activity from other
aspects of regulation.
• The delays and costs involved in obtaining building permits prevent the majority
of households from obtaining them before constructing their buildings. Thus in
practice building regulations are having no effect on building standards.
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• The finding that informal transactions obey basic economic laws calls into
question many of the existing interventionist land policies. For example, the
restriction of stool land transactions to leases and the establishment of entire
bureaucracies to manage and collect ground rents is unnecessary and
redundant. Purchasers buy and pay for perpetual interests in land. The
existence of a formal requirement prohibiting such transactions are completely
ignored. In the event a great deal of real resources is wasted through rent-
seeking behaviour.
• Government control of many aspects of land transactions has crowded out the
private sector. As the study shows, there is little involvement of private sector
development of housing at any large scale in Accra. Given gains from scale
economies that could result from co-ordinating and supplying the housing needs
that are currently handled discretely by individual households, one would expect
some local or foreign entrepreneurs to attempt to serve the market. That this is
not occurring at any significant level may be due to the risks introduced by
interventions. Ambiguities in security of title and the transformation of the
purchase of customary land into an illegal activity introduced by land policy make
it too risky for the commitment of large capital investments necessary to serve
this market on a large scale. As things currently are, the demand for housing
and neighbourhood services are inefficiently supplied by individual households
themselves.
• Concerted attempts to eliminate corruption, ineptitude and shirking on the part of
bureaucrats in government land agencies by prosecuting them, transferring them
to new offices and many such punitive and preventive measures, are only
targeting symptoms of the problem. So are attempts at prosecution, harassment
and introduction of further regulation to prevent apparently irrational and illegal
activities of customary land suppliers and purchasers. The cause of the
problems is structural. They result from too many attempts to interfere in the
operation of the market. These create opportunities for rent-seeking. As the
theory predicts, and the survey in this study has confirmed, so long as policies
contrive rents, there will always be bureaucrats and other agents striving to
appropriate them. Permanent solutions therefore lie not in tackling bureaucratic
corruption and/or preventing customary owners from receiving the proceeds from
their land transactions. These only succeed, at best, in replacing one set of
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corrupt political agents with another 21 . Permanent solutions lie in eliminating
contrived rents that induce these destructive economic behaviours. That calls for
the removal of all forms of market intervention and a re-focusing of market
regulation.
9. 4. 2. Recommendations For Policy Reforms
As intimated, the single policy recommendation that follows from the findings and
conclusions of this study is a recommendation for the removal of all forms of land
market interventions. Competition among landowners for purchasers would lead
them into introducing efficient strategies which would eventually lead to affordably
planned neighbourhoods. Landowners would employ efficient systems to ensure
that 'double allocations' do not occur when they are legally allowed to receive the
proceeds of transactions; it would be in their own interest to see to developing
customer confidence in this and other aspects of the transaction. Land price
information would also be transparent. This would aid agents in making the right
economic decisions. Purchasers would construct houses by efficiently combining
land and other resources that are within their budgetary constraints. Within
constraints households are better placed than bureaucrats to ensure that they
construct safer houses. And, above all, removal of intervention would eventually free
up resources currently being wasted through rent-seeking behaviour for the provision
of more productive housing and neighbourhood services. There are strong reasons
why one can rely on these and similar outcomes to eventuate. But there are also
good grounds for why the needed reform of the existing regulatory regime may prove
intractable.
Reform of the current state of affairs is not going to be easy. It would be naïve to
expect otherwise. The task of reform is made the more difficult because rent-
seeking behaviour is pervasive in land administration in Accra. As the theory
teaches, bureaucrats, politicians and interest groups (including some sections of
traditional establishments) have gambled resources into contriving and/or occupying
extant monopoly positions. They are not going to give them up without a fight.
Efforts to rid the market of unwarranted interventions are therefore likely to be
vehemently resisted by these groups who benefit from the current system. Their
attempts to protect existing rents can themselves generate rent-seeking behaviour
which might lead to further waste of resources. Moreover, much of the current waste
21 A great deal of the intractable problem of corruption in the wider
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is sunk cost which can never be retrieved. In this regard the nature of land
administration has permanently lowered the output of housing services that could be
produced from combining urban land resources. Failure to recognise these
constraints to reform is tantamount to committing the same errors that one commits
when one agues for government intervention to solve all market problems. Indeed,
attempts at solutions across SSA countries supported by donor agencies such as the
IMF and the World Bank - e.g. site and service projects, low income housing,
cadastral mapping and squatter upgrading -- have met with limited success precisely
because of a failure to appreciate rent-seeking behaviour among the very
bureaucrats who are entrusted with management and allocation of project resources.
The record of such projects in SSA makes disconcerting reading. See Chapter 2 for
a discussion and the following for some evidence: O'connor, 1991; McAuslan, 1985;
Amis 1990; Campbell, 1990; Mattingly, 1993; Brobby, 1991; Larbi, 1994: Antwi,
1995). Concerning this, Mattingly (1993) has observed that projects meant for the
poor end up benefiting the rich.
9. 4. 3. Immediate Reforms That Stand Reasonable Chance of Success
Fortunately, there are avenues for policy changes that can be made to raise the
current level of efficiency. These are policy reforms that stand the least chance of
being defeated by vested interests. One such policy is the use of compulsory
acquisition. This policy is so unpopular that much as interested bureaucrats would
want to continue its use, any serious attempts to stop it being used would be easy to
achieve. In any case the difficulty of using compulsory acquisition as a result of
resistance by the customary owners (through illegal sales) has served notice to
bureaucrats of the need to refrain from using the policy instrument. At the time of
the field survey for the study, the stakes had been raised so much that land
administrators in Accra were relying on the army to enforce the policy in some areas.
The next set of policies for reform are those that possess no discernible benefits.
Recall that costs imposed on agents as a result of market regulation have been
classified under; (a) those possessing the potential to enhance market efficiency
and; (b) those for which rational justification is difficult to pin down (see section 9. 2.
2, page 165). The latter group of regulations, viz, those of restraining agents from
organising transactions in preferred ways, need immediate abolishing. These
include restrictions on permissible interests, on receipt and disbursement of incomes
economies of SSA countries may be explained by this phenomenon.
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from customary land transactions, and the need for consent and concurrence. They
strangle agents, crowd out private initiative and waste resources but bring about no
discernible benefits. The bundling of these regulations with others means that
reform of the system must begin with the de-coupling of the various strands of
regulations. Once this is done, the stage would be set for abolishing unwarranted
regulations. The following policy reforms would address many of the problems
identified in this research.
• The de-coupling of various strands of regulations relating to urban land
transactions. Documentation of ownership of property rights in urban land, for
example, should be organised independently of planning approvals; the need for
consent and concurrence, and other regulations. This would lead to
transparency of the system. The latter indeed is recommended as the first stage
of reforming bureaux (see Niskanen 1994).
• Abolish the restriction of permissible rights that can be sold. Economic agents
are better placed to evolve property rights that are better attuned to the
opportunities available.
• Abolish the need for consent and concurrence by the Lands Commission to
rectify or perfect stool land transactions. This regulation has no practical
purpose or benefits. But it enables bureaucrats to rent-seek.
• Abolish the prescriptions on the receipts and management of proceeds from
stool land transactions. This prescription runs counter to economic intuition. It is
unimaginable to expect a supplier of a product to undertake all the costs
necessary to produce and make the product available to the purchaser only to
collect the bureaucratically determined price from some bureau exogenous to the
transaction. If the purpose is to tax proceeds form customary land transactions a
more efficient way is to use the tax system of the country. Again transparency of
the activity would be achieved. And a political and economic case would have to
be made and defended for such a tax.
• Abolish the use of compulsory purchase to create residential neighbourhoods.
From the evidence the world over, governments can never be successful
property developers. In SSA, governments (or their various arms) cannot even
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be contemplated to provide social housing now or in the distant future. The
realities of the macro economic circumstances of these countries make sure of
that. Any (fuzzy) moral justifications of using these powers for developing
residential neighbourhoods for 'the poor' do not exist in practice. Perverse
outcomes resulting from their use, in the end, harm the poor'.
9. 4. 4. Efficiency Enhancing Regulation
Market regulation has its place. Indeed regulation to see to enforcement of contracts
and property rights have long been argued by neo-classical economists to be
essential for the operation of markets. As Firmin-Sellers (1997) has found, and the
evidence of prevalence of 'double allocation' found in the field survey of this study
confirms, in an evolving urban land market of a developing economy where the
necessary institutions are not completely well established, opportunities abound for
exploitation of agents by groups in strategic positions. There is therefore a case for
regulation to ensure this does not eventuate. But in reform of the existing system,
market regulation must be justified on their actual (as against theoretical) positive
impacts on agents. Regulation to enhance the operation of the market should
therefore be the aim. If they are to work the emphases should be on policies that
lead players to behave in desired ways by presenting them with the right incentives.
Here regulations under (a), discussed above, are appropriate.
The first, and possibly the most important area of bureaucratic involvement in the
market, is the recording and dissemination of land and property ownership
information. It is important to realise the difference between the statistical exercise of
compiling and dissemination of information on property ownership and the supply of
additional (supposed to be superior) property rights. A confusion between the two
and the attempt to supply both concurrently, inherent in current regulation has led to
the observed chaotic circumstances. The statistical exercise can be better served
from a central data base that can be provided more efficiently, at present, by
government departments. That of providing efficient property rights, as has been
shown in the study, are better left to agents who are better placed to evolve the most
efficient system.
There is also a case for the supply of 'public goods' such as culturally relevant
neighbourhood amenities which might not be adequately supplied if everything is left
to the market. Regulation through planning approvals are therefore necessary in this
regard. So are building standard regulations which when properly applied would
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educate and compel private agents to take on board, in constructing buildings,
knowledge which might be helpful to them but which might be too complex or too
expensive to acquire (an aspect of market failure, see Chapter 5). There is also the
need for objective dispute resolution machinery that can be trusted by agents. This
can only be efficiently provided by central government with its monopoly over the
power to force citizens into conforming. The absence of this at present was found to
exact costs on agents.
In more specific terms, therefore, the continuance of bureaucratic involvement in the
market in enhanced and better focused terms in the following areas are
recommended:
1. The gathering, storage and dissemination of property ownership information is an
area where a well focused bureau is necessary to provide a market enhancing
service. To be effective it has to be extensive and cover the entire market. This
can be achieved only if the cost/benefit functions are right for agents. A
reorganisation of the operation of the bureaux as discussed in 9. 4. 5 below is a
pre-requisite in realising the goals. The records for household property
ownership information could be organised like a census where information on
what actually exists on the ground is compiled through site visits rather than the
current practice where the information is expected to be brought to the offices of
the bureaux. As this study has shown, this information exists in the field and can
be collected with relative ease and minimum resources. In just under ten weeks,
with five graduates, extensive information on 286 households were compiled for
this study. Given the resources at the disposal of the relevant bureaux, a great
deal can be achieved if key bureaucrats are induced into organising resources in
this manner (for how this can occur see 9. 4. 5). In view of the level of
sophistication of the market, basic information such as details on; ownership,
neighbourhood, house number and type, head of household, and next of kin;
could be incorporated with map based data which can be upgraded as markets
develop and sophisticated information come to be demanded. The system
should be demand driven.
A related area is a comprehensive record of traditional landowners. Here the
activities of bureaux could be re-focused into compiling statistical information on
stool and family land ownership, boundaries, categories of uses, that are actually
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agreed by all parties and sections of contiguous stools and families. This would
serve as an effective and authoritative source of information to purchasers. As
above, the information needs to reflect what actually is happening on the ground.
There was some indication that attempts similar to this are being made
piecemeal by the LCS in some parts of the country. It is recommended that
rather than this being peripheral to the core activities of the bureau, it should
rather be the main focus of land administration. The only way to get the bureaux
to behave in a manner to achieve this is through the re-organisations proposed in
9. 4. 5 below.
A point worthy of note is that the activity of collecting and disseminating property
information is considered best to be supplied through bureaux not because it is
an activity that the market is perceived to be incapable of supplying. On the
contrary, under conducive environments the market would be the most efficient
means. In the UK, for example, the Investment Property Databank (IPD) has
built a successful business on the back of compiling, analysing and
disseminating investment property data. However, under the present
circumstances where a great deal of resources in terms of equipment, buildings,
and staff have already been spent on establishing bureaux for the purpose, they
are better placed to handle this more efficiently. Provided, that is, a re-focusing
of their operations as described in 9. 4. 5 is undertaken. This is the case
because interventionist policies in the wider economy for sustained periods in
Ghana has crowded out and blunted the private sector to the extent that one
cannot reasonably expect the sector to be capable of providing this service at the
moment.
2. Planning is the next area of recommended market regulation. There is some
justification for the need for planning to supply public goods. Apart from being
tied to title at present, it would appear that objectives are exaggerated and rent-
seeking behaviour abounds (see Larbi, 1996). Like the recommendation on
property information gathering above, a more market oriented planning approach
that recognises the cost/benefit implications of agents is recommended. This
can only be achieved if some way is found to incorporate land suppliers into the
process. It should be noted that irrespective of whatever system that is
operated, planning will only be successful if minimised to supply attributes that
are, in fact, relevant 'public goods'. Knowledge of these has to be gained
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through systematic studies of agents rather than by relying on some supposedly
superior notions of planning which may or may not have any relevance to agents.
3. Regulation of building standards should be re-focused. Again relevant and
feasible regulation should be the guiding principle for regulators. There is no
point in attempting to regulate to achieve standards that agents cannot afford.
Agents consider costs of the existing regulative system to be too prohibitive and
therefore avoid it. This defeats the very purpose of ensuring the construction of
safe buildings. Given the diversity of agents and the consequent diverse
standards and level of demands for housing services, it is recommended to
explore the operation of a regulative regime that discriminates among the various
market participants. High building standards might be enforced in certain
neighbourhoods while lower standards, unacceptable in these neighbourhoods,
are allowed elsewhere to cater for the different levels of affordability. This calls
for a much more refined regulatory regime than currently exists and can only be
successful if detailed knowledge of agents' preferences are gained. Once again
there is a need for systematic study of agents here.
4. Better and dedicated adjudication systems that are trusted and incorporate all
stakeholders are urgently needed. This recommendation actually takes us
outside the realm of land market regulations into that of the independence of the
judiciary in Ghana. Recommendations as to how this can be achieved is beyond
the remits of this study and urgent research is called for possibly from the legal
and related professions. It can only be recommended, as earlier studies
(Brobby, 1991; Larbi, 1994) have done without any success, that special courts
for land affairs -- lands tribunals - should be established to deal exclusively and
objectively on land matters. But effectiveness of these would depend on
availability of good property ownership information and therefore conditional on
the success of the recommendations in (1) above.
9. 4. 5. Restructuring Bureaux
The above recommendations for enhanced and focused market regulations are
conditional on a reorganisation of the bureaux that are entrusted with regulation. It is
here that the involvement of donor agencies could be much more efficiently
employed. Given the notoriously difficult task of reforming bureaux, not least
because the information required for the task is seriously guarded, it is necessary for
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donor agencies to bring pressure to bear through the projects they fund if successful
reform is to be achieved. As Niskanen (1994) has observed:
efficiency in government cannot be much improved
without changing the basic institutions and processes that affect the demand
for and supply of government-financed services" (Niskanen, 1994; p 275).
This study has shown that the operations of land agencies in Accra (like all bureaux)
are inconsistent with the public interest of improving urban land allocative
mechanisms, their raison d'être for being established As far as it is possible,
therefore, the purpose of re-organising bureaux is to change them to make their
behaviour more nearly consistent with the public interest. How can this be
achieved? By a realignment of the incentive structures of key bureau members.
Notice that the recommendations for bureaucratic involvement above are on the
implied assumption that there is demand for the outputs to be supplied. This means
that when well structured key members in their bid to maximise the utility of their
offices, would behave in ways consistent with the public interest. Therefore bureaux
involved should be restructured and operated along market oriented lines. Incentive
structures should be reorganised. This can be done through the nature and
structure of funding. Allow bureaucrats a free hand to employ qualified staff and
equipment. These should be funded from moneys generated from marketing their
services. For example the information recording and dissemination activity has
potential demand which can be exploited if the bureau supplying it is induced to
operate in that manner. They should be allowed to sell their expertise where
demand for them exists. The way to ensure that this occurs is to link emoluments of,
at least key members, to performance. Any such arrangements should be
transparent to avoid rent-seeking behaviour, the very behaviour that has
necessitated reforms. And all these call for minimisation of political control. In sum,
the structural changes recommended to get bureaux in land administration to mimic
the behaviour of private firms are;
• Increase the competition among bureaux for the supply of the same or similar
public services. In this regard, healthy competition can be triggered between the
Lands Commission Secretariat/Deeds Registry, Land Title Registry, Land
Valuation Board and the (newly established) Office of the Administrator of Stool
Lands for the supply of property information services.
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• Change the incentives in the bureaucracy to induce more efficient behaviour by
the senior bureaucrats. A more transparent salary scale devoid of subjectively
determined perquisites but linked to performance - number of properties for
which information is successfully recorded, say - might produce the desired
results.
• Increase the competition to the bureaucracy by greater use of private sources of
supply of public services. Here the employment of private consultants in
valuations and field surveys are in order especially for donor funded projects.
In the course of following the recommended reforms the very raison d'être of some
bureaux may be undermined. For example the raison d'être of the Office of the
Administrator of Stool Lands would be in doubt if the recommendations to abolish the
restriction of permissible rights and the associated management of proceeds from
stool land transactions is implemented. There may however not be a need to close
them down. A restructuring and re-focusing of such bureaux to supply similar
services supplied by other bureaux would utilise resources released. As to whether
there would be enough demand to justify the involvement of all bureaux, the finding
from the survey that virtually none of the ownership information on informally
transacted properties are officially documented indicates the extent of potential
demand across the country. There is enough demand to support the existence of
many bureaux supplying outputs of this nature provided they are made to operate in
a market oriented way. It is only through the lens of bureaucratic behaviour and
rent-seeking competition that one can explain the existence of extensive potential
demand which goes unmet while institutions established to supply the services are
unable or unprepared to employ abundantly available resources (in this case
unemployed graduates) to supply the needed outputs.
9. 5. Limitations of The Study
In Chapter 3 attention was drawn to aspects of the data generated for this research
which imposes some limitations on the findings. As explained in Chapter 3, efforts
have been made to counter their effects on the validity and reliability of the findings.
The following are further limitations that need to be highlighted in order that the
findings can be appreciated in the appropriate context.
9. 5. 1. Validity of Findings
Throughout the study it has been implied that the office of stool representatives
presents the right incentives that would induce them into making efficient decisions if
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formal institutions were reformed to allow this. Indeed the success or failure of some
of the recommendations are conditional on this very assumption. But there are
reasons to believe that the assumption might not hold true in many circumstances.
There is a real concern about opportunist behaviour by some members and heads of
stools and families. The abiTity of the occupiers to sell lands and use the money for
their personal enjoyment appears to be inconsistent with the traditional status of their
office as trustees to hold the land in trust for and on behalf of the community. There
are also reported cases of regulation capture, where head of stools and families
have employed the very government regulative regimes to behave in ways that
would not be possible under the customary establishment prior to regulations. In this
sense government intervention has led to a kind of moral hazard where the
traditional institutions have lost the incentives to check and ensure that occupiers of
offices behave as traditionally required. This and similar behaviour are anecdotally
reported to be creating tensions which cut deep into the very existence of the
traditional societies and their institutions. To the extent that these are occurring, the
validity of some of the recommendations of the study are open for debate.
9. 5. 2. Data Employed
In hedonic type studies, the results are enriched with the inclusion of some indicators
of neighbourhood and physical attributes of properties of the households surveyed.
The absence of secondary data on these meant that this could only have been
achieved by employing qualified surveyors to inspect all the 286 properties to
generate consistent data. Clearly the expense and time involved in such an exercise
was beyond that which was available for this study. Nevertheless the absence of
physical attributes of properties and some indicators of neighbourhood qualities
blunted some of the conclusions. A specific aspect that has suffered is the study's
inability to distinguish more finely between the policy impacts on the various informal
neighbourhoods.
9. 5. 3. Research Design
It is possible that some of the findings are specific to Accra. However, as explained
earlier, many of the findings could apply to many SSA cities. Further research is
needed on this basis.
Another area is the lack of inclusion of empirical information from the various
bureaucracies involved in the land market. A more complete picture could have
been painted if a systematic investigation of relevant bureaux concerning their
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objectives, costs, and other aspects of their operations was undertaken. However,
resources available for this study did not allow that. Certain findings and conclusions
may not be wholly reliable precisely because they are not based on empirically
derived information on bureaux in Accra. A study specifically focused on land
administration bureaux is therefore needed to refine the findings here.
9. 6. Areas For Further Research
Recommendations for policy reforms would lead to better outcomes if better
knowledge of many aspects of the problems not directly investigated in this study are
gained. In this regard research in the following areas to gain better understanding is
considered essential.
9. 6. 1. Culturally Relevant and Feasible Planning
It has been observed that planning may be relevant to agents. Possible areas of
concern is the relevance of many outputs planning regulation attempts to supply.
There is a need for empirically based study into culturally relevant public goods' that
warrant policy intervention to effect their supply. Given cultural and economic
circumstances of SSA, which outputs of planning are really necessary public goods
to be supplied need to be established. Research into these areas attempting the
calibration of cost implications to agents of planning policy are needed.
9. 6. 2. Economic Study of Traditional Landholding Institutions
There is the need for research into the economic forces shaping the traditional
institutions of land holdings. Empirically based research employing insights from
public choice and transaction cost economics to investigate the behaviour of
occupiers of strategic offices of these institutions is needed. And a better
understanding of the actual state of property rights emanating from these institutions
in urban areas would inform policy makers.
9. 6. 3. Possibility of Private Enterprise in Large Scale Housing Provision
An informed study into the possibility of large scale provision of housing by the
private sector is needed. Studies attempting to explain why the few private firms
operating in the market find it necessary to supply only the top end of the market
given the extent of demand at the lower end are called for. Eventually, it is answers
to these questions that would solve the housing and neighbourhood problems in
Accra and many other SSA cities.
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9. 6. 4. Investigation of Behaviour of Land Agencies
Economic studies of the operation of existing bureaux involved in the land market
are needed. Systematic studies of their behaviour, costs, outputs, sources of
funding, employment practices need to be undertaken. There is a complete dearth
of knowledge on how these operate in Accra. This study has concentrated on
market agents. A Study employing economic insights into bureaux involved would
complete the picture.
9. 6. 5. Studies Based on Other SSA Cities
As has earlier been mentioned, it is possible that aspects of the findings of this study
are specific to Accra. Further research employing similar methodology utilised in this
study is required in other SSA cities.
9. 6. 6. Research into Effective Land Dispute Resolution Machinery
Research is also needed to investigate and design an effective land dispute
resolution machinery which is objective and trusted by agents. Questions as to why
land tribunals are not operating, why agents currently have no confidence in existing
judiciary systems need to be investigated. In any such study the cost/benefit
implications to agents and the positive externality aspects of effective dispute
resolution systems should be potential areas where attention could be focused.
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APPENDIX IA
I	 HOUSEHOLD INTERVIEW SCHEDULE	 I
Objectives
To gain insights into the operation of the Accra land market. Specifically:
1. To assess the extent to which government land policies influence household
demand for housing land.
2. To assess the perception of households on security of property rights conveyed by
customary land transactions.
3. To ascertain whether classic economic forces condition households in their housing
land choices.
Qualified Respondents (Persons to be interviewed).
1. Owner of property.
2. Qualified representative of owner defined as follows:
Owner is abroad and representative negotiated purchase of the land/property
on his/her behalf. Such representative is the qualified respondent to be
interviewed.
To be Read to Respondent:
Please do your best to provide as accurate a response as possible to the questions.
The provision of accurate answers is a priority for the success of this research.
This research is jointly funded by the Royal Institution of Chartered surveyors
(RICS), UK and Napier University, UK. Any related correspondence should be
forwarded to the principal researcher:
Yaw Adarkwah Antwi BSc (Hons) Dip (Cantab) MA ARICS
Lecturer in Property Valuation and Investment Appraisal
School of the Built Environment
Na pier University
10 Colinton Road
Edinburgh EHIO 5DT
U.K.
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l.a Sex
1. Male
2. Female
l.b Age (years)
1. Under 30
2. 30 - 39
3. 40-49
4. 50 - 59
5. Over 70
INTERVIEWER INSTRUCTION
A tick (#) at the end of a question indicates that a choice of more than one of the
possible answers provided is acceptable. In all other cases one (and only one)
possible answer should be chosen.
1. GENERAL BACKGROUND
l.c What is the highest form of
formal education you have?
1. None
2. Elementary
3. Post elementary (i.e.
secondary, technical,
vocational, training college etc.)
4. University
l.d What is your current
employment status
1. White colour employee (e.g.
teacher, bank employee etc.)
2. Blue colour employee (e.g.
auto-mechanic, brick layer etc.)
3. Self employed (specify) ........
4. No specific employment
2. LAND ACQUISITION
2.a Which of the following best
describes how you came to
own this property?
1. Acquired plot and
developed from scratch.
2. Acquired uncompleted
structure and finished it up.
3. Acquired fully developed
house.
4. Inherited property
5. Received property as a gift.
2.b When did you acquire the
plot or property?(approximate
year)
2.c From whom did you acquire
the plot or property?
1. Stool/Family
2. Private person
3. Government
4. Other (please specify)
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2.d From the day you approached
owner, how long did it take to
gain access to plot or
property?
1. Under 3 month
2. 3-6 month
3. 7-12 month
4. Over 12 months
2.e Before buying this one did
you consider any other plots
or properties in the city?
1. Yes
2. No (go to 2.2.g)
2.f If yes, what influenced your
decision to buy this particular
one instead of other(s)
considered? ( ')
1. speedy negotiation
2. credible record of owner's
integrity
3. price level
4. no history of land disputes
5. documents will be processed
by Lands
6. location of land
7. other (specify).............
2.g The Lands Commission gives
out government lands which
every Ghanaian of 21 and above
is entitled to. Have you ever
applied for a government land?
1. Yes
2. No (go to 2.2.j)
2.h If yes, how long ago was this?
1. Upto 1 year ago
2. 2 years ago
3. 3 years ago
4. 4 years ago
5. 5 years ago
6. over5 years ago
2.1 What was the outcome of the
application?
1. Obtainedaplot.
2. Was informed my application
was not successful.
3. Have not heard anything
since.
Goto2
2.j If no, why? ( V)
1. Don't know of the existence
of government lands
2. Don't know I am entitled.
3. Understand it is impossible
to get government land
without "connections"
4. Understand one has to pay a
lot of money to stand a
chance of getting a plot.
5. Government lands are for
"big" people not the likes of
me.
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3. MARKET PRICE INFORMATION
3.a How did you know the plot
or property was available? (V)
1. Through friends and/or
colleagues and/or relative
2. Advised by professional
(lands officer/valuer/lawyer
etc.)
3. Approached by owner
4. Advertisement (where).....
3.b How much did you pay for
the land? (state amount)
3.c To whom was price paid?
1. Owner
2. Government Department (e g.
Lands)
3. Other
3.d How was the payment
effected? (")
1. Lump sum in cash
2. Lump sum by cheque
3. By cash instalments
4. Instalments by cheque
5. Payment in kind (i.e. in lieu
of services rendered; in
exchange for durable
consumer goods e.g. cars)
6. Other form
3.e Which of the following did
you incur in addition to price
of the plot ?(
1. Demarcation/surveying fees
2. Pillaring fees
3. Preparation of documents
fees
4. Processing of documents
fees
5. Infrastructure fees
6. None
7. Other
3.f To whom was these fees
paid?
1. Not applicable
2. Owner
3. Government Department (e.g.
Lands)
4. Other
3.g What was your main source
of finance for acquiring the
plot or property? (s')
1. Bank loan
2. Loan from relative/friend
3. Money from relative abroad
4. Personal gradual savings
5. Earnings from abroad
6. Other (please state) .........
3.h In relation to prices achieved
for comparable plots the price
you paid was a fair market price.
Do you:?
1. Definitely agree
2. Agree
3. Not sure
4. Dontagree
5. Definitely don't agree
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3.1 Would you say the owner
took into consideration any of
the following factors in
determining the price you
paid? ( V)
1. Your employment status
2. Your ethnic origin
3. Your financial status
4. Your social status
5. None of the above
6. Other
4. INTEREST IN PROPERTY
4.a What interest do you think
you have in the land?
1. Forever (freehold)
2. 99 years (lease)
3. Less than 99 years
4. Don't know
5. Other (please specify)
4.b Where have you registered
your title to the land? ( )
1. Not registered
2. Lands Commission /Deeds
Registry
3. Land Title registry.
4.c Which of the following is
true about your property?
1. Obtained registered title
before commencing
development.
2. Commenced development
after sending papers for
registration but before the
process was completed.
3. Commenced development
same time as sending
papers for registration.
(Continue at top of right
column)
4. Substantially developed
before sending papers for
registration.
5. Finished and/or occupied
development before sending
papers for registration.
6. Have not submitted
documents for registration.
4.d Why did you register title?
(V)
1. I have not registered title.
2. I considered it necessary
before big sums are spent
developing the land.
3. Requested by the bank
granting loan for building the
house
4. Requested by bank granting
loan for my business.
5. To raise bank loan in future.
6. To protect against litigation
7. To have peace of mind
8. Better to have registered
title
9. Registration is compulsory.
191
4.e From the day you submitted
your documents, how long did
it take to have them
registered?
1. I have not submitted my
documents for registration.
2. Less than 3 months
3. Between 3-6 months
4. Between 7-12 months
5. Between 1-2 years
6. Between 2.5 -5 years
7. Over 5 years
4. f To ensure the registration
process was speeded up,
which of the following did you
do after submitting your
documents? (Ye)
1. I have not submitted any
documents.
2. Did nothing but wait.
3. Paid a Lands worker to
follow it through the system
4. Paid an agent to follow it
through the system
5. Paid regular visits to the
offices and 'tip' officers.
4.h If documents are still in 'the
process', how long have they
been there?
1. Not applicable
2. Less than 3 months
3. Between 3-6 months
4. Between 7-12 months
5. Between 1-2 years
6. Between 2.5 -3 years
7. Over 5 years
4.1 Which of the following
explain why your documents
are not registered? (s')
1. Not applicable, I have
registered documents
2. They are in the process
3. Owner did not provide
documents.
4. Too expensive.
5. Too cumbersome.
6. Too time consuming
7. Too much trouble.
8. Not necessary.
9. I am to register in future.
1O.Don't know I need to register
documents.
4.g How much is your estimate
of the total cost of registration
(including 'tips', payments to
agents etc. if any) (state
amount)..............................
5. POST REGISTRATION EXPENSES
To be answered by property owners with registered documents only.	 I
5.a Do you pay annual ground 	 5.b If yes, how much do you pay
rent?	 perannum9.................
1. Yes
2. No(goto4.5.d)
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5.c Where do you pay the rent?	 5.d If no, why? ( ')
1. Don't know I need to pay
Continue at Q.6
	 I	 ground rent
2. Nobody asks me for it
3. Don't know where to pay it.
4. I ignore demand notices.
6. PHYSICAL DEVELOPMENT
6.a How long did it take you to
	 6.c Did the city authorities, at
obtain building permits? 	 any stage of development,
1. Didn't have building permits	 requested you to 'stop work
2. Less than 3 months	 and produce permits'?
3. Between 3-6 months	 1. Yes
4. Between 7-12 months
5. Between 1-2 years
6. Between 2.5 -5 years
7. Over 5 years
6.b Why don't you have
permits? ( ')
1. I have permits.
2. Application in the process.
3. Don't know I need one.
4. Application was refused.
5. Don't need one.
6. Application took too long.
7. Other (specify) ...........
2. No (go to 7)
6.d If yes, what did you do? ( )
1. Ignored it and continued
building
2. 'Tipped' the inspector and
continued
3. Went to get a permit
6.e How much is your estimate
of the total cost of obtaining
building permits (including
'tips payments to agents
etc.) (state amount)
7. LITIGATION
7.a Have you been involved in
any litigation with respect to
the plot or property?
1. Yes
2. No(goto6.7.g)
7.b Who was the other party to
the litigation?
1. The stool/family from whom
land was purchased
2. Rival Stool/family of my
vendor
3. Rival purchaser from same
stool
4. Rival purchaser from another
stool
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7.c Has the litigation been
settled
1. Yes
2. No(gotol.7.f)
7.d If yes, where was it settled?
1. Formal judiciary system
2. Traditional judiciary system
3. Other (please specify).
7.e How long did it last?
1. Less than 1 year
2. 1-1.5 year
3. 2-3 years
4. 3.5 -5 years
5. Over 5 years.
7.f When did the litigation start?
1. Before any work on the plot
started.
2. When building materials
were sent to the plot.
3. When building workers
started work on the plot
4. Half way through the
building work
5. After building was
completed.
7.g On a scale of 0 to 10, where
10 signifies the most
satisfactory view and 0 the
worst, how do you rate the
government machinery for
settling land disputes?
0, 1,2,3, 4,5,6,7,8,9,10
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8. GOVERNMENT LANDS "SQUATTERS"
To be answered by owners in areas purported to have been compulsorily
acquired by government only
8.a Did you obtain the land
through a government
department
1. Yes (end interview)
2. No
8.b If no, did you know, before
you bought the plot, thatthe
government claims to be the
owner?
1. Yes
2. No(goto8.8.d)
8.c If yes, why did you buy it
from someone other than
government?
1. The stool/vendor was
known by everyone to be
the one selling lands in the
area.
2. It was impossible to get the
land from government
3. Some government (land)
official(s) assured me it was
safe to buy because
government cannot enforce
the acquisition.
4. Given the location, the plot
was offered at a cheaper
price than I could obtain in
comparable areas.
5. Because everyone around
did the same but no
property or very few have
ever been demolished.
8.d At the moment registration
of documents on lands in this
area is not allowed. Would
you consider registration if
the government were to allow
it?
1. Yes
2. No (state reasons)
8.e If yes, would you still
consider registration if you
would be asked to pay a
penalty of about 11/i times the
market price of the land?
1. Yes
2. No
If you want to offer any general comments on the land market in Accra please
provide it below.
Thank you very much for participating in this research. 	 I
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etc.) (4)
3. Approached by owner (4)
4. Advertisement (where) (4)
3. b
3. c
APPENDIX lB
HOUSEHOLD INTERVIEW SCHEDULE
I	 2 STAGE ANALYSIS
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND
1.
2. a
2. b
2. c
2.d
2. e
2.f If yes, what influenced your
decision to buy this particular
one instead of other(s)
considered? ( ')
Test of economic
rationality of
respondent's selection
criterion
speedy negotiation (4)
2. credible record of owner's
integrity (4)
3. price level (4)
4. no history of land disputes(4)
5. documents will be processed
by Lands (4)
6. location of land (4)
7. other (specify) (4)
2.g
2.h
2.1
2.j If no, why? ( ")
Respondent's view on
government lands
1. Don't know of the existence
of government lands (0)
2. Don't know I am entitled. (-1)
3. Understand it is impossible
to get government land
without 'connections" (-4)
4. Understand one has to pay a
lot of money to stand a
chance of getting a plot. (-4)
5. Government lands are for
"big" people not the likes of
me. (-4)
2. LAND ACQUISITION
3. MARKET PRICE INFORMATION
3.a How did you know the plot
or property was available? ( ")
Test on fl w f
information
1. Through friends and/or
colleagues and/or relative (4)
2. Advised by professional
(lands officer/valuer/lawyer
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3.d How was the payment
effected? fl')
Test of flexibility of
payment - customer
oriented operation
1. Lumpsum in cash (4)
2. Lump sum by cheque (4)
3. By cash instalments (4)
4. Instalments by cheque (4)
5. Payment in kind (i.e. in lieu
of services rendered; in
exchange for durable
consumer goods e.g. cars)
(4)
6. Other form (4)
3.e Which of the following did
you incur in addition to price
of the plot ?(	 --
Test of level of
additional expenditure in
land transactions.
1. Demarcation/surveying
fees(-4)
2. Pillaring fees(-4)
3. Preparation of documents
fees (-4)
4. Processing of documents
fees(-4)
5. Infrastructure fees (-4)
6. None (0)
7. Other (-4)
3.f
3.g What was your main source
of finance for acquiring the
plot or property? ( ')
Test of impact of
operation of Banks
1. Bank loan (4)
2. Loan from relative/friend (-1)
3. Money from relative abroad
(-2)
4 Personal gradual savings (-
4)
5. Earnings from abroad (-3)
6. Other (please state) (0)
3.h In relation to prices achieved
for comparable plots the price
you paid was a fair market price.
Do you:?
Test of significance of
price on respondent's
property choices.
1. Definitely agree (4)
2. Agree (2)
3. Not sure (0)
4. Don't agree (-2)
5. Definitely don't agree (-4)
3.1 Would you say the owner
took into consideration any of
the following factors in
determining the price you
paid? ( ")
Test of the economic basis
of pricing
1. Your employment status (-1)
2. Your ethnic origin (-4)
3. Your financial status (0)
4. Your social status (-4)
5. None of the above (4)
6. Other (-1)
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4. INTEREST IN PROPERTY
4.a
4.b Where have you registered
your title to the land? ( ')
Test of applicability of
formal title registration
1. Not registered (0)
2. Lands Commission IDeeds
Registry (4)
3. Land Title registry.(4)
4.c Which of the following is
true about your property?
Test of purchaser's
I confidence in formal
title.
1. Obtained registered title
before commencing
development. (4)
2. Commenced development
after sending papers for
registration but before the
process was completed. (3)
3. Commenced development
same time as sending
papers for registration. (2)
4. Substantially developed
before sending papers for
registration. (1)
5. Finished and/or occupied
development before sending
papers for registration. (-3)
6. Have not submitted
documents for registration.
(-4)
4.d Why did you register title?
(s'-)
Test of practical
importance of title
registration to
respondent.
1. I have not registered title.(0)
2. I considered it necessary
before big sums are spent
developing the land. (4)
3. Requested by the bank
granting loan for building the
house (2)
4. Requested by bank granting
loan for my business. (1)
5. To raise bank loan in future.
(2)
6. To protect against litigation
(4)
7. To have peace of mind (1)
8. Better to have registered
title (1)
9. Registration is compulsory.
(-4)
4. e
4.f To ensure the registration
process was speeded up,
which of the following did you
do after submitting your
documents? (V)
Test of confidence in
operation of documentation
process
1. I have not submitted any
documents. (0)
2. Did nothing but wait. (4)
3. Paid a Lands worker to
follow it through the system
(-4)
4. Paid an agent to follow it
through the system (-3)
5. Paid regular visits to the
offices and 'tip' officers. (-3)
4.g
4.h
4.1 Which of the following
explain why your documents
are not registered? (s')
Test of perception on
'cost' of d cumentation
1. Not applicable, I have
registered documents (0)
2. They are in the process (0)
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3. Owner did not provide
documents. (0)
4. Too expensive. (-4)
5. Too cumbersome.(-4)
6. Too time consuming (-4)
7. Too much trouble. (-4)
8. Not necessary. (-4)
9. I am to register in future. (-1)
10.Don't know I need to register
documents. (0)
5. POST REGISTRATION EXPENSES
To be answered by property owners with registered documents only. 	 I
5.a	 54 If no, why? ( )
Test of efficacy of policy
5. b	 restricting transactions
to leases.
5. c	 1. Don't know I need to pay
ground rent (-4)
2. Nobody asks me for it (-3)
3. Don't know where to pay it.
(-3)
4. I ignore demand notices.(-1)
6. PHYSICAL DEVELOPMENT
6. a
6.b Why don't you have
permits? ( ")
Test of effectiveness of
building permit process I
1. I have permits. (0)
2. Application in the process.
(1)
3. Don't know I need one. (-3)
4. Application was refused. (-
4)
5. Don't need one. (-4)
6. Application took too long. (-
2)
7. Other (specify) (0)
6. c
6.d If yes, what did you do? ( )
Test of effectiveness of
building permit process II
1. Ignored it and continued
building (-4)
2. 'Tipped' the inspector and
continued (-3)
3. Went to get a permit (4)
6. e
7. LITIGATION
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7. a
	
7. e
7.b
	
7. f
7. c
	
7.g
74
	
7.h
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8. GOVERNMENT LANDS "SQUATTERS"
8. a
8.b
8.c If yes, why did you buy it
from someone other than
government?
Test f C nfiden e in
government's ability in
supplying rights of
physical p ssession in
land
1.
known by everyone to be
the one selling lands in the
area. (-4)
2. It was impossible to get the
land from government (-4)
3. Some government (land)
official(s) assured me it was
safe to buy because
government cannot enforce
the acquisition. (-4)
4. Given the location, the plot
was offered at a cheaper
price than I could obtain in
comparable areas. (-4)
5. Because everyone around
did the same but no
property or very few have
ever been demolished. (-4)
8.d
8. e
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APPENDIX 2A
CodeNo.....
CUSTOMARY LAND OWNERS (STOOLS/FAMILIES)
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE
NAMEOF STOOL/FAMILY................................................................
NAMEOF INTERVIEWEE................................................................
DATEOF INTERVIEW.....................................................................
OBJECTIVES
To gauge the extent to which price signals determine how customary land owners in
Accra manage their lands within (or irrespective of) the limits set by government urban
land policies. Specifically;
1. To assess the extent to which existing government policies influence customary
land owners in their supply of land.
2. To determine typical management costs of customary land owners.
3. To Ascertain whether customary land owners respond to classic economic forces in
the utilization of their lands.
Qualified Respondent
Stool/Family representative responsible for land maters.
To be Read to Respondent:
Please do your best to provide as accurate a response as possible to the questions.
The provision of accurate answers is a priority for the success of this research
This research is jointly funded by the Royal Institution of Chartered suiveyors
(RICS), UK and Napier University, UK. Any related correspondence should be
forwarded to the principal researcher:
Yaw Adarkwah Antwi BSc (Hons) Dip (Cantab) MA ARICS
Lecturer in Property Valuation and Investment Appraisal
School of the Built Environment
Napier University
10 Colinton Road
Edinburgh EHIO 5DT
U.K.
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INSTRUCTION FOR COMPLETION OF QUESTIONAIRE
A .T.at the end of a question indicates that a choice of more than one of the possible
answers provided is acceptable. In all other cases one (and only one) possible
answer should be chosen. Relevant answers should be indicated with a tick () in the
appropriate box(es).
1. GENERAL BACKGROUND
l.a What is your capacity in the
traditional establishment
l.b How long have you been in that
capacity?
l.c What is the highest form of
formal education you have?
ElNone
El Elementary
El Post elementary (i.e.
secondary, technical,
vocational, training college
etc.)
El University
2. TITLE
2.a What type of documents does
the stool or family have on its
lands? iT.
El None
ElStatutory declaration
El Deed of gift
El Court judgement
ElLease
Elother (please specify)
2.b Where has the stool or family
registered title to its lands? iT.
El Not registered
El Lands Commission /Deeds
Registry
El Land Title registry (yellow
card)
2.c Why did the stool or family
register its title documents? 4
El Not registered title
El To comply with government
directives
ElTo protect interest against
counter claims
ElTo facilitate sale of lands
El To safeguard lands after
prolonged litigation
El Felt that it is appropriate to
register title to land
El Other please specify
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24 Why is title to some or all lands
not registered? .7.
Not applicable, stool has
registered title on all lands.
El No knowledge about
registration
El Not necessary
El Too expensive
El Procedure too
cumbersome
El Presented but
Lands/Deeds would not
register them
El Other (please specify)
3. PHYSICAL DELINEATION AND PROTECTION OF LAND
3.a How are your lands demarcated	 3.b Why have you not taken steps
on the ground? 4
	
to have the land suiveyed and/or
El
El
pillared? .7.
Surveyed and pillared.
Not applicable, our lands
Boundaries determined by	 are surveyed and/or
landmarks (e.g. hills, trees, 	 pillared.
streams, valleys, etc.)
El
Don't know lands should be
Boundaries determined by	 surveyed and pillared.
extent of lands farmed by
subjects and/or authorised	 Can't get qualified
'strangers'.	 professionals to do it.
El Other (please specify)	 El Not necessary, can sell the
lands anyway.
El Surveying and pillaring add
little to sale price.
El Too expensive
El Other (please specify)
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3.c How do you protect your lands
from being encroached upon? 4
El By employing land guards.
3.f When asked, which of the
following reasons do 'encroachers'
give for encroaching on your land?
4
El Through regular
inspections by
representatives of
stool/family.
El Permanent physical
presence of stool
subjects/authorised
strangers' through farming
etc. ensures encroachment
impossible.
El By relying on registered
documents on the lands
and prosecutions in court.
ElOther please
state............................
3.d Have you ever had people
encroaching on your land?
El Yes
El No(goto3.3.g)
3.e If yes, what did you do? .T.
El Advise/warn them to move.
El Physically remove them.
El Made them pay the market
price of the land and stay
El Took them to court
ElOther please
state............................
El Occupied the land on their
own initiative.
El Bought land from another
purported owner
El Obtained land from a
government agency
El Authorised by a
government agency
El Other please state
Continue at Q4
3.g If no, what would you do if you
found encroachment on your land?
ST.
El Advise/warn them to move
El Physically remove them
El Make them pay the market
price of the land and stay
El Take them to court
El Other please state ..........
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4. MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES
4.a Which of the following factors 	 4.c Why doesn't the stool/family
trigger the stool/family's decision to	 has layouts approved? .7.
sell lands? .7.
El Enquiries made to
stool/family by the public for
land.
El Judged from sale by
nearby landowners.
E1 Suspicion of government
attempts to take control of
land.
El Prompts by officials in
government land agencies.
El Desperate need of funds to
meet stool's liabilities.
4.b Are your layouts approved by
the relevant government body?
El Yes (go to 4.4.d)
ElNo
El Not applicable
El The stool has layouts
approved.
ElNo knowledge that layouts
should be approved.
El Procedure too expensive.
El Procedure too slow.
El Procedure too
cumbersome.
El Not necessary.
El Other (please specify).
4.d When does the stool or family
begin to sell its plots? 4
El Plots are sold without
layouts
El When layouts are prepared
but before approval.
ElWhen layouts are approved
by appropriate planning
authority.
El When plots are
demarcated and pillared.
El When roads are
constructed.
El Other (please specify)
4.e What is the average size of your
residential plots (give dimensions if
preferred)? ...................................
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4.f What factors does the stool or
family consider in deciding plot
sizes? ST.
El Size of plots previously sold
by the stool/family.
El Size of plots sold by other
stools nearby.
Size of government plots
nearby.
El Size considered affordable
by the average expected
purchaser.
El Town and Country planning
advice and practice.
El Other please
state.............
4.g How does the stool/family keep
records of its land sales? .1.
El In a ledger
EJ On a plan
El Other (please specify)
4.h Does the stool/family keep
copies of title documents provided
to purchasers?
El Not applicable, the stool
does not provide documents
to purchasers
El Yes
ElNo
4.1 In your estimation how regular
does double allocation occur per
layout?
El None whatsoever
El 1 in every 10 plots allocated
El 1 in every 50 plots allocated
El1 in every 100 plots
allocated
4.j Why does double allocation
occur? .T.
El Lack of records on previous
sales
El Oversight
El Non-development by first
purchaser
El Don't know, stool has no
experience of it.
ElOther reasons (please
specify) ...................
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5. COST OF ADMINISTRATION
5.a How many people constitute the 	 54 Which of the following
body that allocates the stool/family's 	 professionals do you employ for
land?(state number) ....................land allocation? 4
5.b Are these members engaged
full time
El Yes all are full time
El Only some members are
full time (state number)
ElAll are part-time
5.c How are the members paid for
their time spent in land allocation?
4
ElRegular salary, (state
amount)................
ElCommission on saTes
achieved (state rate)..........
ElOccasionally, depending on
availability of funds (state
amount)......................
ElGiven plots of land (state
howmany)......................
El Other (please state)
El Surveyors
El Planners
El Lands officers
El Lawyers
El Others (please state)
5.e How are these professionals
paid? 4
ElRegular salary, (state
amount)................
ElCommission on sales
achieved (state rate)..........
ElOccasionally depending on
availability of funds (state
amount).....................
ElGiven plots of land (state
howmany)......................
El Other (please
state)..............................
5.f How much is your estimate of
the total cost of preparing plots for
sale of your most recent land sales
(include, cost of allocation
committee, professionals, labourers,
etc.) (state amount)
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6. CIRCUMSTANCES OF PLOT SALES
6.b From the day the stool is
approached, how long does it take
for a purchaser to be granted access
to plot?
6.a When was the last time the
stool/family sold plots?
IJ Within the last 12 months
1J 2 years ago
11 3 years ago
11 4 years ago
1 5 years ago
11 Over 5 years ago
1 Under 1 month
111-3 months
13.5-7 months
117.5-9 months
19.5 -12 months
11 Over 12 months
6.c Who qualifies for a plot?
11 Anybody interested and
prepared to pay the
appropriate price.
11 Members of a specific
family (please
specify)..........
El Members of a specific
ethnic group (please
specify)...............
El Other (please specify)
64 How do you think purchasers
come to know about the
stool/family's plots? 4
11 Introduced by a subject of
the stool/family.
El Introduced by a
professional attached to the
stool/family.
El Introduced by land agent.
El Introduced by officers at
government land agencies.
El Purchasers approach
directly to inquire.
El Through advertisement by
the stool (newspapers, radio
TV etc.)
El Other (please specify)
6.e Which of the following are good
reasons why the stool does not
advertise its land sales in
newspapers, on radio, TV etc.? .?.
El Not applicable, the stool or
family advertises lands for
sale on TV, radio etc.
El Doesn't want to attract
attention of government.
El Doesn't want to attract
attention of parties disputing
stool/family's ownership.
El Not necessary since
purchasers somehow come
to know eventually.
El None of the above.
El Other please state
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6.h How many plots does the
average purchaser normally buy?
El1 plot
El2 plots
1J3 plots
El4 plots
El5 plots
Elmore than 5 plots.
6.f Are there instances where a
purchaser who is prepared to pay
the relevant price is denied a plot?
El Definitely no
ElNo
El Not sure
El Yes
El Definitely Yes
6.g What is the maximum number
of plots the stool/family will sell to a
single purchaser?
El 1 plot
El 2 plots
El 3 plots
El 4 plots
EJ5 plots
Elmore than 5 plots.
ElAs many as purchaser can
afford
7. DETERMINANTS OF PRICE OF PLOT
7.a What is the approximate range
of the price of a residential plot sold
by the stool or family?
(state amount range)
7.b Which of the following reflect
the pricing of your plots? 'Ti
El Price level for a number of
plots in a given time are
decided though bargaining
with purchasers may result in
some adjustments
El Price decided on individual
purchaser basis
ElPrices are decided
arbitrarily depending on what
Stool/family occupier thinks
best when a purchaser
comes forward.
El Other (please state)
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plot? IT.
7.c What factors does the
stool/family take into consideration
when deciding how much to sell a
74 Apart from price of land what
other payments do you receive from
a purchaser when he/she buys a
plot? (Tick as many as are
11 Prices achieved on stool's
previously sold lands
1J The state of development
on plots already sold by the
stool.
El Prices achieved by other
landowners nearby
El The number of people
approaching the stool in
relation to number of lands
we have available for sale
El Number of plots available
for sale by other owners
nearby
El Social status of purchaser
El Financial status of
purchaser
El Employment status of
purchaser
El Ethnic origin of purchaser
El Other (please state)
applicable) ST.
El Cost of demarcation and
pillaring
El Cost of preparing
documents/site plans
El Cost of processing
documents for registration
El Contribution towards cost of
constructing roads and other
infrastructure
El Other (please
specify)...........................
7.e In which of the following forms
do you receive payments for plots?
.T.
El Lump sum in cash
El Lump sum by cheque
El By cash instalments
El Instalments by cheque
El Payment in kind (i.e. in lieu
of services rendered;
exchange durable consumer
goods like cars etc.)
El Other form (please
state)......................
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8. LITIGATION
8.a How many land litigation(s) has
the stool/family been party to in the
last 40 odd years (i.e. since
independence)?
ElNone
Eli
El2
El3
El4
El More than 4
8.b Who was the other party to the
litigation (s)? ST.
El Not applicable
El Private individual (s).
El Stool or family.
El A section of this stool or
family.
El government agency.
El other (please specify)
8.c What caused the litigation(s)?
ST.
El Title dispute
El Boundary dispute
El Both title & boundary
El Compensation claims
El Other(please specify)
8.d Where was the litigation
settled?
El The litigation is not yet
settled.
El Formal judiciary system
El Traditional judiciary system
El Other (please specify)
8.e How long did the litigation last?
El Less than 1 year.
El i year.
El 2 years.
El years.
El years.
El years.
El Over 5 years.
El Litigation has not been
settled yet.
8.f How do you rate the government
machinery for settling land
disputes?
El Very satisfactory
El Satisfactory
El Not sure
El Unsatisfactory
El Very unsatisfactory
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9. GOVERNMENT PRESCRIPTIONS ON LAND SALES
9.a How do you comply with
government policy that stool lands
should be restricted to leases only?
El The stool is not aware of
this policy
El By making sure that plots
sold are documented as
leases even though we
receive the full market price
for a direct sale.
It is avoided by not
providing documents.
El Other please
specify...........................
9.b Are you aware that ground rents
in your leases are to be paid to a
government body not you?
El Yes
ElNo
9.c Are you aware that only 18% of
ground rents collected are to be
returned direct to the stool?
El Yes
ElNo
9.d Have you ever collected your
share of ground rents from the
appropriate government agency?
El Yes
ElNo
9.e Which of the following reflects
your view on government's
prescriptions on sale of stool/family
lands? 4
El The government attempts
to take away stool's lawful
income.
El The policy gives
government officials a
chance to interfere with stool
lands for their personal
benefit.
El Everyone knows the
government cannot enforce
this position.
El This particular government
policy doesn't matter: we
collect market price of lands
sold anyway.
El It is a good idea to ensure
occupiers of stools do not
squander the income
ElOther please specify ......
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10. COMPULSORY ACQUISITIONNESTING
1O.a Has any of the stool/family's
land been compulsorily acquired by
government?
El Yes
El No (go to 9.1O.h)
1O.b If yes when was the
acquisition made?
(approx. year).........................
1O.c Has compensation been paid?
El Yes
El No (go to 1.1O.e)
El Don't know (go to 1.1O.e)
1O.d If yes when was compensation
paid after the acquisition?
El Less than 1 year
El Between 1-2 years
El Between 2%-4 years
El Between 4% - 6 years
El Over 6 years
1Oe Did the Stool/family submit any
claims for compensation?
El Definitely yes
El Yes
EJ Not sure
EIN0
El Definitely no.
1O.f Did the stool/family make any
efforts to frustrate the acquisition?
El Definitely yes.
El Yes
El Not Sure
El No (go to 1.1O.h)
El Definitely No (go to 1.1O.h)
1O.g How was the acquisition
frustrated? 4
El By selling plots and
encouraging immediate
development.
ElBy harassing government
allottees to prevent them
from developing their plots.
ElBy taking government to
court
El By locating stool subjects
on unoccupied lands
ElOther please state
Continue at Q.1.1O.i
1O.h What would you do if you
suspected government was
planning to compulsorily acquire
your land?
El Sell plots and encourage
immediate development
ElHarass government
'allottees' to prevent them
from developing their plots.
El Take government to court
ElLocate stool subjects on
unoccupied lands
ElOther please state
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10.1 In general what is your view on
government's use of compulsory
acquisition to take lands from stools
or families to give out as
government lands?
liVery unfair
Unfair
Ii I don't have a view
Fair
liVery Fair
10.j Has any of the stool/family's
land been vested in the
government?
11 Yes
Ii No (go to 1.1O.m)
1O.k If yes is the stool or family
consulted by the Lands Commission
in deciding the allocation and sale of
such lands?
10.1 Has any revenues been
forwarded to the stool/family
concerning vested lands
Ii Yes
liNo
10.m In general what is your view
on government's use of vesting
legislation to take control of lands
from stools or families and allocate
as it deems fit?
liVery unfair
11 Unfair
Ii I don't have a view
Ii Fair
I] Very Fair
IiYes, always
IiYes on some occasions
Ii Not sure
Ii No, I don't think so.
11 Absolutely no.
If you want to offer any general comments on the land market in Accra please
provide it below.
Thank you very much for participating in this research 	 I
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APPENDIX 2B
l.a
CUSTOMARY SUPPLIERS RESPONSES
2ND STAGE ANALYSIS
1. GENERAL BACKGROUND
2. TITLE
2.a What type of documents does
the stool or family have on its
lands? .T.
Test of prevalence of formal tifie among
suppliers of land	 --
1. None (-4)
2. Statutory declaration (4)
3. Deed of gift (4)
4. Court judgement (2)
5. Lease (4)
6. other (please specify) (0)
2. b Where has the stool or family
registered title to its lands? .1.
Test of confidence in formal title I
1. Not registered (-4)
2. Lands Commission /Deeds
Registry (4)
3. Land Title registry (yellow
card) (4)
2.c Why did the stool or family
register its title documents? .1.
Perception of benefits of formal title
1. Not registered title (-4)
2. To comply with government
directives(1)
3. To protect interest against
counter claims (4)
4. To facilitate sale of lands (4)
5. To safeguard lands after
prolonged litigation (4)
6. Felt that it is appropriate to
register title to land (4)
7. Other please specify (0)
2. d Why is title to some or all
lands not registered? .1.
Test of perception of constraints of
obtaining formal title
1. Not applicable, stool has
registered title on all lands.
(0)
2. No knowledge about
registration (0)
3. Not necessary (-4)
4. Too expensive (-4)
5. Procedure too
cumbersome (-4)
6. Presented but
Lands/Deeds would not
register them (0)
7. Other (please specify) (0)
3. PHYSICAL DELINEATION AND PROTECTION OF LAND
among suppliers
3.a How are your lands
	
1. Surveyed and pillared.(4)
2. Boundaries determined bydemarcated on the ground? 4'	 landmarks (e.g. hills, trees,
Test of prevalence of cadastral surveys
	 streams, valleys, etc.) (-4)
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3. Boundaries determined by
extent of lands farmed by
subjects and/or authorised
'strangers'. (-4)
4. Other (please specify) (0)
3.b Why have you not taken steps
to have the land surveyed and/or
pillared? 4
Test of perception of benefits of
cadastral surveys among suppliers
1. Not applicable, our lands
are surveyed and/or
pillared. (0)
2. Don't know lands should be
surveyed and pillared. (0)
3. Can't get qualified
professionals to do it. (2)
4. Not necessary, can sell the
lands anyway. (-4)
5. Surveying and pillaring add
little to sale price. (-4)
6. Too expensive (-4)
7. Other (please specify) (0)
3. C How do you protect your lands
from being encroached upon? 'Ti
Test of confidence in utilising formal
institutions to enforce property rights in
landl
1. By employing land guards.
(-4)
2. Through regular
inspections by
representatives of
stool/family. (-4)
3. Permanent physical
presence of stool
subjects/authorised
'strangers' through farming
etc. ensures encroachment
impossible. (-4)
4. By relying on registered
documents on the lands
and prosecutions in court.
(4)
5. Other please state (0).
3.e If yes, what did you do? iT.
Test of confidence in utilising formal
institutions to enforce property rights II
1. Advise/warn them to move.
(-1)
2. Physically remove them. (-
4)
3. Made them pay the market
price of the land and stay
(0)
4. Took them to court (4)
5. Other please (0)
3.f When asked, which of the
following reasons do 'encroachers'
give for encroaching on your land?
4
I Test of causes of encroachment
1. Occupied the land on their
own initiative. (-4)
2. Bought land from another
purported owner (-4)
3. Obtained land from a
government agency (-4)
4. Authorised by a
government agency (-4)
5. Other (0)
3.g If no, what would you do if you
found encroachment on your land?
4
Test of perception of ability of formal
institutions in enforcing property rights
in land.
1. Advise/warn them to move
(-1)
2 Physically remove them (-
4)
3. Make them pay the market
price of the land and stay
(0)
4. Take them to court (4)
5. Other please state (0)
3. d
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4. MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES
-	 and pillared. (4)
4.a Which of the following factors 	 5. When roads are
trigger the stool/family's decision to	 constructed. (4)
- --o. L)rner(u)
sell lands? .7.
Test of economic rationality of
decisions of land sales
1. Enquiries made to
stool/family by the public for
land.(4)
2. Judged from sale by nearby
landowners.(4)
3. Suspicion of government
attempts to take control of
land. (4)
4. Prompts by officials in
government land agencies.
(4)
5. Desperate need of funds to
meet stool's liabilities. (4)
4.b
4.c Why doesn't the stool/family
has layouts approved? .7.
Test of perceived constraints in
complying with planning regulations.
1. The stool has layouts approved. (0)
2. No knowledge that layouts should
be approved. (-4)
3. Procedure too expensive.(-4)
4. Procedure too slow. (-4)
5. Procedure too cumbersome. (-4)
6. Not necessary. (-4)
7. Other (0)
4.d When does the stool or family
begin to sell its plots? .7.
Test - of compliance with planning
regulations
1. Plots are sold without
layouts (-4)
2. When layouts are prepared
but before approval. (-3)
3. When layouts are approved
by appropriate planning
authority. (4)
4. When plots are demarcated
4. e
4.f What factors does the stool or
family consider in deciding plot
sizes? .7.
Test of economic rationality of
parcelling land
1. Size of plots previously sold
by the stool/family. (3)
2. Size of plots sold by other
stools nearby. (3)
3. Size of government plots
nearby. (3)
4. Size considered affordable
by the average expected
purchaser. (4)
5. Town and Country planning
advice and practice. (2)
6. Other please (0)
4.g How does the stool/family
keep records of its land sales? .7.
Test of level of record keeping
1. lnaledger(4)
2. On a plan (4)
3. Other (0)
4.h Does the stool/family keep
copies of title documents provided
to purchasers?
Test of supplier's interest in ensuring
that terms of agreement are kept.
1. Not applicable, the stool
does not provide documents
to purchasers
2. Yes
3. No
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4.'
4 .j Why does double allocation
occur? ST.
Test of level of unscrupulousness in
land sales
1. Lack of records on orevious
sales (-4)
2. Oversight (-4)
3. Non-development by first
purchaser (-4)
4. Don't know, stool has no
experience of it. (0)
5. Other reasons (0)
5. COST OF ADMINISTRATION
6. CIRCUMSTANCES OF PLOT SALES
6.a
6.b From the day the stool is
approached, how long does it take
for a purchaser to be granted access
to plot?
Test of speed of supply in meeting
demand
1. Under 1 month
2. 1-3 months
3. 3.5-7 months
4. 7.5-9 months
5. 9.5 -12 months
6. Over 12 months
6.c Who qualifies for a plot?	 - -
Test of economic rationality of supply of
plots
1. Anybody interested and
prepared to pay the
appropriate price. (4)
2. Members of a specific family
(-4)
3. Members of a specific ethnic
group (please specify) (-4)
4. Other (0)
6. d How do you think purchasers
come to know about the
stool/family's plots? .T.
Test of flow of information in market
1. Introduced by a subject of
the stool/family.(4)
2. Introduced by a professional
attached to the stool/family.
(4)
3. Introduced by land agent.(4)
4. Introduced by officers at
government land
agencies.(4)
5. Purchasers approach directly
to inquire. (4)
6. Through advertisement by
the stool (newspapers, radio
TV etc.) (4)
7. Other (4)
6. e Which of the following are
good reasons why the stool does
not advertise its land sales in
newspapers, on radio, TV etc.? 4.
Test of efficiency of level of market
information provided.
1. Not applicable, the stool or
family advertises lands for
sale on TV, radio etc. (0)
2. Doesn't want to attract
attention of government. (-4)
3. Doesn't want to attract
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6.h
attention of parties disputing
stool/family's ownership. (-4)
4. Not necessary since
purchasers somehow come
to know eventually. (4)
5. None of the above. (0)
6. Other (0)
5 5 plots
6 morethan5plots.
7 As many as purchaser can
afford
6.1 Are there instances where a
purchaser who is prepared to pay
the relevant price is denied a plot?
Test of economic rationality of supply I
1. Definitely no (4)
2. No (2)
3. Not sure (0)
4. Yes (-2)
5. Definitely Yes (-4)
6.g What is the maximum number
of plots the stool/family will sell to a
single purchaser?
Test of economic rationality of supply II
1 1 plot
2 2 plots
3 3 plots
4 4 plots
7. DETERMINANTS OF PRICE OF PLOT
7.a
7. b Which of the following reflect
the pricing of your plots? 4
Test of economic rationality of pricing
1. Price level for a number of
plots in a given time are
decided though bargaining
with purchasers may result in
some adjustments (4)
2. Price decided on individual
purchaser basis (4)
3. Prices are decided arbitrarily
depending on what
Stool/family occupier thinks
best when a purchaser
comes forward. (-4)
4. Other (0)
7.c What factors does the
stool/family take into consideration
when deciding how much to sell a
plot? 4
Test of economic rationality II
1. Prices achieved on stool's
previously sold lands (4)
2. The state of development on
plots already sold by the
stool. (4)
3. Prices achieved by other
landowners nearby (4)
4. The number of people
approaching the stool in
relation to number of lands
we have avaitable for sale (4)
5. Number of plots available for
sale by other owners nearby
(4)
6. Social status of purchaser (-
4)
7. Financial status of purchaser
(0)
8. Employment status of
purchaser (-4)
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9. Ethnic origin of purchaser (-
4)
1O.Other (0)
7. d Apart from price of land what
other payments do you receive from
a purchaser when he/she buys a
plot? (Tick as many as are
applicable) iT.
Test of quoted price as indicator of
clearing price
1. Cost of demarcation and
pillaring (-4)
2. Cost of preparing
documents/site plans(-4)
3. Cost of processing
documents for registration (-
4)
4. Contribution towards cost of
constructing roads and other
infrastructure (-4)
5. Other (0)
7.e In which of the following forms
do you receive payments for plots?
.7.
Test of flexibility of payment - customer
orientation
1. Lump sum in cash (4)
2. Lump sum by cheque (4)
3. By cash instalments (4)
4. Instalments by cheque (4)
5. Payment in kind (i.e. in lieu
of services rendered;
exchange durable consumer
goods like cars etc.) (4)
6. Otherform(0)
8. LITIGATION
8.a How many land litigation(s) has
the stool/family been party to in the
last 40 odd years (i.e. since
independence)?
Test of level of disputes of supplier's
title.
1. None
2. 1
3. 2
4. 3
5. 4
6. More than 4
8.b Who was the other party to the
litigation (s)? 4
Test of society's recognition of
supplier's title.
1. Not applicable (0)
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2. Private individual (s). (-4)
3. Stool or family. (-4)
4. A section of this stool or family. (-4)
5. government agency. (-4)
6. other(0)
8.c What caused the litigation(s)?
A
Test of causes of disputes
1. Title dispute (-4)
2. Boundary dispute (-4)
3. Both title & boundary (-4)
4. Compensation claims (-4)
5. Other(0)
84 Where was the litigation
settled?
Test of confidence in formal judiciary
system.
1. The litigation is not yet
settled. (0)
2. Formal judiciary system (4)
3. Traditional judiciary system
(-4)
4. Other(0)
8. e
8.f How do you rate the government
machinery for settling land
disputes?
Test of perception of formal institutions
settling land disputes
1. Very satisfactory (4)
2. Satisfactory (2)
3. Not sure (0)
4. Unsatisfactory (-2)
5. Very unsatisfactory (-4)
9. GOVERNMENT PRESCRIPTIONS ON LAND SALES
9.a How do you comply with
government policy that stool lands
should be restricted to leases only?
Impact of leasing prescription.
1. The stool is not aware of this
policy (-4)
2. By making sure that plots
sold are documented as
leases even though we
receive the full market price
for a direct sale. (-4)
3. It is avoided by not providing
documents. (-4)
4. Other (0)
9.b
9. c
9. d Which of the following reflects
your view on government's
prescriptions on sale of stool/family
lands? it.
Test	 of	 perception	 on	 lease
prescription.
1. The government attempts to
take away stool's lawful
income. (-4)
2. The policy gives government
officials a chance to interfere
with stool lands for their
personal benefit. (-4)
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3. Everyone knows the
government cannot enforce
this position. (-4)
4. This particular government
policy doesn't matter: we
collect market price of lands
sold anyway. (-4)
5. It is a good idea to ensure
occupiers of stools do not
squander the income (-4)
6. Other (0)
10. COMPULSORY ACQUISITIONNESTING
10.a
10.b
10. C
10.d
10. e
10.f Did the stool/family make any
efforts to frustrate the acquisition?
Test of feuding between formal and
informal institutions
1. Definitely yes.(4)
2. Yes(2)
3. Not Sure (0)
4. No (-2)
5. Definitely No (-4)
1 0. g How was the acquisition
frustrated? .T.
Indicator of feuding between formal and
informal system
1. By selling plots and
encouraging immediate
development. (4)
2. By harassing government
allottees to prevent them
from developing their plots.
(4)
3. By taking government to
court (4)
4. By locating stool subjects on
unoccupied lands (4)
5. Other (4)
10.h What would you do if you
suspected government was planning
to compulsorily acquire your land?
Test of perception on the feuding
between formal and informal system
1. Sell plots and encourage
immediate development (4)
2. Harass government
allottees' to prevent them
from developing their plots.
(4)
3. Take government to court
4. Locate stool subjects on
unoccupied lands (4)
5. Other (4)
10.! In general what is your view on
government's use of compulsory
acquisition to take lands from stools
or families to give out as
government lands?
Test of perception on use of
compulsory acquisition powers
1. Very unfair (-4)
2. Unfair (-2)
3. I don't have a view (0)
4. Fair (2)
5. Very Fair (4)
10.j
1O.k
10.1
10.m In general what is your view
on government's use of vesting
legislation to take control of lands
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from stools or families and allocate
as it deems fit?
Test of perception of use of vesting
legislation
1. Very unfair (-4)
2. Unfair (-2)
3. I don't have a view(0)
4. Fair (2)
5. Very Fair (4)
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APPENDIX 3A
Code No.....
I	 PROPERTY CONSULTANTS QUESTIONNAIRE 	 I
QUALIFIED RESPONDENT
To be completed by qualified property professional (GIS, RICS or equivalent
qualification) in the company.
OBJECTIVES
To ascertain the perception of consultants on the level of efficiency of the market in
which they operate as an indirect way of assessing efficiency gains brought about by
professional private consultants in the market. Specifically:
1. To assess consultants' view on problems of the land/property market in Accra.
2. To investigate the environment in which consultants operate in the land/property
markets in Accra.
3. To assess the level of professionalism with which consultants operate in the market.
NAMEOF COMPANY.......................................................................
NAMEOF RESPONDENT................................................................
DATEOF COMPLETION.....................................................................
Request
Please do your best to provide as accurate a response as possible to the questions.
The provision of accurate answers is a priority for the success of this research
This research is jointly funded by the Royal Institution of Chartered surveyors
(RICS), UK and Na pier University, UK. Any related correspondence should be
forwarded to the principal researcher:
Yaw Adarkwah Antwi BSc (Hons) Dip (Cantab) MA ARICS
Lecturer in Property Valuation and Investment Appraisal
School of the Built Environment
Na pier University
10 Colinton Road
Edinburgh EHIO 5DT
U.K.
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INSTRUCTION FOR COMPLETION OF QUESTIONAIRE
A .T.at the end of a question indicates that a choice of more than one of the possible
answers provided is acceptable. In all other cases one (and only one) possible
answer should be chosen. Relevant answers should be indicated with a tick (') in the
appropriate box(es).
1. Background Company Information
l.a How many people are employed in your company (include all
supporting staff)
El Less than 5 people
	
1115-20
El 5-10	 El Over 20
10-15
l.b How many of your employees are qualified property or real estate
staff (surveyors or valuers etc.)
El1
	
[18-10
112-4
	
El Over 10
El5-7
l.c How long has the firm been operating as real estate (property)
consultants?
El Less than 3 years
	 1110%-i 5years
El3-5 years
	
ElOver i5years
El 5%-iD years
l.d How would you describe the company's main areas of practice? .7.
11 Valuation advise for
individual private clients
El Valuation advise for private
companies
Valuation advise for
government departments
El Estate management (letting,
rent collection etc.) for
individual private clients.
El Estate management (letting,
rent collection etc.) for
private companies.
ElEstate management (letting,
rent collection etc.) for
government department.
ElEstate agency (i.e.
arranging sales or purchase
of property for clients)
ElProcessing and registration
of title documents for clients
El Other (please
specify)...........................
227
I.e As fee income provider to your firm, rate the following on a scale of I
to 6, where I indicates least provider and 5 most provider? .7.
J Government/Quasi- Government
Department
J Foreign company/agency
] Private Ghanaian Company
[	 ] Private foreign individual
[	 ] Private Ghanaian individual
( ] Other (please state)
If Over the past 12 months which of the following has provided you with
the single biggest fee income?
I GovernmentiQuasi-
Government Department
El Foreign company/agency
El Private Ghanaian Company
El Private foreign individual
El Private Ghanaian individual
El Other (please state)
1.g How did you win your biggest fee earning job in the past 12 months.'.
El Company was retained by
client from previous work
El Through competitive tender
El Through introduction by
another client/colleague etc.
El Through lobbying in
appropriate departments
El Approached by client direct
El Other(please specify)
1.h As users of private property (real estate) consultant's services in
Accra, rank the following from 1, least user to 5 most user
El Govern ment/Quasi-
Government Departments
put together
ElForeign companies and
agencies put together
El Private Ghanaian
Companies put together
El Private foreign individuals
put together
El Private Ghanaian
individuals put together
El Other (please state)
1.1 Property (real estate) consultancy in Accra is plagued by the level of
political lobbying by a substantial number of professional firms, Is this
statement
El Definitely True	 El False
El True	 El Definitely false
El Don't know
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1.j Property (real estate) consultancy in Accra is plagued by the level of
unprofessional behaviour by a substantial number of professional
firms. Is this statement
El Definitely true	 El False
El True	 El Definitely false
El Don't know
2. Land Price Information
2.a How much is a typical residential plot in stool/family land areas of
Accra where there are no disputes (i.e. when Lands will process
documents)? (state price range) ....................................
2.b How much is a typical residential plot in a stool/family land areas of
Accra where Lands would not process documents? (state price
range) ...........................................
2.c How much is a typical residential government plot sold by the original
governmentallotte ?(state price range) ...........................................
2.d Rank the following from the least important (1) to the most important
factor (10) in determining land prices in Accra.
Location of Land
] Whether or not Lands will
process documents
] Whether or not site has
layout
] Whether or not layout is
approved
] Level of development of
area
] Record of stool/family
concerning double allocation
] Record of stool/family
concerning litigation.
] Whether or not access
roads are available
] Whether or not electricity
is nearby
] Whether or not pipe water
is nearby.
2.e How do you rate comparables held by Lands Commission Secretariat
and Land Valuation Board in relation to prices actually paid by parties to
land transactions?
El Very reliable	 El Unreliable
El Reliable	 ElVery unreliable
El Not sure
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11 Comparables are equal to
or above actual market
prices.
111-10% below
1121-50% below
1151-100% below
11 Over 100% below
11 11-20% below
2.f In general, how far below market prices are comparables kept by
Lands Commission Secretariat & Land Valuation Board?
2.g When undertaking valuations, which of the following do you rely on
for comparables? .1.
11 Not applicable we don't
undertake valuations.
11 Comparables from
government land agencies
(e.g. Lands Commission and
Land Valuation Board)
11 Comparables from
surveying colleagues in
private firms.
Comparables from in-firm
database of past transactions
1 Comparables gathered from
the field by in-firm personnel.
11 Other sources (please
state) ..............................
2.h Which of the following non-economic factors would you say
stools/families take into consideration in determining prices in land
transactions in Accra? sY.
1 Purchasers' employment	 11 Purchasers' social status
status	 1 None of the above
11 Purchasers' ethnic origin	
11Other (please state)
11 Purchasers' financial status
3. Market Problems
3.a In purchasing land for residential development in the city, rank the
following from 1, the least, to 5, the most problematic stage.
(	 ] Processing the title
documents in Lands
Department.
[ ] Processing the title
documents in Land Title
Registry
[ ] Obtaining information on
the right owner of particular
lands
[ ] Negotiating with owner on
price and other terms of the
transaction.
[ ] Getting owner to grant
access to the land.
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3.b The following problems are generally associated with the
land/property market in Accra. Rank them from least serious (1) to most
serious problem (10).
[	 J Problems caused by
general interference of
government departments in
land transactions.
[	 ] Problems caused by the
customary land system which
does not allow private
individual ownership of land.
[	 ] Problems resulting from
double sales of lands by
traditional owners
(	 ] Problems resulting from
documentation and registration
systems.
[	 ] Problems resulting from
the absence of easily
accessible database on
land/property ownership.
[	 ] Problems concerning the
lack of clarity of title resulting
from the segmentation of the
market into stool/family and
government lands.
[	 ] Problems resulting from
the general lack of formally
registered documents on
lands/properties available in
the market.
[ ] Problems of unresolved
title disputes between stools,
families and government.
[	 ] Problems resulting from
the ineffectiveness of courts in
resolving land disputes
] Other problems
4. Title Documentation
4.a How long, (without 'following up'), does it take to process documents
on stool/family lands via the Lands Commission system?
11 Can't tell, it is so variable	 El Between 1-2 years
11 Less than 3 months	 El Between 2%-3 years
11 Between 3-6 months	 El Between 31,45 years
El Between 7-12 months	 El Over 5 years
4.b How long, (without 'following up'), does it take to process documents on
stool/family lands via the Land Title Registration system?
El Can't tell it is so variable	 El Between 1-2 years
El Less than 3 months	 El Between 2% -3 years
El Between 3-6 months	 El Between 31/5 years
El Between 7-12 months	 Over 5 years
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4.c What is your estimate of the total cost of processing title documents
on stool lands through the Lands Commission system (including 'tips'
etc. exclude stamp duty)" .............................................
4.d What is your estimate of the total cost of processing title documents
on stool lands through the Land Title Registration system (including
'tips' etc. exclude stamp duty)" .............................................
Corn ments
Thank you for your time.
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APPENDIX 3B2	 LI
LANDS (MISCELLANEOUS SERViCES) FEES
INSTRUMENT I
xerc Se o U pers con'rea on tn
	 a:Js C irn ssi
	 by sction 21(2) of tne
ar is Comm s on
	 934	 483) S !str c' made ti S
: : ees payable for specific land related services
c fLS	 J n cc in 2 ot c CL	 o i S I strument sha,i be pad fl
r :ect of te services specf.ed •n reaton to thm n cc; :mn 1 of he SChCCUC
Fevocat ion
2.	 The follcw:n g
 instruments are hereby revoKed -
Administration of Lands (Amendment) Rgutations 1978 (L.I. 1142)
State Lads An-enivant) Regulat:cns 
. 973 LJ 1i64.
SCHEDULE
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Service	 Fee
For p ot j ur	 'u' ee o to	 r s:	 ent
a	 'c o	 :	 .os	 n1 p t cf a	 >t uCO i3
son
For pocessirg p ottng or 000Lrrarce fc	 cn ntnert
fo	 res deiti s i	 a a t	 c's	 0.050 of the
is us o the
and
Fc p ottn1J or c r -renca c- co: fr	 nsrmen of
sry eri	 cot -c-ca	 Lst	 n .o'-o 'os so or	 c50 COO CO
onnn-' C1fl.1.
I 4
	
For process rg octtnc or oc;curreice	 nstrument	 0.05% of the
for a commercial or :ndu:.r a! and (ma re thnn one ac re	 value of tre
and
S
S
7
For orocessing. cotiiO c ooncLrrence for caon instrument
in respect of resientta! ccmmerc5i or id',' r iol and (any
sad t on: sore or a cart : an acre I
Fo in aect on of and -
i )
	
witnin a regional cao;tal - tra.sport charge
outside a regonal captal - trai.sport charge
Provision on request of any site advisory service relating to
compulsory acquisition of land
1% of the alje
of the land
10, 000.00
20, 000. 00
ninimum
300, 000.00
8
	
On presentation for plotting and concurrence for each
	
40,000.00
instrument
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9	 For preparat on and p ocessng of a ledse for res dent al
industr al or commercial purposes State and vested lands)
1C	 Residential lease preparation and processing v k ere the
Lands Commission prepares the lease in respect of stool
lards
11
	
Processing fees for consent to mortgage a residential,
industrial or commercial leasehold
1 00,000.00
ci 00,000.00
p20,000.00
12
	
Processing fees for consent to assign or sublet the vho'e of
a residental, industrial or commercial leasenold	 d30,000.00
13
	
For preparation of a lease fora petrol filling station on public plOo,000 00
land
14
	
For preparation of any licence for any temporary use of
	 50,QQQQQ
public land
15
	
For preparation and processing of a lease in respect of land
	 50,000.O0
for agricultural purpose
16
	
Processing and plotting of land the ownership of which is 	 33.3% of the
declared by statutory declaration	 total cost of 3
publications in
the newspaper
MRS. 1
CHAIRMAN, LANDS MMISSION
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